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Abstract 
 
 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) along with other agreements was 
concluded in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1994. However, 
negotiations continued within the WTO framework  and are still a work in progress on 
some specific issues under the GATS including the question of Emergency Safeguard 
Measures, which has been raised in Article X of the GATS as part of its ‘built-in 
agenda’.   
The thesis looks at the concept of the Emergency Safeguards Measures (ESMs) in the 
GATT/WTO and tries to develop an answer to the ‘question of ESMs’, which is 
deluding the negotiators and researchers for more than fifteen years.    The thesis tries to 
analyse whether the GATT type ESMs can be transposed to GATS.  It also explores that 
whether ESMs that are modelled on GATT are feasible under GATS, and if feasible, are 
these really desirable. If these are feasible and desirable then what should be their 
possible structure remaining within the existing GATT paradigm.      The thesis walks 
through the provisions that already exist in the GATS to meet the circumstances 
perceived by the countries that are seeking specific ESMs under GATS and whether 
these provisions address the concerns of the demanders of the concept.  
The thesis not only takes into account the academic and legal literature on the subject 
but also and perhaps more practically, takes into account the dynamics of the 
negotiations, discussions and debates within the WTO system on the subject.  The thesis 
tries to provide an in-depth analysis of the issue and goes beyond what is already 
available in the International Trade Law literature on the ESMs under the cross border 
trade in services.   It seeks to answer a question that presently exists in the International 
Trade Law especially with reference to the law emerging out of WTO. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Chapter Introduction  
 
The Chapter starts by providing a summary of the thesis. It then moves on to detail the 
background and the real world trading environment against which it has been written 
especially with reference to the existence of provisions for application of Emergency 
Safeguards Measures (ESM) in the international trade agreements.   Identifies the gap that 
exists in the legal literature and also as an unfinished business under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services and the objective of the thesis as an effort to bridge that 
gap.  After providing the basic rationale for writing the thesis, the chapter then goes on to 
give a broad outline and details the manner in which the thesis has been structured.  
 
The Chapter also introduces the subsequent Chapters of the thesis. These latter Chapters 
have been organized in terms of the progression of the thought processes with respect to the 
ESMs. Their structure start from introduction of the concept of ESMs under the original 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and its evolution leading up to conclusion 
of the Agreement on Safeguards and finally leading up to the conclusions.  
.   
1.2 BACKGROUND: LANDSCAPE   
 
  The contemporary rule based liberalized international trading regime, does not allow the 
importing country to unilaterally and impulsively alter its committed market access 
conditions. The relatively low barriers to cross border trade and rise in  the quantum of 
imports  because of  liberalized market access conditions in specified circumstances 
provide justification to the importing countries to apply some sort of exceptional import 
restraints  that are commonly known as ‘contingency protection’. As the term suggests the 
concept of ‘contingency protection’ covers the “protection provided to the domestic 
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businesses against foreign competition … by restricting imports; however, provision of this 
protection is contingent on something that may occur
1”.  
 
 This concept in the context of contemporary international trade and economic law 
predominantly refers to trade restrictive measures that are taken by governments mainly to 
counteract injury or threat thereof to domestic producers that is understood to have arisen 
primarily from the increased imports. The ‘contingency protection provisions’, that are at 
times also referred to as ‘trade remedy measures’,  are now an essential and integral 
component of most of the post-World War II International Trade Agreements that govern 
the global trade and economic liberalization process and also the conduct of  the rule based 
cross border trade in goods and more recently also in services.  The concept provides 
incorporation of provisions or remedies in the International Trade Agreements which 
enables the importing country to impose import restrictions that are contingent on 
occurrence of certain specified situations and circumstances. The imposition of restrictions 
on conduct of trade under these provisions are authorized and covered by the Agreements 
that essentially aim for trade liberalization and governance of this liberalized trade.   These 
trade remedy provisions are basically intended to discourage countries that are signatories 
to any International Trade Agreement governing conduct international trade under a 
liberalized regime from taking any extra-legal measures in an emergency situation that is 
outside the scope of the Agreement and which in its implementation process can jeopardize 
the Agreement itself. The provisions are thus an effort to ensure that the management of the 
conduct of International Trade stays within prescribes of the agreed disciplines.  
 
  The GATT/WTO legal framework assigns definite meanings and understanding to the 
concept of contingency protection wherein “the term trade remedy laws refer to three types 
of national laws that impose trade restrictions under specified conditions”2.  In principle the 
GATT/WTO rules permit countries to take contingency protection measures in two types of 
situations.   Firstly the governments are permitted to come to the rescue of their domestic 
production or manufacturing facilities that are suffering injury or threat thereof when 
foreign suppliers engage in an unfair competition. Behaviour that can lead to such unfair 
                                               
1
 Garner Bryan A, Black’ Law Dictionary Thomson Reuters 2009, p 362 & 1343 
2
 Research Handbook in International Economic Law, Edited Andrew Guzman and Alan O Sykes Edward 
Elgar, USA, 2007.p 62 
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competition in itself can be in two forms; i) it could result when foreign suppliers charge 
lower than normal prices for their goods because of the ‘subsidies’ the producers or 
manufacturers are receiving from their government; or ii) because the producers or 
exporters are ‘dumping goods’ in the market of the importing country.    The goods can, 
however, only be treated as to have been dumped if the criterion laid down in the Article 2 
of the WTO’s Agreement on Antidumping3 have been established and the corrective 
actions contemplated can also be taken strictly in terms of the Agreement.  Likewise, 
countervailing duties can be levied by an importing country on the goods that are receiving 
some benefit that may be classified as subsidies that defined as defined in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
4
.   The Countervailing action has 
also to fully observe the disciplines prescribed under the Agreement.  A country is also 
allowed to ‘escape’ or to put it in other words ‘depart’ from its trade liberalization 
obligations undertaken by the country through inclusion in its schedule of market access 
commitments in certain specified situations even when nothing unfair has transpired in the 
conduct of trade.   
 In GATT/WTO parlance these ‘provisions’  that allow a signatory country to ‘escape’ 
from its market access obligations under the Agreement are generally referred to as 
‘safeguards measures’.  However, the application of the safeguards measures is only 
possible when the conditions prescribed in the WTO Agreements for the use of the ‘escape 
clause’ provision have been reached.   A Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
thus has the conditional flexibility to depart from its previously agreed-upon legally 
binding obligations. This flexibility in practical terms implies that the Member can either 
withdraw or modify a tariff or a non-tariff market access concession granted by the 
Member so as to avoid a material adverse effect of some kind to the producers of like or 
competitive products
5
 within the national territory of that Member and which is caused by 
an otherwise normal and fair import competition.  “The heart of the original GATT bargain 
in 1947 involved the reciprocal reduction of tariff rates, and negotiated ceilings or 
                                               
3
 World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, The Legal Texts,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1999, p 147 
4
 World Trade Organisation, The Legal Texts, The Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1999, p 231 
5
 World Trade Organisation, Agreement on Safeguards (Article 2), The Legal Texts, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 1999, p 275  
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‘bindings’ on tariffs governed by GATT article II. The drafters of GATT anticipated that 
tariff concessions might become unexpectedly burdensome as a particular matter, however, 
and provided two principal mechanisms for the adjustments of tariffs commitments. GATT 
Article XXVIII provides for the renegotiations of tariff commitments once every three 
years, as well as for ‘out of season’ renegotiations under special circumstances authorised 
by the membership. In addition, the drafters provided for ‘emergency action on imports of 
particular products’ in GATT Article XIX, a provision that addressed unexpected import 
surges
6”.  
   
   In addition to the ‘emergency or general safeguards’ there are other special safeguards 
that are applied only to specific category of imported products; for instance Article 5 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture and Article 6 ‘transitional safeguards’ of now defunct 
Agreement on Textile and Clothing.  However, Article XIX
7
 of the GATT is the most 
important of all the permitted exceptions to compliance with the positive market access 
commitments that are made by the member countries under GATT and is titled as 
‘Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products’.  “Article XIX is also often termed 
as the GATT ‘escape clause’, as it allows GATT members to ‘escape’ from their tariff 
commitments (and other obligations) under specified circumstances
8”.  The ‘emergency 
actions’ taken by the Member countries under the provisions of this Article came to be 
known as Emergency Safeguard Measures.  
 The provisions of Article XIX are not completely unique, there is a whole array of other 
Articles in the General Agreement
9
  and also in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
World Trade Organisation “which can be made to fall under the rubric of safeguards10”.    
The broader ‘safeguards complex11’ includes provisions which permit members to 
                                               
6
 Research Handbook in International Economic Law, Edited Andrew Guzman and Alan O Sykes Edward 
Elgar, USA, 2007. P 62 
7
 All Article numbers mentioned in this chapter indicate Articles numbers of GATT 1994 unless otherwise 
stated or implied. 
8
 Research Handbook in International Economic Law, Edited Andrew Guzman and Alan O Sykes Edward 
Elgar, USA, 2007. P 63 
9
 The text of the Agreement is hereafter referred to as the ‘General Agreement’ and the institution is 
addressed as GATT  
10
 Bhala Raj, Modern GATT Law, a Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2005. p. 939 
11
 Some of the other safeguard clauses in the General Agreement include Article VI (permits the imposition of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties); Article XII ( permits the imposition of import restrictions in order to 
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withdraw from their trade policy obligations under the Agreement on WTO but only under 
agreed disciplines and under certain specified situations mentioned in the General 
Agreement and the Agreement establishing the WTO. Implementation of Article XIX of 
the General Agreement right from its early days had many conceptual and interpretive 
concerns, but these concerns received little attention of the Members during the period 
prior to Tokyo Round (1973-79) of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs).  
  
  In the pre-Tokyo round period the membership structures of the GATT and pattern of 
international trade flows were fairly different from the current structures and during the 
period an exporting country rarely challenged an application of any emergency safeguard 
measures that was applied by an importing country primarily because; i) the dispute 
settlement system under GATT, before conclusion in 1988 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)
12
 within the framework of Uruguay Round (UR)of MTNs, was very 
tedious and often gridlocked; and ii) there were almost constant on-going tariff negotiations 
amongst the CONTRACTING PARTIES
13
 to GATT under the six rounds of MTNs which 
preceded the Tokyo Round of MTNs.  The issues and concerns with coherent application of 
the ESMs had by the launch of the Tokyo Round
14
 attained enough significance to the 
included in the agenda of MTNs. The Tokyo Declaration provided for the MTNs to 
“include an examination of the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard system, considering 
particularly the modalities of application of Article XIX, with a view to furthering trade 
liberalization and preserving its results
15”.  Despite intensive efforts made in the final 
stages there was little substantive movement forward in the area of Safeguards in the Tokyo 
                                                                                                                                               
safeguard a contracting party's external financial position and its balance-of-payments); Article XVIII ( 
permits contracting parties the economies of which can only support low standards of living and are in the 
early stages of development to impose tariff and import restrictions); Article XX ( permits actions to 
safeguard public morals, health and safety); Article XXI (permits action to protect essential security 
interests); Article XXVIII (permits contracting parties to renegotiate concessions in GATT schedules); and 
Article XXXV (permits the non-application of the General Agreement between particular contracting parties).  
Article IX.3 of the Marrakech Agreement establishing WTO also provides room for waiving the obligations. 
Then there are other sector or Agreement specific safeguards like  Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
12
 Dispute Settlement Understanding; Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation was agreed and implemented in 1988.  
13
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in its Article XXV clarifies that whenever the contracting parties 
(individually) act jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the thesis is however relaxed 
about this subtle differentiations. (text in the bracket added).  
14
 The Tokyo Round was the seventh round of MTNs that was held under the auspices of GATT during 1973-
79 and 102 countries participated.  
15
 The Tokyo declaration issued after the Ministerial meeting laid the agenda and launched the new round of 
MTNs (14 September 1973), Clause 3 (d) 
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Round MTNS and it was not possible to reach any agreement. Declaration issued at the 
conclusion of the GATT 1982 Ministerial meeting in its paragraph 7(vi), recognized that 
“there is need for an improved and more efficient safeguard system which provides for 
greater predictability and clarity and also greater security and equity for both importing and 
exporting countries, so as to preserve the results of trade liberalization and avoid the 
proliferation of restrictive measures”. The CONTRACTING PARTIES in launching of the 
eighth Round of MTNS at Punta Del Este agreed to negotiate “a comprehensive agreement 
on safeguards (that) is of particular importance to the strengthening of the GATT system 
and to progress in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations”16.   In short, the deficiencies in the 
provisions of the Article XIX and also in the related GATT practices led to the negotiations 
and conclusion of the Agreement on Safeguards during the Uruguay Round.  
 
  The decisions reached by the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body while interpreting key 
provisions of the Agreement on Safeguard logically should have developed jurisprudence 
on the subject but these decisions failed to articulate any coherent doctrine as to exactly 
how and when safeguard measures are allowable.  The high rate of disputes and successful 
challenge by the exporting countries to any application of an ESM by an importing country 
signifies the apparent inability of Members to comply with the GATT rules that were seen 
by the importing countries to warrant an application of an Emergency Safeguards Measure.  
Alternatively, it can be deduced that the rules themselves may have been so structured or 
were interpreted by the Panels and the Appellate Body (AB) in such a manner so as to 
cause considerable difficulties for Members to comply with them and thus be reluctant to 
make use of the ‘escape clause’ provisions unnecessarily.    Instead of “providing useful 
guidance for the resolution of textual conundrum arising out of the weakness of the 
negotiated text of the Agreement combined with  the decisions on the disputed cases makes 
it all the time more difficult for WTO members to apply safeguard measures. Every 
emergency safeguards measure that has been taken by any member country and that has 
been challenged under the DSU of the WTO has been ruled either by the Panel or by the 
AB to be in violation of the WTO law”17.   
 
                                               
16
 World Trade Organisation Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986, Part 1, Section D 
17
 Sykes Alan O, The safeguards mess: a critique of WTO jurisprudence, World Trade Review (2003), 2: 3, 
261–295  
CHAPTER 1                          
 7 
The role of the ‘civil society’ in the conduct of national and international affairs and 
economic relations has also gradually increased in the recent past and in certain instances 
the civil society influences the international trade flows between the countries more 
meaningfully than the border measure scheduled by the importing country in its market 
access commitments.  The existence of required conditions for application of one of the 
three possible trade remedy mechanisms aside there is now also an emerging recognition of 
need for creation of space with respect to accommodation of the concerns of the civil 
society in conduct of international trade, but in its existing architecture there are “no public 
interest dimensions to the WTO; at best, WTO bodies (Panels and AB) can decide, or not, 
that a national public interest measure that has trade restrictive effects is consistent with 
WTO law
18”.  Important opinion formers initiative and now starting to propose the 
broadening of the concepts safeguards measures and adding of a new public policy 
dimensions to the conduct of international trade under the WTO Agreements.   Pascal 
Lamy
19
 in one of his presentations has proposed addition to the existing safeguards regime 
a new dimension of the public policy
20
 concerns that will imply possible broadening of the 
concept of emergency safeguards through introduction of concepts like ‘collective 
preference
21’.   Lamy is not alone to have such a strand of thought, “other analysts have 
also suggested the need to expand the availability of a safeguard for national policies. The 
proposals are, however, silent whether this should be done by expanding the framework of 
the WTO through a new Agreement covering ‘public policy’ concerns or expansion of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and incorporating these ‘public policy’ concerns as one of the 
conditions for application of Emergency Safeguards along with simplified application 
criteria.  
                                               
18
Sara Dillon,  International Trade And Economic Law And The European Union, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2002. P. 4. 
19
 Pascal Lamy is presently the Director General of the WTO and prior to that he was Trade Commissioner of 
the EU. 
20
 Lamy Pascal speech, “Co-Existence between Public Policy and Free Trade: Can We Achieve Good 
Protectionism?” Conference of the Greens/European Free Alliance at the European Parliament, Brussels, 5 
March 2004.  . 
21
Lamy Pascal speech, “Collective Preferences and Global Governance: What future for the Multilateral 
Trading System”,Brussels,15 September,2004,   
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1.3 THESIS INTRODUCTION 
 Despite some improvements in the AoS, over GATT Article XIX provisions, ambiguities 
and serious apprehensions still exist with respect to practical application of an ESM by an 
importing country that need to be addressed in order to ensure the integrity of the 
multilateral system governing the application of ESMs.   These concerns include the 
inability of the DSB to construct a coherent interpretation of the AOS, possible re-
emergence of the use of prohibited ‘grey area measures22’ and the failure of domestic 
safeguard regimes of most member countries including some major WTO Members to 
comply with the multilaterally agreed disciplines on safeguards.    Even with the 
transformation of Article XIX into the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards23, the increase 
which is visible in the use of some other GATT/WTO sanctioned trade remedy instruments 
is not reflected in the use of emergency safeguards provisions
24
.   
  The conclusion of the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) under the UR (1986 – 95) to some 
extent revived the use of Emergency Safeguard Measures (ESMs) and subsequently several 
disputes with respect to application of ESMs were brought under the DSU. The number of 
application of safeguard measure in the aftermath of WTO’s coming into operation 
suggests that the member countries are trying to evade use of the ESMs and are instead 
choosing other available ‘trade remedy instruments’ like ‘antidumping measures’ as it is 
much easier and flexible to use as it can be applied in a discriminatory and unilateral 
manner and the country applying the measure does not need to compensate the affected 
party. These pre-requisites or conditions for application of these measures may be different 
but in practice there is, however, always a fair amount of “interdependency of protective 
devices, as well as dispute settlement dynamics which contribute to the incentive structure 
for WTO members to pick and use from various trade restrictions
25’.     
 The GATT covered only international trade in goods. However, the post-World War II 
growth and constantly increasing importance of the services sector for major economies of 
                                               
22
 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Background Note by the GATT Secretariat, "Grey-Area" 
Measures, Document No: MTN.GNG/NG9/W/6, 16 September 1987 
23
 This aspect has been discussed in some detail in Chapter 3.  
24
 LEE Yong-Shik, Revival of Grey-Area Measures? The US–Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement: Conflict 
with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, Journal of World Trade 36(1): 155–165, 2002. 
25
 Kent Jones, The safeguards mess revisited: the fundamental problem, World Trade Review (2004), 3: 1, 
83–91.  
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the free world led to some, “isolated attempts that were confined to specific issues 
(insurance and transport) were made as early as in late 1950s
26”.  It was realized in 1970s 
that internationally agreed disciplines of cross border trade were also required to be 
developed for the services sector on the pattern of those which were already available for 
international trade in goods.   Drawing from the decisions contained in declaration issued at 
the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of MTNs, initiatives towards a possible multilaterally 
agreed agreement covering cross border trade in services were taken in early 1980s
27
.  In 
1984 the US   called for inclusion of trade in services on the trade agenda and development 
of a framework of rules for international trade in services. The “US proposal was supported 
by the Israel, Canada and the Nordics and opposed by countries like India, Argentina, 
Brazil and Cuba
28”.  A number of fundamental principles contained in the General 
Agreement as its central provisions to the treaty were also recognised as to be successfully 
applicable to trade in goods, these included concepts such as market access, transparency, 
MFN and national treatment.  
  The negotiations on Agreement for international trade in services were eventually 
included in the Agenda of the Uruguay Round (UR) of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTNs). The Punta Del Este Ministerial declaration of 1986, which launched the Uruguay 
Round of MTNs. This inclusion was bitterly opposed by some major developing countries 
like Brazil, India, and Yugoslavia. A separate group for negotiations on cross border trade 
in services was established “with a view to expansion of such trade under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization”29. The five point agenda for the initial phase of 
negotiations included: i) definition of services and gathering of services data on services; ii) 
establishment of the broad concepts …; iii) a multilateral framework ..; iv) determination of  
existing disciplines and arrangements to trade in services; and v) establishment of 
regulatory framework…”30   
                                               
26
 Macrory Patrick F J, Arthur E Appleton, Michel G Plummer (Ed), The World Trade Organization, Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis, Volume I, International Law Institute, Springer, USA 2005 p. 803 
27
 The decision of GATT Ministerial Meeting held in 1982 in the context of “SERVICES”.. 
28
Macrory Patrick F J, Arthur E Appleton, Michel G Plummer (Ed), The World Trade Organization, Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis, Volume I, International Law Institute, Springer, USA 2005 p. 805 
29
 Koul Autar Krishen, Guide to WTO and GATT, Economics, Law and Politics, Kluwer Law International, 
Hague, 2005 p.482  
30
 Macrory Patrick F J, Arthur E Appleton, Michel G Plummer (Ed), The World Trade Organization, Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis, Volume I & II, International Law Institute, Springer, USA 2005, p. 804 
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 The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of MTNs in 1994 substantively broadened the scope 
of multilateral rulemaking in the area of international trade. The system extended its reach 
into new subject areas and also simultaneously moved towards predictable and effective 
judicial procedures and dispute settlement.   The new areas of Intellectual Property 
(Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights), Investments (Agreement on 
Trade Related Investment Measures) and International Trade in Services
31
 (General 
Agreement on Trade in Services) were brought under multilaterally agreed and unified 
disciplines of the Agreement Establishing WTO through the concept of ‘single 
undertaking’. 
 The General Agreement on Trade in Services along with an array of different Agreements 
was annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
 
Organization, 
which entered into force on 1
st
 January 1995.  However, negotiations
 
on some specific 
issues and some sector specific Agreements were not able to be concluded during the 
course of the MTNs under the Round and negotiations on these were agreed to be 
continued. Apart from improved market access conditions in areas such
 
as 
telecommunications and financial services, the focus of continued negotiations was on four 
areas of rulemaking: domestic regulation, emergency
 
safeguard measures, government 
procurement, and subsidies and
 
the relevant mandates for conduct of these negotiations are 
already provided in the text of General Agreement
 
on Trade in Services (GATS).  These 
provisions at times oblige conduct of negotiations and are also sometimes referred
 
to as the 
‘built-in agenda32’ of WTO Agreement. With the possible exception of domestic regulation, 
where WTO Members are committed to negotiating
 
disciplines to avoid unnecessary trade 
barriers, there has been
 
little progress in other areas, and no agreed outcome is in
 
sight at 
present. 
 
Even with almost two decades of the conclusion of the UR of MTNs, the GATS is still a 
work in progress with its framework still under construction.    Member countries of the 
WTO were confronted with the rule making and the work in some key areas including 
                                               
31
 World Trade Organisation, The Legal Texts, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 1999. (Annex I B to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization). p 284 
32
 Some of the WTO Agreements contain provisions for continued negotiations and also specific Agenda for 
these further negotiations. These treaty provisions are termed as ‘inbuilt agenda’ and l examples are; Article 
X of the GATS and Article 9 of the TRIMs. 
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conclusion of negotiations on Emergency Safeguards Measures in international trade in 
services remains as an unfinished business;  
Paragraph 1 of Article X of GATS provides that:  
“…there shall be multilateral negotiations on the question of emergency 
safeguard measures based on the principle of non-discrimination. The 
results of such negotiations shall enter into effect on a date not later than 
three years from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement”(emphasis added).  
 
The negotiating mandate provided in the text of the GATS had serious interpretative 
problems and there is a disagreement amongst the Members of the WTO on the very 
interpretation of the mandate itself; on what it means, stipulates or intends members to do.  
Some members focussed on the word “question” to argue that there was no original 
definitive intention for creating or drafting a provision, specific enabling Article or some 
other form of creation of strict discipline for application of an ESM that was to be 
concluded by the agreed time limit. While some others  members focus on the phrase 
“results of such negotiations shall enter into effect…”   and argue that the only results that 
can enter into effect call for positive tangible outcome that precisely imply the drafting of a 
specific provision, article or agreed discipline on application of ESMs in the services 
sector.  The debate on the mandate itself, till the negotiations stalemated, reflected the deep 
differences between the member countries that would favour the inclusion of an ESM 
within the scope of the GATS and those that would rather conclude against such an 
inclusion
33
.    For some developed country members even if all or most of the technical 
issues faced in devising ESMs for international trade in services can be resolved still these 
countries would be reluctant to accept ESMs under GATS since in their view, even if 
feasible, emergency safeguards in services may not be desirable anyway.  
 The drafters of GATS have structured this framework Agreement for the services sector on 
the model provided by the GATT despite fundamental differences in the underlying 
products and dynamics of cross border trade in services and that of trade in goods.   It was 
                                               
33
 Mario Marconini, Emergency Safeguard Measures in the GATS: Beyond Feasible and Desirable, 
UNCTAD. March 2005. 
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felt by some members that guidance for development of specific ESMs under GATS can 
possibly be drawn from the existing trade remedy provisions already available in the 
General Agreement governing conduct of international Trade in goods.  However, 
developments of exactly the same tools for international trade in services as are already 
available for merchandize trade has many conceptual problems and are much more difficult 
because of different characteristics and the complex nature of the service transactions. 
Member countries faced formidable challenges in defining and accepting the model 
provided by the GATT to be equally relevant in the context of services sector. All these 
challenges combined with the limitations of the GATT model itself had created a complete 
impasse in the negotiations on ESMs under GATS.  
 
The very feasibility, desirability and practicability of ESMs under GATS is still an open 
question despite it being part of the built-in agenda
34
 of the WTO Agreement and there 
initially also being an agreed time frame for conclusion of the negotiations on the issue. 
The Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR) was confronted with major systemic and 
political questions that needed to be resolved.  There “is no significant progress in the 
negotiations on the ESMs which continued to be characterized by important divergences of 
views
35” till negotiations came to a deadlock.  
 A solution to the impasse in the negotiations on Emergency Safeguards in the WPGR does 
not appear to be in sight.  It appears that the solution may need to transcend the existing 
dichotomy created between the feasible and the desirable.  This requires undertaking work 
in two key areas.  Firstly to carefully examine and also ultimately put right those arguments 
which are being put forward as a negotiating strategy.   Secondly it is necessary to look at 
the ‘real concerns’ that negotiators may have in the area of ESMs under GATS and then 
provide the answer to the very basic ‘question’ put forward in Article X of GATS.   
                                               
34
 Some of the WTO Agreements contain provisions for continued negotiations and also contain the directions 
and agenda for further negotiations, this is termed as ‘inbuilt agenda’ for future negotiations e.g. Article X of 
the GATS and Article 9 of the TRIMs. 
35
 World Trade Organization, Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 10 February, 
Document No: S/WPGR/M/54 dated 22 February 2006 
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1.4 THESIS OUTLINE AND ORGANISATION 
 
The concept of ESMs with respect to international trade in goods has a fairly long history 
that goes back to the turn of twentieth century.  In the context of contemporary 
international economic and trade law the concept has been researched, debated and 
negotiated for more than eighty years.  Substantive research on the subject of emergency 
safeguards measures in merchandise trade has also been undertaken by the international 
economic law scholars around the world and also by the multilateral institutions like WTO, 
UNCTAD and the World Bank.  The research undertaken either has a pure theoretical slant 
or focuses only on the economic impact analysis ignoring the ground realities and political 
dimension of conduct of international trade. The canvass of this research is limited and 
overwhelming restricted to trade in goods with little work done on the concept in the 
context of cross border trade in services.   
 The research undertaken in the area with respect to application of emergency safeguards 
on trade in the services sector by the multilateral institutions, like the World Bank and 
UNCTAD, are extremely limited.   The analyses and proposals emerging are very guarded 
with substantive efforts being spent on remaining within the boundaries of political 
correctness.   Practically no definitive recommendations have been made to bridge this 
important legal gap, to tackle the question posed in Article X: 1 of the GATS and to 
provide a road map for future.   
 The thesis analyses the concept of ESMs, its history; issues involved and then goes on to 
look at main concerns faced in agreeing on development of ESMs under GATS.  The thesis 
looks at the concept of the Emergency Safeguards in the GATT/WTO and tries to develop 
an answer to the ‘question of ESMs based on nondiscrimination’ agreed by the WTO 
members in the Article X of the GATS, which has been eluding, or may be deluding the 
Member countries of the WTO for the last ten (15) years.    The thesis focuses on the 
Emergency Safeguards Measures (ESMs)  already existing in the WTO in the context of 
international trade in goods and evaluates whether the existing paradigm provided by the 
General Agreement can possibly be transposed to GATS or provide a model for developing 
a similarly structured instrument for international trade in services.   
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 The thesis also assesses whether the GATT type ESMs are essentially required and are 
feasible under GATS and if these are feasible than what should be their possible structure 
based on the pre-determined, agreed and mandated ‘principle of non-discrimination’.    The 
study undertaken explores as to what instruments or provisions already exist in the Services 
Agreement to meet the possible circumstances which may be perceived by the member 
countries that are seeking specific ESMs under GATS and goes on to see that if provisions 
that are already available in the GATS render the desirability of standalone ESMs 
redundant, if not then, how the existing provisions do not address the specific concerns of 
the demanders of the concept. It also evaluates that if specific ESMs are desirable under 
GATS then what new provisions may be created so as to fulfill this desirability of the 
requesting Members. The study, amongst others, also tries to find the clues to develop the 
answer the question raised in Article X of GATS in the existing Regional and Preferential 
Trade Arrangements. 
 The thesis primarily limits itself to the short analysis of the concept, its origins and legal 
provisions of the GATT Article XIX type ESMs with the objective of transposition of this 
structure available under GATT to GATS. The study then looks at the proposals and 
possibilities of answering the question of feasibility and desirability of ESMs for 
International Trade in Services.  The pure economic and political perspectives have not 
been explored in any details but have only been touched upon in the early part but these do 
crop up at times in the margins of the legal analysis of the emergency safeguards 
mechanisms under GATT paradigm particularly with reference to the conceptual link of the 
application of ESMs with the structural adjustments in the economies. 
  The establishing of the feasibility and desirability and also defining the contours of 
possible ESMs for the international trade in services is a topic, which has mostly been 
avoided by the researchers.   The debates in the WTO on ESMs in the area of services have 
also mostly been dominated by the divergences of the views, were circumscribed by the 
rigidities of the historical negotiating positions of the Member countries and undertaken 
under the shadow of parallel processes. The discussions have been inconclusive and are 
now on a standstill. The thesis not only takes into account the academic and legal literature 
on the subject but also and perhaps more practically, takes into account the dynamics of the 
negotiations, discussions and debates within the WTO system on the subject.  Though the 
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thesis has a narrow focus on the stand alone ESMs under the GATS, but its findings can 
have parallel relations and almost a universal applicability on most of the issues that have 
remained part of the unfinished business for stretched period of time and on the agenda of 
different Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  
  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization is primarily a trade agreement 
embarked upon by politicians and in essence reflects the balance of interests of the Member 
countries.   The thesis takes this important factor into account and tries to provide an in-
depth analysis of the issue and goes beyond what is already available in the International 
Trade Law literature on the ESMs under the cross border trade in services.  In short it 
studies the views of the negotiators on both sides of the intellectual/conceptual divide; i) 
demandeurs and; ii) opponents of any standalone ESMs under GATS.  
The thesis briefly explores the concept, its genesis under the GATT framework, 
experiences with the concept and intends to propose as how to deal with the question of 
ESMs left open under Article X of the GATS.  It seeks to fill a major gap that presently 
exists in the International Trade Law especially with reference to the law emerging out of 
WTO.    
 
The thesis has six (6) chapters; including this Chapter 1;  
 
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPT OF ESMS: EVOLUTION THEREOF 
The chapter 2 explores the history of the concept of the ‘escape clause provision’ and 
also analyses the reasons for incorporating this concept in the GATT/WTO Agreements 
and its evolution under the General Agreement.   The requirements for the application of 
the ESMs and some important interpretive issues and relationship with other relevant 
provisions of the General Agreement are also covered in this Chapter.  The Chapters looks 
at the difficulties encountered by the contracting parties in application of the ESMs under 
Article XIX of GATT.  
The Chapter not only looks at the evolution of the concept under Article XIX of GATT but 
it also provides important basis for subsequent analytical and substantive work undertaken 
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in the latter Chapters of the thesis. The efforts made by the GATT Contracting Parties to 
reform the emergency safeguard provision and make them more relevant and coherent are 
also touched. The Chapter identifies the problems faced by the concept of ESMs in its 
application in the merchandise trade and its evolution leading up to the GATT Ministerial 
meeting at Punta del Este with Emergency Safeguards Measures being included as a 
separate agenda item for negotiating “… A comprehensive agreement on safeguards…”  
 
CHAPTER 3: ESMS: ISSUES and AGREEMENT on SAFEGUARDS 
The chapter looks at the development of the concept from under Article XIX of GATT to 
an independent Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) under the WTO and resulting 
jurisprudence has created new balances amongst the Members and requires a review.   The 
Chapter recalls evolution of the concept, underlying reasons for introduction of ‘extra-
legal
36’ measures like Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and development of Agreement 
on Safeguards (AoS) and its negotiations. The Chapter analyses the development of case 
law under Article XIX of GATT and the AOS and some relevant internal law provisions of 
important economies like the EC and the US.   This is not an exhaustive exercise but 
contrarily it is minimal in nature.  
 
The Chapter tries to identify the additionalities or the deviations, if any, that have been 
created by the AoS over GATT Article XIX provisions, to the post UR regime relating to 
application of Emergency Safeguards Measures under the GATT/WTO system. The 
chapter also briefly refers to the decisions of the Panels and Appellate Body when 
interpreting key provisions of the law and attempts to analyse the AoS. Most Panel and 
Appellate body rulings discussed relate to the period prior to the 2007; when negotiations 
were suspended under the WTO on the issues relevant to the thesis. This brings out major 
concerns that already exist with the concept of ESMs under the GATT and that render the 
concept in-coherent in certain ways.  
 
 The Chapter has consciously been  kept to a minimum so as to retain space for the 
substantive work that is to follow, therefore,  only touches those issues that have a natural 
                                               
36
 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Note by the Secretariat "Inventory of Article XIX actions and other 
measures which appear to serve the same purpose" (MTN.GNG/NG9/W/2/Rev.1).   
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linkage or impact on the manner in which any ESMs can possibly be structured for the 
services sector drawing from within the GATT/WTO context, this was important as when 
Ministers agreed at Punta del Este in 1986 to launch Uruguay Round (UR) of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTNs); they also decided, “ as part of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, to launch negotiations on trade in services…. GATT procedures and practices 
shall apply to these negotiations”. 
 
CHAPTER 4: ESMs and GATS,  
  Chapter 4 builds on the work already done and tries to evaluate the relevance of 
discussions held with respect to the development of the ESMs under the GATS.  The 
different formal and informal submissions made by the WTO Members on the issue in the 
WPGR have been briefly analysed.  The proposals have been analysed with respect to their 
viability for practical application and have also been evaluated against the benchmarks 
provided by the Article XIX of the General Agreement and WTO’s Agreement on 
Safeguards (AoS) governing the application of ESMs for trade in goods.   
 
This Chapter was essentially required to look at the issues that any structuring of the ESMs 
under GATS on the paradigm provided by the GATT will have to encounter under the 
provisions of the regime applicable for merchandise trade. The Chapter is only a reality 
check with regards to the fact that whether the features that essentially define the 
application of ESMs under the GATT paradigm for trade in goods can be transposed to 
GATS so as to create ESMs for cross border trade in services in any coherent manner. In 
light of the dearth of substantive research already undertaken on ESMs under GATS; the 
study draws from discussions on the subject in the formal and informal meetings at the 
WTO the various submissions made by the WTO Member countries to the Working Party 
on GATS Rules (WPGR).   
 
CHAPTER 5: ESM REGIME: ADAPTATION THEREOF under GATS 
The Chapters briefly revisits and analyses and then judges the various viewpoints put 
forward by different countries on the question of ESMs under GATS in the deliberations 
held in the Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR).  The Chapters then goes on to look at 
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the specificities of the cross border trade in services and evaluates the provisions in the 
Services Agreement that substantially substitute the need for independent ESMs under 
GATS but simultaneously remaining within the universe provided by the GATT paradigm. 
The GATS’s nexus with investments under mode 3 of service delivery has created 
complications with the concept of ESMs under GATS and rapid proliferation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs). The Chapter tries to analyse the proposals, undertakes 
‘situational analysis’ through hypothetical examples and identify circumstances for which 
ESMs type safety valves are already provided in the Agreement circumstances and also 
those for which ESMs may be required.   An effort has also been made to briefly highlight 
the possible conflicts and impact of the BITs with respect to the application of any ESMs. 
 
The different possible models for ESMs under GATS that had emerged in the discussions 
or mentioned in the WPGR have been briefly evaluated followed by a succinct look at the 
different RTAs with the intention of finding some form of model that can be helpful for 
development of independent provisions for application of ESMs under GATS. The Chapter 
near the end looks at all the possible models that were found under the GATT concept and 
briefly judges these models for their suitability to ESMs under GATS. The Chapter closes 
by noting     that despite strong reservations for undertaking market access commitments in 
absence of ESMs under GATS, the developing countries have started exploratory meetings 
for further liberalization and are also taking major liberalization commitments under the 
RTAs and BITs.  
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
To put the conclusions drawn in the thesis in right perspectives, the Chapter briefly recalls 
the background, the negotiating process and different issues involved in development of 
Emergency Safeguards Measures (ESMs) under General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).  The Chapter then tries to explore and find solutions to the question of emergency 
safeguard measures posed in Article X through some other domestic trade policy 
instruments, not brought under discussions before, that can possibly have nexus with the 
conduct of cross border trade in services, particularly with respect to mode 3 of delivery.  
The two areas explored in this context were the Subsidies and Competition policies because 
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these, though, not part of the GATT model but these do belong to the box of contemporary 
domestic economic policy instruments.  
 
  The Chapter goes on to draw its own reasons and tries to briefly analyse as to why the 
negotiations in the WPGR went the way they did; look at the structural problems that are 
inherently present in the GATS and then goes on to gauge the problems with the WTO 
system as a whole that may have impacted the development of ESMs.  The phenomenon of 
shift towards the regionalism or other forms of economic integration agreements are also 
looked at but solely in the context of development of ESMs under GATS.  Brief efforts 
have also been made to look at the evolution and importance of ‘collective preference’ 
concerns, lack of capacity and willingness in WTO system to address these concerns, 
which in turn have created the image and relevancy problems for the WTO.  The chapter 
concludes by analysing that whether the negotiations on development of standalone ESMs 
under GATS stalled for simple straight forward reasons of limitation of the model, or 
structural issues with the Services Agreement or simple preference for regionalism despite 
good faith efforts, or, were there external or unconnected considerations that led the 
negotiations to failure because of a deliberate policy choice by some important players.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPT OF ESMs: EVOLUTION THEREOF 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter explores the historical background to the introduction of the concept of 
‘escape clause provision’ in the international trade law and also the reasons for 
incorporating this concept in the GATT/WTO Agreements.   The requirements for the 
application of the ESMs, some important interpretive issues and relationship with other 
relevant provisions of the General Agreement are also covered in this Chapter.  The 
Chapter after explaining the concept, it looks at the difficulties encountered by the 
contracting parties in application of the ESMs under Article XIX of GATT. It also briefly 
analyses the issues of concern and the reasons for the derogation from Article XIX 
provisions under the General Agreement by some member countries. 
The Chapter not only looks at the evolution of the concept under Article XIX of GATT but 
it also provides important basis for subsequent analytical and substantive work undertaken 
in the latter Chapters of the thesis. The efforts made by the GATT Contracting Parties to 
reform the emergency safeguard provision and make them more relevant and coherent 
derive a lot from this chapter. The Chapter also looks at the problems faced by the concept 
of ESMs in its application in the merchandise trade leading up to its evolution under the 
GATT Ministerial meeting at Punta Del Este with Emergency Safeguards Measures being 
included as a separate agenda item for negotiating “… A comprehensive agreement on 
safeguards…”  
2.2 BACKGROUND: CONCEPTUAL 
In the pre-World War II period, the principal organizing principle for developed and 
developing country economic relationships was colonialism. In the early years of GATT 
most of the developing countries were either still in the process of or had in the recent past 
come out of the colonial rule
1
 and, therefore, had very little understanding or experience of 
managing their international trade regimes.  The early drafting of the post-war rules on trade 
policy that were enshrined in the General Agreement were ‘based on the idea of one set of 
                                               
1
 Articles 1.2 of the GATT 1947 is a good reminder of the then prevailing ground realities 
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rules for all countries’2, therefore the original GATT had no development provisions and its 
applicable rules were the same for the developed and less developed developing countries
3
.  
The General Agreement initially laid down one set of rules for the conduct of international 
trade relations amongst all countries irrespective of the fact whether these are developing or 
developed countries.  
  Developing countries coming out of colonial rule had very little capacities to manage their 
domestic trade regimes and international trade relations in any meaningful and 
comprehensive manner, let alone the creation of workable institutions that were in a position 
to understand, apply and enforce Contingency Protection instruments provided in the 
General Agreement including Emergency Safeguards Measures and develop enforcement 
and surveillance mechanisms. The developed countries already had a long experience that 
stretched for over a century
4
  of dealing with these contingency protection instruments.  The 
developing countries not only lacked understanding of managing sophisticated trade policy 
instruments but also had little experience and understanding of dynamics of international 
negotiations and simultaneously lacked physical and intellectual resources to manage the 
complexities of multilateral trade and the negotiating processes. In the successive rounds of 
MTNs that were held under the auspices of GATT, the understandings of the developing 
countries about the issues involved were low and these countries were in general also not 
very active in the first six rounds of the MTNs and were merely bystanders or outsiders to 
the negotiating processes that were underway under the aegis of GATT.   
 
In short, the advent of twenty century witnessed the emergence of move towards rule based 
conduct of International trade in the free world while the colonies were governed through a 
complex system of colonial preferences.  The US was in the process of emerging as an 
important economic player and it had initiated a process of bilateral trade agreements that 
formally contained provisions for application of Emergency Safeguards Measures. Treaty 
                                               
2
 Hudec Robert E, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 
1987. 
3
 The General Agreement recognizes ‘developed countries’ or ‘countries in early stages of development.’ 
4
 Some the trade remedy legislations (safeguards) were promulgated around the turn of the nineteenth century  
that included;  i) Australia (Industries Preservation Act, 1906, ii) Britain (The Safeguarding of Industries Act 
of 1921), these have been discussed in Chapter 1.  
CHAPTER 2 
 22 
provisions for application Emergency Safeguards have since generally been an essential 
component the post-colonial international trade Agreements between independent nations. 
2.3. ESCAPE CLAUSE: EVOLUTION 
 Most of the basic concepts that inspired and subsequently expanded themselves under 
the post-World War II multilaterally agreed International Trade and Economic Law already 
existed prior to the War.   However, prior to the War these concepts were anticipated only 
in the context of the bilateral trade relations between different countries which were 
considered industrially advanced, independent and having some structurally organized 
managerial systems within their governments.  Different International Agreements for 
governance cross border trade existed if different forms across the globe. However, of all 
the pre-World War II international trade instruments that probably had the most profound 
effect on the development of post war regime governing conduct of international trade was 
the ‘US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (Act of 1934). The Act of 1934 was 
originally conceived and intended by the US congress to provide a basis for the US 
executive to enter into bilateral trade agreements only, but the Act had substantive 
significance on post Second World War multilateral trading system and on the evolution of 
international trade and economic law.  Some fundamental and strategic concepts that are 
now regarded as essential component of any international trade agreement are generally 
rooted and derived from this Act of 1934.  The concept of ‘emergency safeguards 
measures’ in the international trade law, as we recognize the concept under GATT/WTO 
framework also stems from the concepts and formulations that were contained in the 
‘Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program’ initiated by the US under its Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 19345.    
 The approach adopted by Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State6 in the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act was incorporated in the Havana Charter.   The Article 29 of the first draft 
                                               
5
 The Act also provided the paradigms for some other key areas that later became defining features of the 
GATT system. It also furnished the template for US Congressional advance authorization that enabled the US 
Executive to conduct negotiations of International Trade Agreements (also commonly known as fast track 
authority).     
6
 Cordell Hull was the US Secretary of State during the World War II. He was in charge of post war planning 
and viewed as “the Father of the United Nations.” He is known for the key concepts that underlay the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.    
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of the Havana Charter was submitted by the United States and contained provisions for 
“Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products”.  The provisions of Article 29 were 
modelled on corresponding ‘escape clause’ provisions in the ‘United States - Mexico 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1942’ concluded pursuant to the Act of 19347. 
This ‘escape clause’ subsequently became Article 34 of the draft that emerged from the 
London meeting of October 1946 but by then it had expanded to contain three additional 
elements that were over and above the US- Mexico Regional Trading Agreement of 1942.  
These three elements were included during considerations at London on the proposals made 
by the US Department of State in its paper titled ‘Suggested Charter of an International 
Trade Organization of the United Nations’.   The additional elements incorporated in the 
text related to “i)... a product which is the subject of a concession with respect to the 
preference; ii) the exemption of ‘prior consultation’ under “critical and exceptional 
circumstances” and; iii) degree of retaliation in “serious cases”, when the Organization 
“may authorize an affected Member to suspend concessions or obligations in addition to 
those which may be substantially equivalent to the action originally taken8”.  
  In the New York meeting of early 1947 a definitive decision was taken to include the 
escape clause in the text of the General Agreement
9
.  Changes that were made in the New 
York and Geneva meetings in the wordings of the escape clause in the draft of the proposed 
International Trade Organization (ITO) were carried over into the General Agreement as its 
Article XIX
10
.   This Article XIX of GATT corresponded to Article 40 of the Charter for an 
ITO of the United Nations (The Havana Charter) and differs from the Havana Charter only 
in some minor ways11. 
                                               
7
 Hudec Robert E, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 
1987.  In the years 1934-42, the United States negotiated reciprocal trade agreements with 27 countries, 
including sixteen developing countries 
8
  These provisions eventually became Paragraph 1(b), 2 and 3 of Article XIX of the General Agreement. 
9
 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, ‘Drafting History of Article XIX and its Place in GATT, 
Background Note by the GATT Secretariat, document no: MTN.GNG/NG9/W/7 dated 16 September 1987. 
Para 1- 4 
10
 The text of the General Agreement is based on the Charter for an International Trade Organization of the 
United Nations (The Havana Charter), which was drawn up by the Preparatory Committee of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment and signed on 30 October 1947. 
11
The difference in wordings are i) absence of the word "relatively" between "such" and "increased quantities" 
in Paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX; ii) use of the word "critical" in Paragraph 2. In the Havana Charter, the 
words "of special urgency" were used and iv) absence of Paragraph 4 in Article XIX of GATT. 
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  The US Congress that authorized the United States’ executive in 1945, to negotiate and 
join an international treaty on trade had also decided that inclusion of an ‘escape clause’ 
was to be made a necessary component in all treaties which involved the granting of any 
concessions by the US.   President Truman, in February 1947 accordingly also, issued an 
Executive Order that mandated an escape clause to be included in every trade agreement 
negotiated by the United States under the authority of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934.   President Truman’s order was later amended and by virtue of the provisions 
of section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 the ‘escape clause’ 
(emergency safeguards) eventually became a permanent feature of the US statutory law
12
.  
2.3. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: ESCAPE CLAUSE  
  Every international trade liberalization Agreement is essentially accompanied by some 
sort of economic, market and even social and political risks.  However, “there are a number 
of alternative ways to deal with the risk of an agreement. States could, for example, build in 
escape clauses …, or other contingencies that concern the parties. This strategy reduces the 
exposure to risk without reducing the agreement’s effectiveness in those states of the world 
in which the parties want compliance. An alternative strategy would be to weaken the 
substantive requirements of the agreement. This reduces the benefits of the agreement, but 
also reduces the level of commitment”13. The existence of Emergency Safeguard Measures 
(ESMs) in any bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral trade agreements is an effort to mitigate 
and manage these risks. If analysed in a narrow sense the presence of safeguard provisions 
are rooted in the perceived need for provisioning of some form of safety valve for the 
domestic industry that can provide it protection from probable unforeseen problems which 
may crop up because of any trade liberalization that has been undertaken by the importing 
country under some trade treaty stipulations. However, if these clauses are looked in a 
broader sense, the concept refers to the treaty provisions which permit a country signatory 
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 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, ‘Drafting History of Article XIX and its Place in GATT, 
Background Note by the GATT Secretariat, document no: MTN.GNG/NG9/W/7 dated 16 September 1987. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 25 
to an international trade agreement to temporarily deviate from the application of the 
obligations that it has assumed under the Agreement
14
.   
 
  International trade rules distinguish between the ways in which an importing country can 
respond to ‘fair’ trade practices on one hand and ‘unfair’ trade practices on the other15 
hand.   The emergency escape clause provisions are available only for use under certain 
conditions to respond to market disruptions and for specified problems created by imports 
which are otherwise not in violation of the agreed rules for conduct of cross border trade.  
In the case of application of ESMs by an importing country, “all that the foreign respondent 
has done is to compete effectively in accordance with the free market principles16”.   In 
other words ‘emergency safeguards’ are measures that are applied to protect domestic 
industry from competition with imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to 
them. These ‘safeguard measures’ are to be distinguished from some other special 
safeguards measures which are applied only to a specific category of imported product or 
do not require the existence of injury to a particular industry
17
. 
 
 Some economic scholars feel that to provide a relief or a remedy to domestic producers in 
situations where nothing unjust has been done by an exporting country to be improper and 
not credible enough reason to allow a Member country to derogate from its specific 
obligations under an international treaty.   The escape clause provisions in an Agreement to 
this group of scholars’ defeats the basic economic concept of ‘comparative advantage’ 
which provides the foundations for modern day conduct of liberalized International 
Trade
18
.   The major strands of arguments that try to justify the necessity thus the existence 
of escape clause provisions in an international trade agreement can be bifurcated and 
placed under two broad conceptual paradigms; i) economic; and ii) political.   
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 Bhala Raj, Modern GATT Law, A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2005. p. 939 
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 Jackson John H, Davey William J and Sykes Alan O Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, Cases, Materials and Text. Third Edition, West Group, MINN, 1995.  p 596 
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 Bhala Raj, Modern GATT Law, A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sweet & 
Maxwell London 2005. p 944 
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 GATT Articles XII, Article XVIII: B (Balance of payments) and Article XX along with others like Article 
5 of Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO fall under this category. 
18
 The contemporary multilateral trading system is based on the philosophy of liberal trade and mutually 
beneficial specialisation... The concept is known as comparative advantage, developed by David Ricardo. 
David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817)  
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2.3.1. ECONOMIC RATIONALE 
 The arguments very closely reflect the reality of the overall GATT/WTO regime that is 
intended not to be a global free trade agreement but is only a negotiated International Trade 
Agreement focussed on creating a liberalized trading system which is based on 
multilaterally accepted rules, ‘which are predictable and the system has no shocks19’.  The 
underlying philosophy and driving force of multilateral trading system emerging out of 
GATT/WTO is simply of progressive trade liberalisation with gradual structural 
adjustments and not that of either a free trade agreement or creation of a Customs Union.    
Within the economic paradigm, the most important argument for creating the treaty 
provisions for possible application of emergency safeguards measures (ESMs) is the 
consideration that the liberalization of international trade has to be ‘without shocks’ and  
the extremely essential concomitant need of an ‘orderly contraction’; if any shocks have 
necessarily  to occur.    The incorporation of ESMs is in the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
is regarded, by the believers of the economic benefits of the ESMs, as essential to facilitate 
the orderly contraction of the industries that lose out to rapidly enhanced trade flows that 
are responsible for adverse market circumstances in the importing country. This sudden 
increase in the trade is also because of the trade liberalization undertaken by the country in 
terms of an international trade Agreement and that the affected industries simply cannot 
regain their competitive edge in the new liberalized trade scenario. To avoid any confusion 
it is of significance to note that orderly contraction is an entirely different concept of 
adjustment as compared to restoration of competitiveness.   
 The protection from imports, made possible by the escape clause provisions which have a 
social significance here, retards the rate of contraction in an import sensitive industry and 
the relief provided by the escape clause provisions prevents shock to different factors of 
production, most important of which is labour, are shielded from shocks and injury.  The 
possibilities to emergency safeguard measures create policy space for the governments that 
“workers are not thrown out of their jobs and their wages are not slashed without warning.  
Rather the escape clause provisions provide these workers with time space to find new 
work, or possibly retrain i.e. to adjust positively to import competition and to learn to 
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operate in the context of a new liberalized market
20”.  The orderly contraction argument is 
not without its critics, economic purists argue that delaying contraction is also an economic 
vice because the factors of production are used up by an inefficient industry for an 
extended period which should otherwise be redeployed immediately to more efficient use. 
 The other argument put forward relates to the restoration of competitiveness as 
differentiated from orderly contraction.   It is argued that measures undertaken pursuant to 
escape clause (Article XIX of GATT) give an industry, which suffering serious injury or is 
being threatened to be injured by the ‘new’ liberalized trading environment, time to adjust 
to the changed operating environment and in the process regain its competitiveness.  This 
argument for application of emergency safeguards measures to restore competitiveness is 
regarded by some as “fairly straight forward21”.   Relief provided pursuant to the 
application of an ESM allows for the restoration of competitiveness by providing “local 
producers space to improve the competitiveness of their products in face of a surge of 
competing imports
22” by increasing the tariff and/or non-tariff barriers.   This temporary 
protection provides the ailing industry time and space to generate profits, reinvest these 
profits into factors of production so as to reduce its costs and thereby regain its competitive 
edge and thus be prepared for the circumstances when the temporary protection provided 
by application of an ESM is eventually removed
23
.   
 
The proponents of this line of argument believe that the international trading community, 
especially consumers in different countries, benefit in the long term, because efficient 
competitors re-emerge as they get time to restructure in light of the temporary reprieve 
which is provided to them through the application of the ESMs.    This view of regaining 
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 Jackson John H, Davey William J and Sykes Alan O Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, Cases, Materials and Text. Third Edition, West Group, MINN, 1995.p 1120 
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 Sykes Alan, ‘Protectionism as a safeguard: A positive analysis of the GATT ‘escape clause’ with 
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 Kitano Taiju Did temporary protection induce technology adoption? A study of the US motorcycle 
industry_National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, May 2011 
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competitiveness is regarded by those opposed to this thought as static and that it neglects 
the negative implications of protection in the long and medium term. It is seen as an 
approach which is solely from the point of view of the welfare of the industry that is being 
hurt in the importing country and that the argument disregards the interests of the 
consumers in the importing country, industry in the exporting country or the world 
economy as a whole. 
 
Stated differently, application of an ESM is a mechanism for distributing and allocating 
the costs of market adjustment required because of circumstances created by the trade 
liberalization which has been undertaken as the consequence of tariff and non- tariff 
concessions granted under the Trade liberalizing international agreement by the importing 
country.  In the liberalised trading environment and with exchange of market access 
concessions products of certain industries are displaced by new, more competitive imports 
and as a  consequence of which at least the factors of production in a domestic economy 
that are mobile should logically shift to the production of the goods that can compete with 
imports.   However, the process of moving the labour, human and physical capital takes 
much longer time than other factors of production and implies some social adjustment 
costs.  These adjustment costs are at times heavy and to render the system free of shocks 
these need to be spread and allocated in some way amongst the WTO Members and also 
within an economy.   Emergency Safeguard measures thus allow an importing WTO 
Member to shift at least some market adjustment costs away from an injured domestic 
industry to an exporter or exporters in other Member countries, simultaneously the concept 
also allows the importing country to shift at least some of the costs to its domestic 
consumers and away from an injured domestic industry.    
 
 The leading arguments under the economic paradigm are based on the foundations that the 
temporary relief provided by the escape clause helps restore the competitiveness and that it 
also facilitates orderly contraction.  The proponents of economic perspective assume that 
emergency safeguards are purely an economic issue but whereas in actuality in certain 
cases the application of measure by the importing country can also involve non-economic 
considerations.  This uncorrupted economic perspective ignores the fact that GATT/WTO 
is primarily a political treaty amongst Member countries which has been negotiated and 
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concluded by the political officials. The General Agreement essentially reflects an agreed 
balance of interests amongst the Member countries and also of the different trade lobbies 
domestically within the acceding countries.    
2.3.2. POLITICAL RATIONALE 
 
 The existence of Emergency Safeguards provisions is justified under the ‘political 
paradigm’ as necessarily required escape clause that primarily provides a political safety 
valve against protectionist pressures. The political officials, who enter into international 
trade agreements, seek to design these agreements in a manner that in addition to creating 
new trade flows and economic development, these Agreements should also enhance their 
domestic political support.  Such political gains from trade agreements result in the 
foremost from market access commitments that benefit domestic exporters and lead them to 
reward the political officials who manage to obtain these enhanced market access 
commitments for their products.  The hardships that are caused in certain other sectors 
because of increased imports by virtue of trade liberalization is reluctantly accepted as 
being the unavoidable price that is required to be paid for easier market access for the 
exports.  Thus an ideal international trade agreement from the standpoint of political 
officials is the one that maximizes the net political gains relative to political costs
24
.  
 
 The public officials who undertake negotiations on behalf of countries becoming party to 
multilateral trade agreements are invariably not comfortable with giving enhanced market 
access as there are always uncertainties associated with the future trade impact of the 
concessions that may be granted by them.    Emergency Safeguards provisions in the 
Agreements, to these political officials, are simply a device for dealing with the political 
uncertainty associated with the trade liberalization. To the officials ‘safeguards provisions’ 
thus provide a ‘loophole’ or temporary circumvention mechanism to the International 
obligations being undertaken by them in the context of an Agreement which in essence is 
targeting to liberalizing trade and limiting trade protection. These arguments suggest that 
the existence of escape clause provisions provide comfort and thus encourage and make it 
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possible for the Members of the WTO to offer greater number of market access concessions 
and undertake larger number of bindings than they would have otherwise done. 
  Article XIX of the General Agreement merely defines circumstances in which the 
temporary suspension of concessions was jointly optimal in a political sense for the 
officials that entered into the market access commitment under the GATT.  The “genesis 
and the negotiating history of the Article suggests that no clear, necessary and causal 
connection was ever intended between safeguard actions and the promotion of economic 
welfare or efficiency as conventionally defined under the  ‘economic justification’ 
arguments
25”. 
Simply put, Emergency Safeguard provisions relieves the negotiators and the political 
decision makers of a Member country of the fear that trade liberalization commitments in 
to which they may enter once made are irrevocable in terms of the Agreement. The 
emergency safeguards provisions provide the negotiators with the possibility to reverse the 
concessions granted though in a limited manner and subject to specific conditions.  A 
Member because of the possibilities created by the safeguards provisions feels liberated to 
enter into expansive market access deals and thus the existence of the provision enhances 
chances of Agreement that not only accommodates the self-interests of the Members but, in 
other word, also helps liberalization.   
2.3.3 OTHER REASONS 
 
There are other explanations also for incorporation of escape clauses in the International 
agreements. Another argument about the purpose of Safeguards draws on the public choice 
theory under which Emergency Safeguard provisions can be regarded as a microeconomic 
tool to political behaviour. The emergency provisions provide a tool to political decision 
makers to interfere in a rule based system and accommodate a popular public opinion. The 
“manner in which these emergency safeguards provisions are structured primarily also 
reflects therefore the manifestation of the public choice theory”26 which predicts that 
political policy makers are generally more concerned about impact of any change in 
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policies, trading environment and regulatory structures on producers than are for the 
consumers because in general the producers are both better organized and politically more 
influential than the consumers.   
 
  The necessity of escape clause in an Agreement is at times also linked to the lack of 
effective dispute settlement procedures under that Agreement.  This consideration for 
incorporation of escape clause in an agreement is essentially influenced by two factors that 
mutually offsetting each other.   ‘Firstly, it reduces the level of commitment of the states in 
a manner that corresponds to how the omission of a dispute resolution clause in the 
Agreement reduces the incentive to comply with the terms of the agreement and not nullify 
the concessions grant by it, while the existence of the safeguards do oblige that a member 
applying a safeguard measure maintains a substantially equivalent level of mutually agreed 
concessions.    This requirement only partially offsets the impact of the safeguards 
provisions on the level of commitment. The state adopting a safeguard measure is given the 
discretion to determine how to maintain the level of concessions, and this discretion 
reduces the extent to which the state is constrained in its actions. Secondly, because the 
escape clause allows a state to suspend its commitment, it reduces the sanction for doing so 
in a manner corresponding to the way in which the omission of a dispute resolution clause 
reduces the sanction for a violation.  When drafting an agreement, then, states try to 
consider both the reduced likelihood of compliance with the (other) terms of the agreement 
and the reduction in total loss if there is such non-compliance
27
. Each of these strategies 
provides flexibility to the parties in a more nuanced and targeted way than simply including 
or excluding a dispute resolution provision.  However, this reason for incorporating escape 
clause in the international agreements is not very relevant to GATT/WTO system as it has 
fairly robust dispute settlement structures.  
 
In simple words, the existence of safeguards provisions in the International Agreements; 
irrespective of the justification for their existence, provide possibilities to the signatories 
for deviation from the obligations assumed under the Agreement and that these provisions 
are essentially aimed to maintain the overall sanctity and integrity of the Agreement.  
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2.4. ESCAPE CLAUSE IN GATT  
The general escape clause
28
 in the form of Article XIX was included in GATT as a result of 
American desires and the key language of the Article is almost similar to the wordings 
contained in the US-Mexico Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1942.  Fearing that the 
lowering of tariff barriers on some particular goods could result in a larger-than-expected 
import-surge that would hurt domestic firms, the U.S. government insisted that the 
agreement should include a provision permitting it to re-institute tariffs in the face of large 
import-surges.   The inclusion of the escape clause in GATT is considered as a significant, 
if not the major, reason as to why United States’ Congress agreed to participate in GATT29.   
 
 This argument appears to be fairly valid and hardly comes as a surprise because the late 
nineteen forties immediately “followed a period characterized by protectionism – the 
economic counterpart of political nationalism which had just been defeated – world trade 
liberalization could only be achieved if framed through a complex system of safeguards.  
Thus, more than half GATT Articles concern exceptions to tariff concessions, National 
Treatment and Most Favoured Nation clauses and of the derogation provisions in the 
General Agreement the most visible is Article XIX
30”.  Inclusion of Emergency Safeguard 
provisions was seen as a political safety valve for the protectionist pressures and as a 
window for possible reinstatement, under extra ordinary circumstances, of a tariff or a non-
tariff measure, which had been removed or lowered by virtue of commitments made in the 
context of concessions granted under international trade negotiations.   
 At the time of introduction of the International Trading System governed by the 
multilaterally agreed rules of the GATT, the core concepts for ‘provisions for remedial 
measures’ that defined the practical application of ESMs like ‘cause or threaten injury to 
domestic industry’ and proportionality of counter measures were already understood and 
legal jurisprudence on these issues was already available in some advanced countries, but 
primarily in the context of  Antidumping (AD) and Countervailing Duties (CVD) laws that 
incorporated concepts parallel to emergency safeguards like ‘injury’, ‘investigation’ and 
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establishment ‘of causal link’ for application of remedial measure that were already in 
place in these countries from the turn of the twentieth century
31
.    
2.5. ESMS UNDER GATT 1947 
2.5.1 ARTICLE XIX OF GATT 
 
Article XIX of the General Agreement titled “Emergency Actions on Imports of 
Particular Products” is essentially the principal and general escape clause of the General 
Agreement.  The Article lays down the basic framework of the application of Emergency 
Safeguard Measures and is still largely the same as it was agreed at the outset of GATT and 
it has only been amended once.   In the Review Session of 1954-55 the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES agreed to change the term “obligations or concessions” that was appearing in 
paragraph 3(a) and (b) of the Article to “concessions or other obligations32”.   The Article 
XIX prescribes and details certain conditions that are required to exist for the application of 
“emergency action on imports of particular products” and simultaneously also provides the 
authority for the use of safeguard measures by an importing country with respect to trade in 
goods under the GATT.   
Paragraph 1 of the Article XIX provides that:  
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred …, any product is being imported … such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the 
contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and 
for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend 
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the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the 
concession.(emphasis added). 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Article XIX further provide that a party invoking its right 
under paragraph 1 to suspend or modify concessions must negotiate with adversely affected 
parties over provision of compensation in the form of alternative trade concession(s). If 
these compensation negotiations are unsuccessful, paragraph 3 allows the safeguard 
measure to be taken nonetheless, but permits adversely affected trading partners to suspend 
‘substantially equivalent concessions’ in response. 
  The General Agreement, primarily for reason of being a negotiated legal text that 
accommodates different and at times conflicting interests, is not straight forward and at 
places fairly skewed.  Article XIX of GATT is no different and fairly mixed to the extent 
that it is regarded by some as “extraordinarily oblique, even for GATT language, resulting 
in difficulty in interpretation and uncertainty in application”33. The Article also, “lacks 
detailed substantive and procedural requirements for the application
34” of measures that 
must be prescribed to be observed under Member country’s domestic law.   Reports 
emerging out of different Working Parties in early years of GATT like in Hatter’s Fur 
Case
35
 and Japan’s accession to GATT combined with parallel discussions in the various 
review meetings unfolded the understandings of CONTRACTING PARTIES to establish 
whether or not a measure taken by a contracting party met the requirements prescribed for 
the application of the Emergency Safeguard Measures (ESMs) under Article XIX.  
 
  In Hatter’s Fur Case it was viewed by the Working Party that the “three sets of conditions 
have to be fulfilled:” 
“(a) There should be an abnormal development in the imports of the product 
in question in the sense that:   
“(i) the product in question must be imported in increased 
quantities; 
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“(ii) the increased imports must be the result of unforeseen 
developments and of the effect of the tariff concession; and 
“(iii) the imports must enter in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers of like or directly competitive products. 
“(b) The suspension of an obligation or the withdrawal or modification of a 
concession must be limited to the extent and the time necessary to prevent or 
remedy the injury caused or threatened. 
“(c) The contracting party taking action under Article XIX must give notice ...  
to consult …   before the action is taken … in critical circumstances … 
consultation … after the measure is taken provisionally”36.(emphasis added). 
 
The Clause (a) of Article XIX from the very early period raised some important 
interpretive issues.  The clause provides that the emergency safeguard measures are 
permissible to be applied by a contracting party only in situations where ‘unforeseen 
developments’ occur and where these developments in turn are also associated with ‘the 
obligations incurred by the contracting party by way of concessions’ granted by the 
country.   As to what constitutes an ‘unforeseen development’, time and space of these 
developments and determination of the ‘effect of the obligations incurred’ had a natural 
understanding in the early years of the GATT system as it was expected to be short-lived
37
.   
The negotiators had made a number of trade concessions in 1947, and the Article XIX 
provided for their suspension in the event that those concessions had an unforeseen, 
adverse impact on industries competing with imports for reasons of a sudden surge in 
import competition.  The interpretation of the requirements of Article XIX (1) of GATT 
became complicated as the General Agreement took a permanent shape and also especially 
considering the fact that the GATT/WTO system is characterized by an ever-changing set 
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of commitments
38
, therefore, with the passage of time the interpretation and practical 
application of the specific requirement of ‘unforseeability’ under Article XIX  started 
becoming complicated difficult  eventually leading to the extent of being problematic.   
 
 The Working Party (1950-51) on “Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff 
Concession under Article XIX of the General Agreement” 39 examined the complaint of 
Czechoslovakia that the United States, in withdrawing a concession on women’s fur felt 
hats and hat bodies, had failed to fulfil the requirements of Article XIX.   The US argued 
that the import surge was due to an unforeseen change in fashion and thus was an 
“unforeseen” consequence of the “obligations incurred” by the US.  The Working Party 
agreed with the fact that the changes of style did not constitute an ‘unforeseen 
development’ but as to whether the United States had acted appropriately, the same 
Working Party also agreed with the special circumstances that  “the degree to which the 
change in fashion affected the competitive situation, could not reasonably be expected to 
have been foreseen by the United States authorities, and that the condition of Article XIX 
can, therefore, be considered to have been fulfilled”40.     The report of the Working Party 
was inconclusive and provided little guidance for future interpretations of the provisions 
particularly as to what constitutes unforeseen development. Thus as the time lapse between 
assumption of market access obligations and occurrence of  injury or threat of injury to 
domestic industry increased the interpretation of the provisions of Article XIX of GATT 
started blurring and subsequent GATT practice, which gradually evolved over time, started 
ignoring this requirements of the first clause of Article XIX of the General Agreement.  
 
The phrase ‘being imported ... in such increased quantities41’ was interpreted in disputes 
in the broader context to cover cases in both situations; where imports may have increased 
sharply ‘absolutely’ or ‘relatively’ to domestic production42. This increase, substantiated in 
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either manner, was regarded as evidence enough for a trade flow situation to qualify to 
“cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers.”   It is not easy to create direct 
causal links between imports and adverse circumstances prevailing in a domestic industry 
as these can have different possible reasons ranging from needs of balancing or 
modernization replacement to the skill development. It is really difficult to conclusively 
determine whether the ‘cause’ of any such injury (or threat thereof) to domestic industry is 
because of ‘increased quantities’ of imports. As is the case in any other international treaty, 
where ever the text of the General Agreement is vague and cannot be interpreted 
meaningfully then support from the negotiating history is normally taken
43
.  The drafters of 
the General Agreement have made no reference to any specifics for determination under 
the ‘injury concept’ like lost profits, unemployment and bankruptcies but chose to leave the 
term undefined. Perhaps the best inference of this absence of specifics is that they 
consciously left this open as they did not wanted to constrain the concept unduly by 
attempting a definition, and in the process allow a variety of factors that may be taken into 
any such analysis. 
 The ‘Non-discriminatory44’ invocation of Article XIX has been a fairly controversial 
issue right from the early stages of its drafting and has since been a subject of an intensive 
and protracted but yet unresolved debate.    The Report on the Accession of Japan
45
 to the 
GATT viewed that “emergency action under Article XIX would have to be non-
discriminatory” and applied to the trade of all contracting parties, including those which 
were in no way responsible for the creation of the circumstances requiring redress through 
application of the measure.   An independent suggestion that was made to the ad-hoc 
Committee to add an additional clause to Article XIX that may permit the possible 
application of Article XIX measures that are only focused on exports originating in 
countries that are responsible for creating the reasons for the application of measures in 
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case of “serious disruption of trade conditions46” was rejected.    The possibility of source 
specific application of Emergency Safeguards was also suggested by the Executive 
Secretary of the GATT in one of his informal notes in mid-sixties recommending47 “as 
worthy of examination ... to place upon the existing provisions of Article XIX an 
interpretation... which would … entitle an importing country to protective measures which 
would be restricted in application to imports from a supplying country which were in fact 
creating the disruptive situation”.   The suggestions made to the ad hoc Committee and the 
informal note of the Executive Secretary were bitterly opposed and summarily rejected.   
 The major exporting developing countries were the real beneficiaries of the notion of ‘non-
discriminatory’ application and, therefore, were always very apprehensive and on constant 
guard so as not to permit any source specific application or allow in whatever form the 
dilution of the concept of  non-discriminatory application of an ESM. This opposition to 
selectivity in application was repeatedly and vociferously stressed by the major developing 
countries. In the discussions concerning the EEC’s invocation of Article XIX on imports 
into the United Kingdom of television sets from Korea and it was viewed “that Article XIX 
did not provide for the discriminatory application of measures to limit potentially disruptive 
imports
48” and any source specific measures were regarded as inconsistent with GATT 
provisions specifically with MFN provisions enshrined its Articles I and XIII.   However, it 
will be interesting to note that the EEC discriminatory safeguard action was revoked only 
after conclusion of a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) arrangement with Korea
49
 as from 
22 June 1979.   
 
A GATT Secretariat note
50
, supported the contentions of the major developing countries 
and opined that the emergency actions under Article XIX are to be taken in respect of ‘such 
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 World Trade Organization, Analytical Index, Guide to GATT law and Practice, Volume I, Geneva 1995, 
p.519. A strong negotiating position was taken by the countries of the Far East, India and Brazil. 
47
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Informal note of the Executive Secretary of GATT “Rationale for 
Dealing with Market Disruption through the Application of Article XIX”, 26 May 1964.  
48
 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Council meeting of March 1978: discussions therein.  
49
 With regard to the possibility of using dispute settlement proceedings under the General Agreement to 
enforce agreements between contracting parties providing for “voluntary export restraints”, it may be noted 
that a Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES provides that “The determination of rights and obligations 
between governments arising under a bilateral agreement is not a matter within the competence of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES”.  
50
 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade,  Secretariat Note “Modalities of Application of Article XIX”, 1978 
(23L/4679, Para. 45) 
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product’ and not in respect of ‘individual contracting parties’ … and provisions of Article I 
(MFN) of the General Agreement will, therefore, apply.     Similarly the Panel Report on 
‘Norway’s Article XIX Action on Certain textile products’ did not make a finding with 
respect to invocation of Article XIX itself but the Panel simply pronounced that 
“emergency action under Article XIX – was subject to the requirements of Article XIII, 
providing for non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions
51”. 
 
  In the case of an Article XIX action taken by Finland, wherein it had imposed a surcharge 
on ‘tights’ that were imported below a basic price, and also in case of a similar Article XIX 
action taken by Canada on import of leather footwear that was also triggered by a price 
threshold. It was held that “price discrimination was contrary to Article XIX” and that 
devices like price breaks could produce “such a narrow and selective definition of source 
that the action could no longer be said to be truly non-discriminatory and conflict with the 
fundamental principles of the General Agreement”.    However, on the contrary in case of 
trade remedy measure taken by a member country under the WTO Agreement on 
Antidumping, managed trade agreements through voluntary price undertakings are 
statutorily acceptable
52
 through the provisions for price undertakings. 
 
 The 1960 decision of the GATT Working Party on ‘Avoidance of Market Disruption’ 
provided for a programme of work which though did not lead to the elaboration of any 
generally applicable solutions to the non-discriminatory aspect of the application of the 
ESMs, but, though indirectly, it did lead to the negotiation of a set of special discriminatory 
safeguard measures relating to a single specific industrial sector - cotton textiles.  This 
product and source specific provisioning eventually culminated in providing the only 
multilaterally accepted derogation from the principle of non-discrimination and structured 
itself in to the ‘Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles’ also commonly 
referred to as Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).   There is a strong opinion amongst the 
practitioners that this legally provided derogation from the basic MFN provisions of the 
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 In 1980 a Panel on “Norway - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products” argued that “to the 
extent that Norway had acted with effect to allocate import quotas … to six countries but had failed to 
allocate a share to Hong Kong, its Article XIX action was not consistent with Article XIII”. 
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 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
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GATT could have been avoided if Article XIX somehow had been capable of being used in 
a manner so as to address the specific source from where the exports are originating that are 
responsible for the market disruption. The developing countries accepted a sector specific 
derogation from GATT framework but simultaneously tried to ensure that no selectivity of 
ESM be able to creep in to the general framework itself.  
 
  The Panel and Appellate Body decisions in cases of application of Emergency Safeguards 
Measures under the General Agreement also created a fair amount of case law and 
jurisprudence.    With respect to the ‘extent and time frame’ of the application of measures 
it was accepted in the ‘Hatter’s Fur Case’ that it is not possible to determine in advance the 
level of import duty that may be necessary to be imposed to enable the industry to compete 
with overseas suppliers and also to indicate in advance the time frame by which the original 
tariff concessions should be wholly or partially restored. The Working Party left it to the 
country applying the measure and viewed that “if and as soon as the industry in the US is in 
a position to compete with imported supplies without the support of the higher rates of 
import duty
53”.  There is an accepted and agreed understanding that emergency safeguard 
actions are not intended to protect domestic producers for an indefinite period of time and 
are temporary and the application of the measure is not the same as the permanent 
withdrawal of concessions granted by a country. The emergency safeguard actions 
necessarily, therefore, have to be ‘temporary and progressively liberalized during the 
period of their application
54’.    The textual provisions in the Article XIX that relates to ‘in 
critical circumstances
55’ have been accepted to mean that safeguard action may be taken by 
an importing country provisionally in critical circumstances, where the injury or the threat  
of injury is imminent, without prior consultations.  
 
                                               
53
 The 1951 Report of the Working Party on the “Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession 
under Article XIX” concluded that “action under Article XIX is essentially of an emergency character.  
54
 Regarding the duration of action under Article XIX at the 1946 London Preparatory Conference it was 
stated during the course of the discussion of Article 29, the draft Article corresponding to Article XIX, that 
“the Article provided only for a temporary relaxation of commitments, not for a permanent revision”.  It was 
also stated that “the general purpose of Article 29 is to deal with an emergency situation.   
55
 At the Havana Conference, it was decided to substitute the words “in circumstances of special urgency” for 
“in critical circumstances” as a clarifying change.  However, this was not among those Charter changes which 
were brought into the General Agreement in 1948. 
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 The 1984 Report by the Chairman of the GATT Council with respect to the provision “if 
agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not 
reached
56” appearing in the text of the General Agreement noted that “contracting parties 
have been given the right to re-establish the balance of rights and obligations … if this is 
significantly modified ... the threat of retaliation could have a deterrent effect against the 
application of safeguard actions … wherever possible, constructive settlements should be 
reached involving compensation rather than the retaliatory withdrawal of benefits 
...”(emphasis added).   While retaliation is legally permissible under the GATT, it has 
rarely been the ‘final outcome’ in practice in the disputed cases of application of an 
emergency safeguards measure.   It was only recently in the US vs. EC Banana Regime and 
the Beef/Hormone cases that GATT/WTO sanctioned retaliations had also been 
implemented.    Prior to this it was only in the Netherlands v. US Dairy Quotas case where 
the retaliation was actually sanctioned by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.     However, 
this lack of practice of retaliation does not in any way suggest that retaliation either as a 
concept or as a legal provision is irrelevant simply because it has rarely been used by the 
affected exporting country.  The possibility of retaliation has been instrumental in 
minimizing the misuse of the ESMs and has been a major deterrent because retaliation has 
repeatedly been threatened during bilateral consultations on the application of an ESM by 
an importing country. Had retaliation not been permissible under Article XIX (3) 
emergency safeguard measures would probably have been used much more frequently
57
.   
 
  The Panels and the AB
58
  while interpreting the provisions in the text of the Article XIX 
“to suspend ... the application ... of such substantially equivalent concessions” have 
invariably accepted that the exporting contracting party which has been effected by the 
emergency safeguards measure has the right to take retaliatory action.   However, to create 
a balance it has simultaneously to be ensured that the suspension of commitments by the 
                                               
56
 Article XIX (C) of GATT. 
57
 World Trade Organization, Analytical Index, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Volume I, Geneva, 1995, 
pp. 539-59.  (Till 1995 there were only 11 safeguards instances in which an affected country either cited 
Article XIX: 3 or made a formal request for retaliation.) 
58
 Article XIX 3(a) February 1982 Council discussion of the proposed EEC measures under Article XIX: 3 
with respect to Australia.  Import restrictions under Article XIX applied by Australia on motor vehicles and 
on footwear were in effect since 1974/75 and the European Communities intentions were notified in 1982, to 
suspend tariff concessions granted by the Community on selected imports from Australia “in accordance with 
the procedures of …”  
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exporting country as a retaliation should not be open-ended because the application of a 
safeguards measure, which is being retaliated against, has a sunset provision. Right to 
retaliate is an accepted principle, and at best, it is the nature and the extent of this action 
and whether or not there existed a substantial equivalence in the safeguards measure and in 
the retaliatory the action taken which can be disputed.    The CONTRACTING PARTIES 
have never “disapproved” of a countermeasure to a withdrawal pursuant to Article XIX: 
3(a), and there is only one instance where the CONTRACTING PARTIES took a ‘formal 
decision not to disapprove’ proposed compensatory action59.  
 
  Some other provisions that are contained in the text of Article XIX and that lay down the 
qualifying circumstances and also legitimize application of an emergency safeguard 
measure also have some ambiguities about them. These required to be clarified through the 
case law and GATT jurisprudence emerging out of the findings of the Panels and Appellate 
Body. These ambiguous textual provisions and that required to be given a meaning through 
Dispute Settlement process include concepts like; i) being imported ... in such increased 
quantities; ii) the extent and for such time as may be necessary; iii) substantial interest; iv) 
to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession;; and 
vii) if agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not 
reached.   
2.4.2. EVOLUTION OF ESMS UNDER GATT. 
The initial ambiguity and rapidly diminishing relevance of some provisions with passage of 
time led to the recognition of the need to redefine Article XIX of GATT as early as late 60s 
i.e. well before the start of the Tokyo Round of MTNs.  The rapid economic emergence of 
Japan along with some other developing countries led to the rise in the use of trade 
limitation measures that were not permitted under the General Agreement which were 
undermining the very credibility of the entire GATT Multilateral Trading System.  The 
discussions held in the GATT during that period with respect to the trade limiting 
mechanisms that were alien to the GATT system focussed primarily on the “selectivity in 
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 World Trade Organization, Analytical Index, Guide to GATT Law and Practice. Volume I,  Geneva, 
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application of emergency safeguards measures
60”.   The major exporting developing 
countries were strongly opposed to introduction of any form of selectivity and the 
importing countries increasingly turned to the use of forms of safeguard actions, which 
were specifically not authorized under the GATT rules
61
.   These measures were termed as 
‘grey area’ measures and were seen as substitutes for the emergency safeguard action and 
their use probably flourished because of the short comings
62
 of Article XIX of the GATT.  
   Application and improvement of GATT disciplines on ESMs has been a topic under 
discussion from almost the beginning of the GATT system and the subject accordingly was 
also included in the agenda of the Tokyo Round
63
, which were the first major MTNs with a 
broad coverage.  The Tokyo Declaration
64
 desired that the negotiations on ‘emergency 
safeguards’ should aim, inter alia, to “include an examination of the adequacy of the 
multilateral safeguard system, considering particularly the modalities of application of 
Article XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization and preserving its results”.  
However, despite intensive efforts and some narrowing of differences the focus of the 
negotiations during the MTNs remained on ‘selectivity’65 of the applied measures and no 
agreement was reached.  
 
 Even after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round the development of disciplines for 
emergency safeguards remained under constant consideration in the GATT.  The pre-
negotiation consultations for the future Round of MTNs included many of the old or 
conventional GATT issues, some of which were genuine leftovers from the Tokyo Round 
while in some other cases formal follow-up or continued negotiations had already been 
agreed in the Tokyo Round outcome. The Tokyo Round results; both the ‘process 
outcomes’ and the ‘tangible products’, combined with the continued consultations created a 
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 Didier Pierre, WTO Trade Instruments in EU Trade Law, Cameron May, London Reprint 2000, p 297 
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 Like Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) or the Orderly Marketing Arrangements (OMAs).  These grey 
area measures were widely used to limit competition primarily in the automobiles, steel, footwear and 
electronic products.  
62
 The whole structure of bilateral restrictions on trade in textiles and clothing under the MFA was regarded 
as a substitute for Article XIX safeguard action.   
63
 Though Tokyo Round (1973-79) was the seventh round of MTNs but all previous rounds focused on 
reduction of Tariffs while Tokyo Round was broad, covered Tariffs, non-tariff measures and ‘framework’ 
agreements.  More than hundred countries participated in the negotiations. 
64
 Tokyo Declaration adopted in September 1973, launched the Tokyo Round of MTNs. 
65
 Sapir André, Old and New Issues in EC-US Trade Disputes Paper for the Conference on “Transatlantic 
Perspectives on US-EU Economic Relations: Convergence, Conflict & Cooperation”, Harvard University, 
April, 2002. 
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significant link between the Tokyo and the next Round of MTNs that followed it and was 
launched in Uruguay. The precise nature and depth of these linkages, however, varied from 
subject to subject and depended on the results achieved in the Tokyo Round MTNs. In the 
area of emergency safeguards (Article XIX), the Tokyo Round negotiations had failed to 
move forward. Because of the importance significance of the subject to most newly 
industrialized countries that feared proliferation of non-GATT permitted measure, the 
negotiations on ESMs could not just be dropped. Therefore, the failure to reach an 
Agreement was managed through insertion of a process outcome in the Tokyo Round 
declaration and agreeing to a plan for continued discussions.   In the area of emergency 
safeguards the Tokyo Round outcome was procedurally and substantively linked to the pre-
negotiations of the Uruguay Round
66.  The “GATT Work Programme” of 1979 in the area 
of emergency safeguards also agreed that “continued negotiations on safeguards constitute 
an essential element … and should be carried out as a matter of urgency …67” In 1982 
CONTRACTING PARTIES again provided that “the contracting parties undertake, 
individually and jointly ... to bring into effect expeditiously a comprehensive understanding 
on safeguards to be based on the principles of the General Agreement
68”.    
 
 The September 1986 Punta Del Este ministerial meeting determined the agenda of the 
upcoming Uruguay Round.  Although of decisive significance, the Punta Del Este meeting 
was in reality only an episode in a long chain of events that eventually lead to the start of a 
new GATT round of MTNs.  The ministerial meeting in Punta del Este not only was the 
formal starting point of the Uruguay Round but also represented the closure of another 
process, that of pre-negotiations
69
.  The Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration, which 
launched the Uruguay Round of MTNs, in the area of safeguards provided that:  “A 
comprehensive agreement on safeguards is of particular importance to the strengthening of 
the GATT system and to progress in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations ….” The 
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declaration then goes on to define the contours of the Agreement on safeguards to be 
negotiated. 
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CHAPTER 3:  Article XIX: AoS  
 
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
To deal with the mandated ‘question of emergency safeguard measures under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services’ (Article X of GATS) it is essentially required that the 
concepts behind ESMs, as it is already practiced in the area of merchandise trade, be 
understood both with respect to the justifications and also the conditionality’s of its 
application.   The development of the concept from under Article XIX of GATT to an 
independent Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) under the WTO and resulting jurisprudence 
has created new balances amongst the Members and requires a review.   The Chapter 3 
looks at evolution of the concept, underlying reasons for introduction of ‘extra-legal1’ 
measures like Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and evolution of Agreement on 
Safeguards (AoS) and its negotiations. The Chapter also analyses the development of case 
law under Article XIX of GATT and the AoS and some relevant internal law provisions of 
important economies like the EC and the US.   This is not an exhaustive exercise but 
contrarily it is fairly minimal in nature.  
 
The Chapter also tries to identify the additionalities or the deviations, if any, that have been 
created by the AoS over GATT Article XIX provisions, to the post UR regime relating to 
application of ESMs under the GATT/WTO system. The chapter also briefly refers to the 
decisions of the Panels and Appellate Body when interpreting key provisions of the law and 
attempts to analyse the AoS. Most Panel and Appellate body rulings discussed relate to the 
period prior to the 2007; when negotiations were suspended under the WTO on the issues 
relevant to the thesis. This brings out major concerns that already exist with the concept of 
ESMs under the GATT and that render it in-coherent.  
 
                                               
1
 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Note by the Secretariat "Inventory of Article XIX actions and other 
measures which appear to serve the same purpose" (MTN.GNG/NG9/W/2/Rev.1).   
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 The Chapter has consciously been  kept to a minimum so as to retain space for the 
substantive work that is to follow, therefore,  only touches those issues that have a natural 
linkage or impact on the manner in which any ESMs can possibly be structured for the 
services sector drawing from within the GATT/WTO context, this was important as when 
Ministers agreed at Punta del Este in 1986 to launch Uruguay Round (UR) of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (MTNs); they also decided, “ as part of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, to launch negotiations on trade in services…. GATT procedures and practices 
shall apply to these negotiations”.  
The chapter in essence provides the basic understanding about the paradigm provided by 
the model of the ESMs as it original existed under the GATT and that was subsequently 
improved by the AoS. This Chapter is central to the thesis as it provides the basic bench 
marks against which all the other models or options for developing provisions for 
application of ESMs under the GATS are evaluated. This bench marking was created by 
multiple influencing factors that among others included the ‘formulation of the mandate’, 
‘interpretation by the members’, the concept of ‘single undertaking’ and GATS structure 
and relationship with GATT and the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
WTO.  
3.2 BACKGROUND: AoS   
 
The experience of developing countries with the Tokyo Round (TR) Multilateral 
Negotiations (MTNs) was not very comforting as in major areas of their concern consensus 
that was sought by them could not be reached.  The Tokyo Round outcome can, at the risk 
of overgeneralisation, be bifurcated into; i) tangible and; ii) procedural component or 
outcomes. In most areas of interest to the developing countries there were no substantive 
decisions and the negotiating outcome was simply limited to a process outcome calling for 
‘continued negotiations’.   While in areas of substantive interests to the developed countries 
and also where agreement on multilateral level was not possible, sector specific side 
agreements were concluded and adopted through mechanism of the ‘voluntary codes2’ 
approach. This plurilateral outcome of exhausting multilateral negotiations was daunting 
                                               
2
 The side  agreements  that were agreed under Tokyo Round MTNs included  codes on; Customs Valuation,  
Government  Procurement,  Standards,  Import Licensing, Subsidies,  and  Antidumping  and  Countervailing  
Duties, International Dairy Arrangement, Trade in Civil Aircraft and Bovine meat Arrangement 
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for the developing countries as by mid 1980s (that was also the pre-negotiating period for 
the UR) these developing countries had already been made to accept and subscribe to most 
of the disciplines of these ‘voluntary codes’ through different mechanisms including the 
conditionality attached to the structural adjustment programmes associated with the 
funding’s provided by the International Financial Institutions like IMF and IBRD.  
 
The decisions contained in the Tokyo Round (TR) Declaration were onerous as well as 
demanding for the developing countries. These agreements were fairly broad with respect 
to their coverage and also the scope. The TR Agreements also had great depth
3
 for the 
developing countries while for the developed countries these were only multilateralization 
of their existing domestic practices. The substantive or tangible part of the outcome 
comprised of elements like deepened liberalization and the emergence and adoption of 
plurilateral codes.  The procedural component of the outcome provided for a broad 
framework for continued negotiations primarily on two general counts; i) in areas, though 
included in the agenda of the MTNs but, where negotiations could not be concluded within 
the framework of the Tokyo Round and; ii) on continued further liberalization of 
international trade.  
 
The outcome of Tokyo Round MTNs in its substantive or tangible component had totally 
failed to develop any understanding on the issues facing the concept ESMs under the 
GATT. However, in its process outcome, the contracting parties agreed to continue the 
negotiations on the issue of ESMs, which was fairly sensitive especially for advanced 
developing countries, with respect to any possibility of selectivity or source specific 
creeping into the application of emergency safeguards measures.  The concerns about 
possible evolution of ESMs especially their non-discriminatory character was important for 
more advanced developing countries which apprehended that any dilution of the concept of 
non-discrimination in the application of the ESMs will open the doors to their being 
frequently subjected to the measures. The advanced developing countries were, therefore, 
                                               
3
 The concept of depth of an international agreement reflects ‘the extent to which an Agreement requires 
states to depart from what they would have done in its absence’.  The notion of depth varies from country to 
country and is itself unsatisfactory because it requires speculation about a counter-factual set of actions, 
because it is impossible to quantify, and because a single agreement may demand large changes in some 
states and virtually no changes in others. 
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the most vocal in the MTNs and provided the intellectual lead to other developing countries 
and ensured that their views should sound as voice of consensus representing all developed 
countries.  The advanced developing countries also effectively used external available 
platforms to forge results, within the developing countries, of their preference on the issues 
involved through discussions in forums like ‘Group of 77’, South Centre Secretariat4 and 
UNCTAD.  The issues surrounding the ESMs were complicated and gaps between different 
viewpoints of major stakeholder were so large that these could not be bridged during the 
negotiating process; simultaneously the issue was also important enough for a group of 
important developing countries that it could not be abandoned outright, therefore, was dealt 
through a process outcome understanding.  
 
 The agenda developed after a long drawn negotiating process for the Uruguay Round 
consisted partly of the unsettled issues from the Tokyo Round like the deadlocked 
negotiations on safeguards (Article XIX in GATT) and of leftovers from the Tokyo Round 
comprising of the trade problems that important actors in the GATT process considered to 
be improperly solved in earlier rounds of negotiations. The Punta Del Este declaration  
recognized the need for “A comprehensive agreement on safeguards is of particular 
importance to the strengthening of the GATT system and to progress in the MTNs” and 
provided for negotiations for an  “agreement on safeguards” that; i) shall be based on the 
basic principles of the General Agreement; ii)  shall contain, inter alia, the elements of 
transparency, coverage, objective criteria for action including the concept of serious injury 
or threat thereof, temporary nature, structural adjustment, compensation and retaliation, 
notification, consultation, multilateral surveillance and dispute settlement; and iii) shall 
clarify and reinforce the disciplines of the General Agreement and should apply to all 
contracting parties
5”, this mandate given by the Ministers was a primarily a repetition along 
with some elaboration of what was agreed at the 1982 Ministerial but in elaboration the 
specific element of non-discrimination was conspicuous by absence.  
3.3 AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS (AoS) 
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 South Centre, Safeguards in  GATSs Important for  Developing Countries, Geneva September 2005 
5
 GATT Punta Del Este Declaration Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986 
CHAPTER 3 
 50 
In the framework created for the conduct of the negotiations under the Uruguay Round of 
MTNs a separate negotiating group on emergency safeguards was created with a strong and 
well defined but complex mandate. The negotiations in the group on emergency safeguards 
were primarily an extension of a process that was already underway from the Tokyo 
Round, therefore, the negotiating group was able to get down to real work quickly and 
substantive proposals for negotiations were tabled before the Group as early as May 1987, 
when some parallel negotiating groups established other agenda items were still struggling 
to define their working parameters.  Success of the negotiations on Emergency Safeguards 
in the UR was regarded by some as essential to restore the credibility of the GATT system 
which provided the basic rules for conduct of international trade in goods.   The issues 
confronting the negotiators were already fairly well known and by as early as April 1987 
the Group also had before it a Secretariat Note on “Work Already Undertaken in the GATT 
on Safeguards
6”.   The note detailed the history of discussions on emergency safeguards 
under the GATT and also “listed the whole array of reasons as to why the previous 
negotiations on the emergency safeguards had failed and also covered almost all of the 
main problems with which the UR negotiators were required to grapple”7.   The main issue 
of disagreement during the negotiations was simply whether or not the emergency 
safeguard measures should be allowed to be applied on a selective basis, this has been a 
controversial issue and debated intensely from almost the inception of the GATT
8
.  
 The Uruguay Round of MTNs finally led to development of an independent Agreement on 
Safeguards (AoS).  The use of temporary trade restrictions under its Article XIX and the 
Agreement on Safeguards authorized under the GATT.  However, the advent of the WTO 
in 1995 added new structures of safeguard provisions contained in the Agreements that 
covered new areas of trade that were integrated into the system, like new safeguards 
structure is found in the Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services’ ( Article X).  The Article 6 of now defunct Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which transitioned the full integration of textile trade in to 
the WTO, also provided for a sector specific transitional safeguard regime. Subsequently a 
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 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade Work Already Undertaken in the GATT on Safeguards Document 
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China specific WTO-plus safeguards regime was created at the time of country’s accession 
in 2001. 
The Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) introduces a number of innovations over Article XIX 
and practices that had over the long years crept into the realm of ESMs.  The AoS 
established the rules for application of the emergency safeguards in trade and goods and 
“created a new balance of rights and obligations”9 between the importing Member 
countries suffering or threatened by ‘serious injury’ and exporting Member country 
suffering lack of predictability and disruption to its trade flows.    The Agreement forbids 
‘grey area measures10’ and seeks through this prohibition to “re-establish control over 
safeguards
11”.    The Agreement seeks to end the use of illegal grey area measures through 
two devices. The first is a simple prohibition on them – Article 11 (1) (b) of the AoS 
provides that ‘…a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export or the 
import side…’ Second, to diminish the perceived incentives to resort to grey area 
substitutes, the AoS alerts the rules regarding compensation and retaliation and provides 
that “All members using safeguards ‘shall endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent 
level of concessions’, i.e. to negotiate trade compensation. But if negotiations over 
compensation are unsuccessful, no right of retaliation exists during the first three years of a 
safeguard measure that conforms to the legal requirements of the agreement and that 
follows an absolute increase in the level of imports [Article 8(3)].  Thus, the ‘threat point’ 
is plainly altered in the compensation negotiations, and nations adversely affected by 
safeguards actions must settle for less in compensation lest they walk away with nothing 
for three years
12”.  Under the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) the automatic right to 
retaliate against an application of a safeguard measure has been suspended for the first 
three years, “provided that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an absolute 
increase in imports and that such a measure conforms to the provisions
13” of the 
Agreement.  
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 Guzman Andrew and Alan O Sykes Edward Elgar (Edited), Research Handbook in International Economic 
Law, USA, 2007. p.66 
13
 Article 8.3 of  the AoS  
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 The Agreement maintains the general non-discriminatory application requirement
14
, but on 
balance it creates a possibility and does allow an importing country to apply emergency 
safeguards measures selectively if imports from certain countries have increased in 
disproportionate percentage
15
. It defines important terms that justify application of  an ESM 
such as ‘serious injury’16, calls for consultations with affected countries17, makes 
safeguards measures time bound
18
 and also lays down that any imposed measures need to 
be progressively liberalised
19
 thus ensuring link of ESMs with adjustment.   The Agreement 
also lays down basic parameters for application of measures like if safeguards measures are 
taken by an importing country in the form of quantitative restrictions (QR) on imports then 
these QRs are not allowed to be below the average level of imports over the past three 
years
20
.   Other important elements of the AoS include procedural aspects of application 
such as the fact that import duties imposed on the product on which provisional emergency 
safeguards measure has been applied are to be reimbursed should the outcome of the 
investigation not show serious injury caused by imports
21
 i.e. there is no definitive 
application of the measure. 
3.3.1. ARTICLE XIX OF GATT AND AOS 
  
The emergency safeguards regime under the WTO is regulated both by the Agreement on 
Safeguards and Article XIX
22
 of the General Agreement.   The defence under GATT 
Article XIX is available as much for violations under GATT as for violations under the 
Agreement on Safeguards.   The Panel on US-Line Pipe rightly observed, “A contrary 
interpretation would ignore the close interrelation between Article XIX and the Agreement 
on Safeguards. This interrelationship of the AoS with Article XIX of the General 
Agreement is specifically spelled out in Article 1 of the AOS which reads as “This 
                                               
14
 Article 2.2 of  the AoS  
15
 Article 5.2 (b) of  the AoS 
16
 Article 4.1.(a) of  the AoS 
17
 Article 12.3 of  the AoS 
18
 Article 7.3 and 9.2 of the AoS, provides a maximum of eight years for developed countries and 10 years for 
developing countries. 
19
  Article 7.2 
20
 Article  8.1 of  the AOS 
21
 Article 6 of the AOS 
22
 World Trade Organization; United States: Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products: AB-2003-3: Report of the Appellate Body. The Report highlights the 'inseparable package' and 
'inseparable relationship' between GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards 
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Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall be 
understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994”. 
  Article XIX (GATT) and the AoS are both integral parts of the WTO Agreement
23
, are 
binding on all WTO Members and both require to be complied to when applying an 
emergency safeguard measure
24
.   However, like in case of similar other WTO Agreements, 
the relationship between the Article XIX of GATT and the AoS was questioned from the 
very beginning of the WTO.  The variance in the wordings of the Article XIX and AOS 
also gave rise to the controversy. 
3.3.2. UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS 
The requirements of “unforeseen developments” are unambiguously enshrined in 
Article XIX of the GATT, but not explicitly repeated in the AoS.   According to some 
developing country Members it is a legally meaningful and viable concept, despite the 
degree of subjectivity involved in defining it.     Simultaneously there is another view 
which is mostly shared by the developed countries that there is no need for the explicit 
inclusion of the wordings of  ‘unforeseen developments’ as the occurrence of ‘serious 
injury’ already implies a drastic change in trading conditions, which had not been foreseen 
at the time when the binding commitments were undertaken by a country.  Some members 
also have doubts whether the notion of unforeseen developments under GATT was 
sufficiently precise to prevent abuse and feels that there is a need for objective tests of 
emergency situations, based on readily available information or standard practices.  
 Article XIX of GATT contains the concept and requirement of “unforeseen” developments 
as its base and then goes on to unfold itself further, this provision or prerequisite is not 
replicated in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards.  
Paragraph 1 of GATT Article XIX is worded as: 
                                               
23
 World Trade Organisation, The Legal Texts, The Results of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1999. Marrakesh Agreement establishing WTO 
Article II: 2 p 4. The Article provides that “the Agreements and associated legal instruments included in 
Annexes 1, 2 & 3 … are integral parts of the WTO Agreement, binding on all Members”. 
24
 Article 11.1 of the AOS provides that a safeguard need to be applied both in accordance with GATT Article 
XIX and the AOS. 
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If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff 
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that 
contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as 
to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of 
like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in 
respect of such product…”  
Whereas the corresponding Article 2.1 of the AOS provides that: 
A member may apply a safeguard measure only if that Member has 
determined that a product is imported into its territory in such increased 
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic 
industry…. 
The provisions laying the precondition relating to ‘unforeseen developments’ and 
‘obligations incurred’ that are contained and central to Article XIX of the General 
Agreement have not been repeated in the AoS. The AoS makes no reference either to 
“unforeseen developments” or to the “effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting 
party under this Agreement”. 
This difference in the wordings was required to be clarified by the dispute settlement 
system to determine that whether the requirements under GATT Article XIX were still 
valid in invoking an emergency safeguards measure after coming into effect of the WTO or 
not as AoS makes no explicit reference to “unforeseen developments” or to the “effects of 
the obligations incurred”.  This discrepancy in the wordings in the text of Article XIX and 
AoS was a contentious issue in several of the disputes
25
 as the absence of the specific 
qualifying wordings was interpreted and understood by some countries and Panel members 
                                               
25
 World Trade Organisation, Appellate Body reports in cases of  Korea-Dairy (2000), Argentina-Footwear 
(2000), US-Frozen Lamb (2001) and US-Steel (2003) all Reports in these cases discuss the issue of 
‘unforeseen developments’ in detail.  
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to mean that the requirement of “unforeseen development” is no longer applicable26 under 
the AoS.     
  The issue of non-replication of the words or the concept of “unforeseen developments” in 
the text of the Agreement was confronted in the very first dispute on emergency 
safeguards, which reached the Panel stage under the AoS
27
.    Korea in Korea--Dairy 
Products argued (supported by the United States) that the provisions contained in text of 
the Agreement on Safeguards after establishment of the WTO now establish the sole 
articulation of the rules that must be followed in the application of an emergency safeguard 
measure
28
.    However, the European Commission (EC) during the deliberations argued 
otherwise before the Panel and was of the view that all WTO obligations are generally 
cumulative and that the provisions of Article XIX of GATT even after the AoS coming into 
force are still fully applicable.  In terms of the interpretations of the EC there was no 
conflict between the provisions of the first paragraph of Article XIX of the GATT and of 
Article 2.1 of the AoS.   The Panel in this case agreed with Korea that a Member applying a 
safeguard measure need not prove that an increase in imports was the result of an 
‘unforeseen development’ implying that the clause did not add a condition for the adoption 
of a safeguard measure and the fact that Korea had failed to examine whether the import 
trends of the products under investigation were the result of ‘unforeseen developments’ was 
not a violation of Article XIX: 1(a) of the General Agreement. The Panel also reiterated the 
distinction between ‘unforeseen’ and ‘unforeseeable’, which was also drawn by the 
Appellate Body in Korea—Dairy Products29.    These findings of the Panel were, however, 
substantively modified shortly thereafter by the Appellate Body.  
  Turning to a literal interpretation, the AB has initially favoured a subjectivist approach by 
equating “unforeseen” to “unexpected” in the important Hatter's Fur case, and this 
approach has consistently been followed in other disputes like Footwear case, Korea--
                                               
26
 The Panel in Korea Dairy for example held that GATT Article XIX does not impose any obligation to 
investigate the ‘unforeseen developments’. 
27
 Korea--Dairy Products; Korea in 1997 imposed ESMs on imports of skimmed milk powder and 
preparations in the form of quotas. The European Communities challenged the imposition of the measures. 
The United States participated as a third party in terms of the … of the DSU 
28
 World Trade Organisation, Korea--Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS98/R, June 21, 1999, p. 26-46. 
29
 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products ("Korea – Dairy "), WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000.     The AB was of the 
view that the term ‘unforeseen’ implies a lesser threshold than the ‘unforeseeable’ . 
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Dairy Products.  The Reports practically complemented the subjective dimension of 
unforeseen with the requirement of an objective un-foreseeability. “This trend towards the 
general obligation of un-foreseeability is in line with the general approach in public 
international law towards the “fundamental change of circumstances”30. 
  
The Appellate Body, regarded that the wording “as a result of unforeseen developments” 
appearing in Article XIX: 1(a) of the General Agreement was, however, not an independent 
condition on its own for the application of an emergency safeguard measure but it did 
describe certain circumstances which must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for 
an application of an emergency safeguard measure to be consistent with the provisions of 
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the AoS. These findings of the Appellate Body that 
‘unforeseen developments’ had to be explored by the country imposing the safeguard 
measures, were effectively used a year later by Australia and New Zealand in Lamb Meat 
case when they successfully argued
31
 that the United States had not fulfilled this 
requirement
32
 before imposing emergency safeguards on their lamb meat exports.  The 
Panel also examined the relationship between GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on 
Safeguard and reaffirmed the findings in Korea—Dairy Products, and Argentina—
Footwear that the ‘unforeseen development’ is a factual circumstance, which has to be 
demonstrated as a matter of fact
33
 and actual reality based exercise.  
  The Appellate Body’s rulings in the Lamb Meat case fine-tuned the legal requirements on 
“unforeseen developments” for the domestic authorities entrusted with investigating injury 
in cases of possible application of emergency safeguards. AB was of the view that “as 
Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 requires that ‘unforeseen developments’ must be 
demonstrated, as a matter of fact, for a safeguard measure to be applied, the existence of 
‘unforeseen developments’ is, in our view, a ‘pertinent issue of fact and law’, under Article 
                                               
30
 Rodriâguez Pablo Martiân, Safeguards in the World Trade Organization Ten Years After: A Dissociated 
State of the Law? Journal of World Trade 41(1): 159-190, 2007. p 162 
31
 United States--Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat, Report of the 
Panel, WT/DS177/R and WT/DS178/R, December 21, 2000, pares 7.4-7.45, pp. 25-33. 
32
 The US had ignored this requirement of the law and as a matter of fact had not included this legal demand 
in its investigation processes.  
33
 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000.  The AB held that the phrase 'unforeseen 
developments' in Article XIX: 1 is grammatically linked to both 'in such increased quantities' and 'under such 
conditions'.    
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3.1, for the application of a safeguard measure, and it follows that the published report of 
the competent authorities, under that Article, must contain a ‘finding’ or ‘reasoned 
conclusion’ on ‘unforeseen developments’.   
The Appellate Body’s comment in Argentina – Footwear Safeguard demonstrates that the 
required exercise is a reality-based discipline; and the AB had focused on the concept of a 
‘clear showing’ of the activity. This concept differs from the presumption of nullification or 
impairment observed in the law of expectations, which shows that the exercise of a right by 
one country could give rise to a claim for reparation from another country, a possibility 
contemplated in the remedy of negotiated compensation
34
 under DSU
35
.   
The Appellate Body (AB) agreed with the Panel to the extent that the WTO Agreement is 
a “Single Undertaking” and that Members must comply with all of the WTO obligations.  
The AB simultaneously concluded that the provisions of both; Article XIX: 1 of the GATT 
1994 and Article 2.1 of the AoS apply to any emergency safeguard measure taken under the 
WTO Agreement.  AB further stated that it was under a duty to apply the principle of 
effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties and also read all applicable provisions in a way 
that gives meaning to all of them harmoniously.  
3.3.3. INCREASE IN IMPORTS AND SERIOUS INJURY. 
 
The AoS provides (Article 2.1) “that safeguard measures may be applied only if a product 
is imported in such increased quantities (i.e. volumes, not values), either in absolute terms 
or relative to domestic production, as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to 
domestic industry Here, the increase of imports is measured in relation to domestic 
production, unlike in anti-dumping and countervailing scenarios, where the relevant 
comparator may be either domestic production or consumption. The possibility of “relative 
increases” appears to imply that imports may even fall, as long as by less than domestic 
production, and still fulfill this requirement. There is no specific numerical threshold in 
terms of import growth that must be exceeded before action can be taken. However, the 
                                               
34
 Carmody Chios A Theory of WTO Law Journal of International Economic Law 11(3), 527–557 
35
  Article  3.8 of ‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ reads as “In 
cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is 
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment…”. 
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Appellate Body also clarified that not all increased quantities of imports (absolute or 
relative) might allow for safeguard action
36”. 
  
To justify an application of emergency safeguard measure increase in imports
37
 must “be 
such” so as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury38.   However, in the case of US-
Lamb Meat, the Appellate Body opined that “the standard of ‘serious injury’ set forth in 
Article 4.1(a) is, on its face, very high. In the US-Wheat Gluten Safeguard AB clarified 
that, “we referred to this standard as ‘exacting’ . . . We believe that the word ‘serious’ 
connotes a much higher standard of injury than the word ‘material39”.  “Serious injury is a 
high threshold, which raises the expectation that evidence of negative developments in 
injury indicators should be significant
40”. The serious injury has been defined in AoS as a 
significant “overall impairment” in the position of a domestic industry41, and the competent 
authority is required to “evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature 
having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the 
increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the 
domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, 
productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment”42.  
 For an emergency safeguard measure to qualify as to have been rightly applied a causal 
link between the increased imports and the injury
43
 to the domestic industry has necessarily 
to be established recognizing the fact that the concept of ‘serious injury’ for application of 
an ESMs has been determined to be a level of injury above the “material injury” standard 
used in case of investigations relating to antidumping
44
.    This issue of causation has been 
the subject of controversy in some of the cases addressed by the Appellate Body
45
.  Despite 
the availability of reliable statistical data in the international merchandise trade the 
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 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2009, Geneva. p.53 
37
 Article 2.1 of AOS 
38
 Article 4.1 (a-b) of the AOS defines serious injury. 
39
Appellate Body Report  US-Wheat Gluten para124 
40
 Stevenson Cliff, Are World Trade Organization Members Correctly Applying World Trade Organization 
Rules in Safeguard Determinations? Journal of World Trade 38(2): 307- 329, 2004 p 312 
41
 AoS Article 4.1.a 
42
 AoS, Article. 4 .2 (a). 
43
 Article 4 .2 (b) AOS  
44
Appellate Body Report US-Wheat Gluten Para. 149 
45
 Issues on injury and causation were ruled upon in US-Lamb Meat, US-Wheat Gluten and Argentine-
Footwear. The Appellate Body declined to rule on the issue in US-Steel. 
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requirement of evaluating the causes of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic 
industry, is not simple. For the application of the emergency safeguards measures a causal 
link between the imports and injury and its attribution
46
 to imports is required to be 
established which a demanding agenda for the domestic enforcement institutions.   
 
 The timings of injury being experienced by the domestic producers and the increase in 
imports may coincide but in such circumstances it cannot be ruled out with certainty as to 
which way the causality between imports and injury is moving in reality.   This is 
especially so when there is only a relative increase in imports, i.e. when the market has 
shrunk and this has hit the domestic suppliers harder than the foreign suppliers, whose 
supplies might have remained unchanged.    Here the questions arise regarding the 
methodology to examine such a relationship.  The Appellate Body has chosen to follow 
causation as a correlations approach and has ruled that a coincidence of a higher level of 
imports and a lower level of domestic activity usually constitutes sufficient evidence that 
imports have caused injury
47
.   
 
 The AoS does not require that the ‘increased imports’ necessarily have to be sufficient 
enough to alone cause injury or even the fact that these increased imports should be the 
most important cause of injury
48
.   In Lamb and Wheat Gluten, the AB had recognized 
multiple causation and reversed the Panel's finding which had demanded that increase in 
imports to be the only and efficient cause (in and of themselves) of the serious injury. 
Accordingly, ‘the causal link’ between increased imports and serious injury may exist, even 
though other factors are also contributing ‘at the same time’, to the situation of the 
domestic industry
49
. 
 The AoS only requires that injury caused by other factors is not attributed to import, which 
is commonly referred to as the non-attribution requirement.  This has also been interpreted 
                                               
46
 This principle of attribution is common to all the three contingency protection instruments under GATT.   
47
United States: Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities: 
Report of the Panel; Para. 8.95. The Panel felt that “However, this could also reflect market conditions where 
decreased domestic supply immediately causes increased imports”. 
48
US Wheat Gluten Paras. 69-74. The investigating authorities should determine whether the increase in 
imports, not alone, but in conjunction with the other relevant factors is cause of serious injury  
49
 AB Report, US - Wheat Gluten, Para. 67 (emphasis is from the report). 
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to mean that the factors causing injury need to be distinguished and separated
50
.    
However, once this has been done it is enough for the investigating authority to show that 
increased imports, not alone but in conjunction with other relevant factors have caused 
serious injury
51
.   It is difficult to see reason of distinguishing various injury factors, if it is 
not to show that the import factor is at least an important factor, however, the AoS only 
requires separation and not ranking of different injury factors
52
.   
   
 Article 2.1 of the AoS speaks of a product ‘being imported’  which appears to imply that it 
is necessary for the competent authorities to examine recent imports, and not just simply 
trends in imports during any arbitrary period of last several years.  Appellate Body in 
Argentina--Footwear with respect to the attribution of increased imports had ruled that 
‘such increase’ must be “recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant 
enough” so as to cause serious injury and that it was not sufficient to examine “simply 
trends in imports during the past five years – or, for that matter, during any other period of 
several years
53”.This statement precluded the simple comparison of import levels at the end 
points of the investigation period, as Argentina had done in this case.   
 
 However, in another case, “the Appellate Body gave importance of import trends over the 
entire period of investigation along with an explanation of how these developments 
supported the investigation authority’s determination that increases in imports were such as 
to cause/threaten to cause serious injury to domestic industry
54
. In US – Line Pipe, the 
panel pointed out that a finding of increased import quantities was still possible even if 
imports declined for part of the period of investigation (including towards the end of the 
investigation period), as long as there clearly was an increasing trend in imports over the 
relevant time period as a whole
55”.  
                                               
50
 US-Lamb pares. 178-180) In US-Lamb Meat, the Appellate Body states that: “. . . the final identification of 
the injurious effects caused by increased imports must follow a prior separation of the injurious effects of the 
different causal factors. If the different factors are not separated and distinguished from the effects of 
increased imports, there can be no proper assessment of the injury caused by that single decisive factor”. 
51
 US-Wheat Gluten Para. 78, US-Line Pipe Para. 209. 
52
 Article 4.2 (b) of the AOS requirement only. 
53
 World Trade Organisation, Argentina--Footwear, the Appellate Body  decision, document No 
WT/DS121/R, para.131and 130 
54
 Appellate Body Report on US – Steel Safeguards, pares. 354- 355 and 374 and Panel Report on US – Line 
Pipe, Para. 7.207 
55
 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2009, Geneva. p.53 
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The reason for separating the injury factors could be the Appellate Body’s interpretation of 
Article 5.1 of the AoS which limits the application of a safeguard measure to what is 
required (US-Line Pipe, paragraph. 260).   “to prevent or remedy serious injury and to 
facilitate adjustment”.    Thus under AoS even though the increased imports do not alone 
need to cause serious injury, the eventual safeguard measure must only remedy the serious 
injury that has been caused by the increased imports.    The import factor is, therefore, 
necessarily required to be distinguished from other factors
56
 to ensure that the safeguard 
measures are only taken to the extent that necessary to prevent injury caused by imports
57
.  
3.3.4. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY, LIKE PRODUCTS 
The definition of the domestic industry under the SGA includes producers of both ‘like’ 
and ‘directly competitive’ products and both of these criteria leave some room for 
interpretation as to the exact delimitation of the domestic industry. In US – Lamb, the 
United States’ authorities included both growers and feeders of live lamb as parts of the 
domestic industry of lamb meat, apart from lamb breakers and packers and argued that 
those four groups were “producers as a whole” of the like product, because they constituted 
a continuous line of production and as such had a substantial coincidence of economic 
interests (Appellate Body Report on US – Lamb, Para. 89). In the US – Lamb, Appellate 
Body was fairly clear as to what determines the domestic industry and viewed that: 
 As we have indicated, under the Agreement on Safeguards, the determination of 
the "domestic industry" is based on the 'producers … of the like or directly 
competitive products'. The focus must, therefore, be on the identification of the 
products, and their 'like or directly competitive' relationship, and not on the 
processes by which those products are produced
58
. 
 The concept of ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive’ products is one of the core concepts in all 
contingency protection frameworks that have been provided under the GATT. A number of 
criterion are employed for determining whether products can be regarded as alike or not 
and the use of the criteria varies appreciably depending on the trade remedy mechanism 
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 The Appellate Body in the US-Lamb case accepted that this method left many methodological questions 
relating to the non-attribution requirement of Article 4.2 (b) unanswered (US-Lamb Para. 178). 
57
 This provision is similar to the ‘lesser duty provision’ that exist in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Agreements. 
58
 Appellate Body on US – Lamb, Para. 94. 
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that is being contemplated to be applied.   The determination of the fact of what constitutes 
a like product has, generally been made on a case-by-case basis, allowing for “a fair 
assessment in each case of the different elements that constitute a “similar” product59”. 
 The concept of ‘like’ product has been used in GATT practice not only in the sense of 
identical or equal products but also for products with similar qualities to the extent of being 
mutually substitutable.  Panels have recognised; that it is hard for two individual products 
to be exactly the same in all aspects, but the products to be regarded as ‘like’ can rather 
share some common features, such as physical characteristics or end uses, while these may 
simultaneously differ in certain other characteristics and in most cases governments also 
use such differences in establishing the regulatory distinctions. The GATT dispute 
settlement system has used this criteria in interpreting this concept of ‘like products’ that 
exists under different GATT provisions is that “which differences between products may 
form the basis of regulatory distinctions  ... (and) which similarities between products 
prevents (such distinctions)” 60.  
The concept of “like or directly competitive product” is not defined in the body of the    
Agreement on Safeguards. Article XIX, 1 (a) of the GATT requires a comparison between 
the imported products and the domestic product of the importing country, where ‘injury’ is 
being inflicted on the producers of the domestic product as consequence of the surge in 
importation. Article 2.1 of the AOS replicates the words used in Article XIX of GATT and 
refers to increased imports of ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive products’. The same concept of 
‘like’ products was also used in Article 6.2 of the now defunct Agreement on Textile and 
Clothing. The structure of the provisions relating to ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive products’ 
in Article XIX of GATT and also in the AOS seem to emphasize the exceptional character 
which is coupled with the concern for possible abuse of the provision. This may lead one to 
expect application of concept in the narrow scope of the term
61
.    
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 Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments (L/3464, adopted on 2 December 1970, 18S/97, 102, 
para.18). The Panel Report on “United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages” (DS23/R, 
adopted on 19 June 1992, 39S/206, para.5.24) . 
60
 Panel Report on “Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and 
Alcoholic  Beverages” ( L/6216, adopted on 10 November 1987, 34S/83, 113-115, para.5.5). 
61
 Choi Won-Mog, Like products in International Trade, Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2003 p.146  
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The drafting history of the GATT, however, does not seem to support this expectation.  The 
London draft of the ITO charter employed the term ‘like or similar products’ and this 
language was changed at the New York Conference with ‘like or directly competitive 
products’ which was incorporated in the General Agreement. This change of words made 
the scope broader
62
.   In the context of Article XIX:1, the two concepts are applied 
concurrently and   whether or not the products are ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive’ makes no 
material difference to the end result, unlike in the contexts of Article III:2 and Article XI:2 
of the General Agreement.   
 The term ‘like products’, however, has been defined in Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (commonly known as 
Antidumping Agreement).  Article 2.6 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that the;  
“like product shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all 
respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another 
product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling 
those of the product under consideration”.  The definition of ‘like product’ appearing in the 
Anti-dumping Agreement is only illustrative by analogy. In defining ‘like products’ 
relevant factors can include general appearance and usage of products, and whether 
production of the imports and production of domestic products constitute essentially one 
and the same industrial process or two different processes. However, the products are 
directly competing with each other must be determined by product substitutability from the 
consumer's perspective. This test has been used in Quartz watches, certain categories of 
glass, Footwear (France) and Footwear (Italy). In Quartz watches, analogue and digital 
watches were determined to be directly competing products, as ostensibly interchangeable 
products which are suitable for the same purposes
63
.  Although for determination of injury 
to domestic industry while creating linkage and causality with increased imports 
identification of the ‘like’ relevant product is crucial.  The definition provided even in the 
Antidumping Agreement is also inconclusive and, it is difficult to draw any clear principles 
for the identification of the ‘like products’ from the existing case law.  This difficulty and 
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 The Cuban delegation at the New York conference described the term to mean “different in form but yet 
competing for the same market” 
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 Certain categories of glass, [1986] O.J. CJ28/7. Beach slippers, [1986] O.J. L340/30; [1987] O.J.L378/30. 
Quartz watches, [1984] O.J. L106/31, at para.10. Stoneware, [1982] O.J. L369/27. 
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lack of elaborate case law has created a situation where institutions investigating trade 
remedy measures in Member countries have a substantial amount of discretion in deciding 
which products are considered to fall within a category
64
.    At the risk of 
oversimplification, there appear to be two broad approaches that can be distinguished.  The 
first approach has been to define likeness a priori in terms of product characteristics, end-
use, tariff classification, or a combination of these elements
65
. The WTO case law
66
 
provides some directions on using an ‘effects’ test when comparing ‘directly competitive’ 
products.  The effects test could include an analysis of the elasticity of substitution across 
products or cross-price elasticity between products. The determination of domestic industry 
to gauge injury or effect and remove the cause of increased imports is important.   
3.3.5. CONSULTATION, RETALIATION RIGHTS AND OTHER PROVISIONS. 
 Article XIX of GATT and Article 3 of the AoS both are parallel provisions and  require 
countries contemplating to apply an ESM to consult
67
 with the exporters of the products 
before taking emergency safeguards actions and the importing country is only in case of 
‘critical circumstances’    allowed to take an ESM prior to the mandated consultations.   
However, over the years imposing safeguard measures without prior consultations with the 
exporters has evolved into a common practice and importing countries invariably take a 
plea of existence of the ‘critical circumstances68’.    The AoS stipulates that the importing 
country when imposing an emergency safeguard measure should “endeavour to maintain 
substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations… between it and the 
exporting Member which would be affected by such a measure …69”  This stipulation in 
practical terms means that a country imposing a safeguard measure against a certain 
product should ‘compensate’ it’s affected trading partners by granting a substantially 
equivalent concession in another area and thus create a new balance in the overall level of 
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concessions.   At the minimum a country is required to at least consult the affected 
countries before imposing the emergency safeguards measure. 
 The AoS also provides for a period of three years after the imposition of a safeguard 
measure, during which the exporting countries affected by the safeguards measure may not 
retaliate
70
.   This provision in the AoS makes the application of ESMs relatively easy and 
this prohibition is a substantive change from the regime provided in the past by the Article 
XIX of GATT.  In pre-WTO regime, reciprocity was the dominant concern and the 
predominated mechanism, but now by virtue of insertion of Article 8.3 of the AOS a basic 
right of retaliation which was available to an exporting country under GATT 1947 has been 
since been removed.  
3.3.6. MEASURES APPLIED, LINKAGES 
 
The only obligation created by Article 5.1 of the AoS with respect of the type of ESM 
measure is to” choose measure most suitable for achievement of the objectives” and the 
type of measure to be applied is not prescribed by the WTO rules.  Safeguard measures can, 
therefore, take different practical forms, such as tariff surcharges; which can be specific, ad 
valorem, variable, or a combination thereof. The measures can also be in form of quotas or 
pure quantitative restrictions, or simple tariff-rate quotas.  
 
The analysis of linkages and fair amount of dependency between any application of an 
ESM and other provisions of the General Agreement are essentially required to evaluate the 
validity of the safeguards measure applied.  The decisions of the Panels and the AB, in the 
cases of application of emergency safeguard measures by importing countries that were 
brought before dispute settlement system, have also developed a substantive case law over 
the years on the relationship and mutual dependencies amongst different provisions of the 
General Agreement.  Linkages with Article I and XIII of the General Agreement have 
already been touched during our discussions concerning ‘non-discriminatory invocation’ of 
Article XIX.   Some other provisions; like those contained in  Article XVIII: A, Article 
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XXIII
71
 and Article XXVIII
72
 of the General Agreement also  have  direct  relationship 
with Article XIX but in most  cases these only have a marginal bearing on the development 
of the case law. Therefore and because of the limitations these are not being discussed 
here
73
 in any detail.  
3.4. ESMS AND REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 
Regional Trading Arrangements
74
 have rapidly gained significance in last few decades 
both for trade in goods and in last few years also for the cross border trade in services. The 
application of an ESM in area of merchandise trade by a country that is member of an RTA 
and also of the WTO needs to be analyzed with respect to the obligations undertaken in the 
context of both the regional and multilateral Agreements.   Some analysis of important 
ESMs related provisions in the EU and the US domestic law will also facilitate in the 
understanding of the approach adopted by major economies and the RTA members towards 
the issue.  
 Article XXIV of the General Agreement provides the legal basis for members to deviate 
from their obligations under the GATT for specified reasons and circumstances with 
respect to RTAs.  Article XXIV defines RTAs
75
 to mean ‘a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated 
on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in 
such territories’.  
 The application of Article XIX emergency safeguards by member countries of a Customs 
Union or a Free-trade Area established under Article XXIV of GATT has long been 
debated and has been a divisive issue.  Article XIX is not indicated amongst the exceptions 
listed under Article XXIV of the GATT.  There are differing views on this ‘non-inclusion’ 
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of Article XIX and relate to the fact whether this exclusion should be interpreted to mean 
that a member of a Customs Union or a Free Trade Area is entitled to be exempted from the 
application of Article XIX measures, which interpreted will mean that imports from other 
members of the customs union or free-trade area are excluded from the application of any 
ESM or that this exclusion of Article XIX from the Articles listed under Article XXIV is 
not deliberate policy choice but merely an omission or an oversight on the part of the 
drafters of the General Agreement. 
  The Regional Trading Agreements between the European Communities and some other 
European countries
76
 that were concluded in late 70s and early 80s contain three provisions 
or paragraphs
77
 that were common to all these Agreements.  These common provisions in 
the RTAs reflected the acceptance of the former view by the EC and these Agreements 
were conceived on the premise that the omission of Article XIX from amongst those 
mentioned in Article XXIV: 8(b) was not an omission but a conscious decision and that 
FTA members were free to exempt other members from possible restrictions imposed 
under Article XIX
78
.   
 The issue of application of emergency safeguards measure by a Regional Trading 
Arrangement while excluding the RTA members was considered by the GATT with respect 
to the EEC’s 1973 Article XIX action on imports of magneto phones from Japan into 
Italy
79
.   The EC regarded that the measure was consistent with Article XXIV and that 
Article XIX provisions though should apply erga omnes, but need not apply to countries 
that had an agreement with the Community in accordance with Article XXIV.  The United 
States shares the interpretations of the EU and has traditionally been of the view that there 
is no agreed interpretation by the contracting parties of the relationship between 
Articles XIX and XXIV.  There is, however, a practice in place under other Article XXIV 
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arrangements that provides for the exemption of Parties to the arrangement from safeguard 
actions.   
 WTO jurisprudence has yet to resolve unambiguously the puzzle of how WTO Members 
that are also members of a Regional Trade Agreement should conduct investigations and 
eventually apply safeguards, which are in line with WTO rules.   The issues encountered 
are whether the imports from the region are to be excluded from injury determination or 
that the safeguard measures are to be applied only to third parties, or are the Members 
under an obligation to apply all ESMs on a non-discriminatory basis.  These issues have 
been raised in almost all of the Appellate Body proceedings under the AOS so far
80
, but 
each time AB had skillfully avoided a definitive ruling on this important concern.  
 The ‘relevant import market’ for application of an ESM in the context of a RTA has been 
defined in the AOS
81
 as the domestic market or territory subject to the injury 
determination-for cases where a customs union intends to impose a safeguard measure.  
The Customs Union, for application of an ESM has two options: it can either impose 
safeguard measures; (i) as a single unit or; (ii) on behalf of a member state
82
.   The Panel on 
Argentina-Safeguards with reference to footnote to the Article 1 of the AOS was of the 
view that, ‘footnote does not concern ‘to whom’ but rather ‘by whom’ a safeguard measure 
may be applied; this footnote thus creates a requirement of parallelism.    The phrase 
“product ... being imported” is common to both sub-paragraphs of Article 2 of the AOS.   
In light of the identity of the language in the two sub-paragraphs of Article 2 (conditions) 
and the absence of any indication that is contrary to this in the text, it is reasonable and 
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appropriate to ascribe the same meaning to this phrase in both Articles 2.1 and Article 2.2 
and that it would be inappropriate and unwarranted to do otherwise. 
 DSB has so far applied this rule of parallelism in the Emergency Safeguards cases and it 
has been found to be violated, in only one set of circumstances i.e. where a WTO Member 
takes account of all imports irrespective of their source in the injury determination, but then 
it excludes regional imports from the application of the safeguard measure
83
 like in the case 
of Argentina Footwear.   Similarly in case of the US-Wheat Gluten, US-Lamb, US-Line 
Pipe and in the US-Steel, as well, the United States was found to have violated the 
Agreement on Safeguards, because the US had excluded Mexico and Canada from the 
application of the emergency safeguard measure while the investigations for the 
determination of the injury on which the emergency safeguard action was based took 
account of all imports, including those from Mexico and Canada.    
 Through this maneuver of parallelism both the Panels and the Appellate Body have 
circumvented the unresolved enigma of whether GATT Article XXIV can justify a 
discriminatory safeguard in violation of Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The 
Appellate Body avoided the question of GATT Article XXIV as it was faced with the 
choice between parallelism and Article 2.2.  The AB in Turkey-Textiles made it clear that 
an otherwise GATT inconsistent measure can only be justified under Article XXIV if the 
requirements in, inter alia, paragraph 8 of Article XXIV are met
84
 but it is worth noting that 
there are few RTAs which meet the requirements of Article XXIV and have also been 
approved by the WTO Committee on Regional Trading Arrangements.  
3.5. INTERNAL LAW PROVISIONS:  THE EU and THE US. 
3.5.1. THE NAFTA & UNITED STATES 
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 The EC and the United States are the two largest trading entities of the world and whose 
trading practices and dispute settlements largely influence the behaviour and domestic laws 
of other Member countries of the WTO.   National/domestic laws of both of these major 
economies which authorize application of emergency safeguard measures within the 
economic area or the individual country, in case of NAFTA; make no mention of the 
requirements relating to ‘unforeseen developments’ despite of its being a textual 
requirement of both Article XIX of General Agreement and also of its associated AOS.    
 
 Section 201 of the US Trade Act of 1974, provides the legal framework under the U.S. law 
for the President to invoke the U.S. rights under Article XIX
85
 of the General Agreement.   
Trade Reform Act of 1974 (Act of 1974) revised the U.S. the then existing statute by 
removing the required link to trade concessions, which broadened the scope of the statute 
to include a wide variety of products that were not the subject of tariff concessions.  The 
Act of 1974 also revised the degree of causation required to justify an application of a trade 
remedy measure by altering the previous language from a “major factor in causing” injury 
to a “substantial cause,” which subsequently became contentious point in disputed cases 
under the WTO
86”.   Section 201 of the Act of 1974 requires imports to be a substantial 
cause of injury and thus there is a “valid reason to distinguish and separate the injury 
factors under US law, which is to assess whether imports are a substantial cause
87”.   The 
Act of 1974 also requires the ITC to determine 'whether an article is being imported into 
the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of the serious 
injury' suffered or threat of injury, without specifying in the statute any baseline against 
which to assess the ‘increased quantities’.  Surprisingly the US safeguard legislation is 
more stringent then the requirements of the AOS in this area
88
. 
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Article XIX of GATT is not directly applicable in the U.S. law and its terms for instance 
the requirement of the “unforeseen developments” have not been carried or incorporated 
into the U.S. domestic statute or the enabling legislations.  The USITC is not obliged by 
any US legislation or any other enabling regulations to examine the existence of unforeseen 
developments in its investigation into the situation of a domestic industry, which is seeking 
temporary protection through application of ESMs; a fact that was also pointed out by the 
AB in Lamb Meat.    
 
 The ITC under section 202 is charged with promptly making an investigation and:  “to 
determine whether an article is being imported into the United States in such increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic 
industry producing an article which is like or directly competitive with the imported 
article
89”.    However, here the US ITC’s investigations and causations analysis highlights 
the most important textual conflict between the U.S. statue and the AOS that is the 
determination of causation of injury. Not only are the texts themselves different, but the 
fundamental ideas behind the differing interpretations of those texts have formed the basis 
for the most contentious and confusing points of the WTO safeguards cases. The conflict 
can basically be expressed as one of “substantial cause” versus “non-attribution”. The 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act 1994 of the US, like similar legislations of most of the 
other Member countries of the WTO, limits the direct effects of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements in the U.S. courts and provides that “… no provision of any of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or 
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect
90”.   
 
 The basic provisions in NAFTA have been structured on the Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement but these provisions have some variances from the Article XIX of GATT.  In 
the context of NAFTA91 the USITC determines whether, as a result of the reduction or 
elimination of any duty under the NAFTA, increased imports from Canada or Mexico are a 
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substantial cause of serious injury or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry. If the 
Commission makes an affirmative determination, it makes a remedy recommendation to 
the President, who makes the final remedy decision. Section 302 investigations are similar 
procedurally to investigations under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974
92
.   
  There are also provisions in NAFTA that do not exist in the Trade Act of 1974.  A 
member country of NAFTA is prohibited from applying safeguard measures against 
another NAFTA member country, unless the imports account for a substantial share of the 
party’s total imports and these imports also contribute significantly to the serious injury.  
Section 801(1) of the NAFTA also limits the application of safeguards against the 
exporting NAFTA member country to either suspending the further reduction of duty, or 
increasing the duty to a level not exceeding the lesser of the MFN rate then in effect (the 
MFN rate is understood to mean the effective rate of import duty on day before the NAFTA 
took effect).  These are provisions are unique to NAFTA and neither Article XIX GATT 
nor the AOS contains any such limitation.  
  Similarly under its Section 801(4), the NAFTA member taking the emergency action must 
provide to the affected member “mutually agreed trade liberalizing compensation” which 
will substantially have the same trade effects, or be the equivalent to the value of the duties, 
expected to result from the emergency action. If the parties concerned cannot agree on the 
compensation, the affected member is entitled to unilaterally take tariff action having trade 
effects “substantially equivalent” to those of the safeguard action. This positive obligation 
to compensate under the NAFTA is also not found in Article XIX of GATT or in the 
AOS
93
. 
3.5.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 In the European framework the establishment of the internal market in 1993 obligated the 
completion of the common commercial policy, and consequently all national measures had 
to be eliminated
94
.  The European Community derives its powers to apply the Emergency 
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Safeguard Measures from ‘Title V. Safeguard Measures’ of Regulations 3285/94 of 22 
December 1994 (the “Regulation”) and 518/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules of 
imports
95
.   The EC also has differentiated or source specific safeguard regimes depending 
on whether the imports are from market-economy countries and these are from non-market-
economy countries
96
.  The safeguard scheme for imports from market-economy countries, 
i.e. the EC Regulation 3285/94 enacted to implement the WTO Safeguard Agreement made 
no distinction between tariff and quantitative safeguard measures
97
.   A legal basis for 
requesting compensatory measures and imposing countermeasures was indirectly provided 
by Article 23 of the Regulation.  
 
   The Regulation 518/94 does not differ much from its predecessor Regulation 288/82 
which was repealed.  However, despite the similarities there were some differences and the 
most conspicuous difference between Regulation 518/94 and its predecessor was that the 
now the new Regulation no longer contained any annexes. While in the case of Regulation 
288/82 all national procedures i.e. individual member country measures were listed in the 
annexes and the regulations provided for procedures concerning national derogations
98
.    
The Regulation 518/94 practically transposed provisions of the Article XIX of GATT 1994 
into the Community law.  According to the Regulation, the safeguard measures by the 
Community must be adopted “with due regard to existing international obligations...”  The 
safeguard measures which may be adopted under these regulations are subject to certain 
conditions which are same as provided in AOS and these are limited “to the extent and for 
such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury caused by the imports and to 
the product causing the injury”99. 
 
The EU Council decided to approve the AOS on 22 December 1994 and the Agreement 
entered into force on 1 January 1995
100
.     The EU legislation on emergency safeguards 
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measure, like the US, also makes no reference to ‘unforeseen development’.  However, the 
European Union in practice observes the treaty requirements of the “unforeseen 
development
101” and the application of any ESMs by the EU during the investigations are, 
as a practice, required to taken ‘as a result ... of the effect of the obligations incurred by a 
contracting party’.  This lack of statutory provisions has not been the subject of controversy 
with respect to the EU as is in the case of the US. This is primarily because of differences 
in the practices of application of the measure.   
3.6 COMMENTS 
If we are to look at Article XIX of GATT and the provisions of concomitant AoS as one of 
the possible templates for developing any independent ESMs for International Trade in 
services within the framework of GATS, it is essential to understand the structure of Article 
XIX of GATT and AoS, as this understanding only can help us in any possible 
transposition of the GATT concepts.  This also requires analysis of the relationships of 
application of emergency safeguards in trade in goods with provisions contained in other 
WTO Agreements especially considering the fact that GATS has been modelled on GATT 
paradigm and setting aside the differences there are several concepts that are not only 
common but also embedded in both the Agreements; the GATS and the GATT.   
The practical application of an ESM, as is understood to mean under the GATT/WTO 
paradigm, by the domestic regulators is fairly complex; requires strong institutional 
capacities both at the level of the agitating industry and also the regulators to comply with 
the mechanics of the process starting from the filing of an application by the industry which 
requires substantive reliable statistical information, investigations, determination of injury 
or threat thereof and then the process goes on to finally culminate in the definitive findings; 
that can sustain detailed legal scrutiny of the WTO dispute settlement system.  Any 
practical application of an ESM to withstand a detailed legal scrutiny is tedious and 
difficult, as has already been experienced in the case of trade in goods.   
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However, over the years, the system for application of Emergency Safeguards Measures 
devised by Article XIX of the GATT has started to malfunction in two ways. The first 
problem arose because the textual requirements of paragraph 1(a) Article XIX became 
increasingly difficult to apply with the passage of time.  The text of the Article required 
that safeguard measures respond to the consequences of an ‘unforeseen development’ but is 
silent with respect to the basic fact about ‘unforeseen by whom, at what point in time?’ 
These questions had a natural answer in 1947 – an ‘unforeseen development’ was 
something unforeseen by the original GATT negotiators in 1947 and when the original 
tariff bindings were negotiated. But ten, twenty, or forty years later, this anchor for the 
unforeseen developments requirement seemed unsuitable, as few things occurring that 
many years later could have been foreseen in 1947. And “if the anticipations of the original 
negotiators were no longer the relevant benchmark, what should substitute for them?
102”  
These questions have a strong relevance to some of the important questions that logically 
arise in latter part of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 4: ESMs and GATS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: CHAPTER 
Chapter 4 builds on the work already done under earlier chapters and tries to evaluate the 
relevance of discussions held under the WTO with respect to the development of the ESMs 
under the GATS.  The different formal and informal submissions made by the WTO 
Members on the issue in the WPGR have briefly been analysed.  The proposals with 
respect to their viability for practical application and have also been evaluated against the 
benchmarks provided by the Article XIX of the General Agreement and Agreement on 
Safeguards (AoS) governing the application of ESMs for trade in goods.   
 
The ambitions of the Chapter are modest and majority of its contents is very basic that has 
more practical than an academic approach. This Chapter was essentially required to look at 
the issues or concerns that any structuring of the ESMs under GATS on the GATT 
paradigm will have to encounter under the regime applicable for merchandise trade. The 
Chapter is only a reality check with regards to the fact that whether the features that 
essentially define the application of ESMs under the GATT for trade in goods can be 
transposed to GATS so as to create ESMs for cross border trade in services in any coherent 
manner. In light of the dearth of substantive research already undertaken on ESMs under 
GATS; the study draws from discussions on the subject in the formal and informal 
meetings at the WTO and the various submissions made by the WTO Member countries to 
the Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR).   
 
 The chapter gives identifies the problems faced in transposing to under GATS the 
paradigm provided by the GATT and the AoS for the application of ESMs. Almost all 
elements that constitute the definitive application under the GATT paradigm are assessed 
against the parallel provisions of GATS.  The issues and concerns with the transposition of 
GATT concepts to GATS and limitations of the GATS in this regards are also looked at.  
The chapter brings out the difference in the underlying products covered by the GATT and 
the GATS. The chapter also highlights some specificities of the services sector that hinders 
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the transposition of the GATT concept of ESMs to the GATS. The impossibility of smooth 
transposition of GATT concept to GATS is also recognized, that lays the foundation for the 
remainder of work required to be done under the thesis.    
4.2. BACKGROUND 
The Punta Del Este ministerial meeting held in September 1986 was the formal starting 
point of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) and termination of 
the pre-negotiations1.  Pre-negotiations leading up to the formal launching of the 
MTNs were fairly controversial primarily over the coverage and the inclusion of new 
areas of international trade into the agenda of the new Round, in addition to those that were 
the carryover from the earlier round of MTNs.    The leftovers from earlier GATT 
negotiations had already been picked up for inclusion in the new MTNs from where these 
stood at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of MTNs.  Negotiators were familiar with these 
backlog issues and also aware of the negotiating positions of the key countries with respect 
to these.  
 
The Uruguay Round (UR) was the most comprehensive of the MTNs ever conducted with a 
fairly broad and demanding agenda.   There was, however, a strong and vocal coalition of 
dissidents led by major developing countries like India and Brazil that was hostile partic-
ularly to the idea that the agenda of the multilateral negotiations should include the new 
issues covering trade in services, intellectual property rights, and trade-related investments, 
that had not been negotiated before or even agreed to be falling under the purview of the 
MTNs that were to be conducted within the auspices of GATT.   The introduction of new 
areas of international trade into the pre-negotiations for the upcoming MTNs had already 
created an atmosphere of almost an open confrontation amongst the negotiating coalitions, 
as compared with the earlier rounds of MTNs under the GATT.   
 
 Punta Del Este Declaration; with respect to negotiations on the cross border trade in 
services sector provided that these should “aim to establish a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules for trade in services including elaboration of possible disciplines for 
                                               
1
 Zartman, William I (ed) Processes of International Negotiations (PINS) Project, International Multilateral 
Negotiations, Approaches to Management of complexity, Josey-Bass, California, USA, 1994, p 56-57 
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individual sectors…”   The framework’s purpose was to be the expansion of trade in 
services “under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of 
promoting economic growth of all trading partners and development of developing 
countries”.   The developing countries in light of their exacting experience with the Tokyo 
Round outcome were extremely unenthusiastic towards expanding the scope of the 
upcoming negotiations especially with respect to the issues new to GATT that were being 
introduced into the agenda of new round of the MTNs.  This reluctance was aggravated by 
the fact that developing countries also had no structures to handle binding negotiations on 
such broad scale and covering areas that were little understood and had never been 
negotiated before within the framework of GATT or elsewhere with the objective of 
creating multilaterally agreed binding disciplines. 
  
Developing countries had little capacities to undertake any analysis of the new issues 
introduced for creation of multilaterally agreed disciplines and to gauge in any meaningful 
manner the possible impact of the outcome of the proposed negotiations. Some narrow 
analytical capacity that was available with a few of the bigger developing countries was 
limited only to traditional GATT issues and even these comparatively developed amongst 
the developing countries were virtually clueless of what the unfolding of the negotiations 
on the new issues may ultimately lead to. The developing countries were therefore,  more 
inclined to negotiate on what they do not want to be included rather than on what they 
really want to be included in the agenda of the future MTNs.  These developing countries 
were not capable enough to identify issues that should be included in the agenda of the 
MTNs so that some balance may eventually emerge in the final outcome (except for the 
inclusion of agenda item on liberalising the trade in textiles where almost all developing 
were agreeable).  
The previous rounds of MTNs were almost incremental in character and basically oriented 
towards elaborating, refining and strengthening the provisions already contained in the 
General Agreement. The UR was to address areas of international trade that hitherto had 
never been addressed before and that even lacked any sector specific plurilateral or 
multilateral agreements.  To become negotiable, the new issues introduced in the agenda of 
the MTNs, including cross border trade in services, required to be analysed starting from the 
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very basics like delimitation and clarification of the subject
2
 under negotiations, creation of 
possible road maps that may impact the desired or possible outcomes and also maintaining 
balance amongst diverse and at times conflicting interests involved in the process.  As a 
generally accepted rule for negotiations it is necessary that pre-negotiations should reduce 
the complexity of the issues that are to be the subject of substantive negotiations, so as to 
make these negotiable and thus leading to manageable negotiations and workable 
outcomes. The ultimate goal of the negotiations is anyway to arrive at workable decisions 
on issues, which is not possible without clear understanding of the issues involved.  
 
 The deliberations during the pre-negotiations amongst the members and the other 
contributory preparatory work to delimit and clarify the new issues involved. The 
deliberations in the dedicated negotiating group created for developing the multilaterally 
agreed framework Agreement for the services sector were dependent solely on the analysis 
undertaken and made available by the OECD secretariat along with some other limited 
research inputs that were provided by a couple of major individual industrialized countries. 
No independent third party analytical inputs even from the academia or from any other 
neutral and credible prospective were, at the time, available to the negotiators. The leading 
industrial countries like the United States, the EC and Canada were in a very advantageous 
position and well placed to shape the necessarily required consensual knowledge available 
with the negotiators in a manner that was more in line with their own specific interests and 
achieve their negotiating objectives.  
 
This analytical and intellectual dominance of some developed countries was deeply 
resented by major developing countries like India and Brazil
3
, as these countries had their 
own aspirations to influence negotiations by structuring negotiating coalitions and leading 
the developing countries in a manner that will help them to achieve their objectives. There 
was visible asymmetry with respect to lack of analytical capacities and excessive influence 
over the building of consensual knowledge that subsequently had a impeding affect and led 
to the rigidities in the negotiating positions of the negotiating coalitions that eventually 
emerged.   
                                               
2
 Zartman, William I (ed) Processes of International Negotiations (PINS) Project, International Multilateral 
Negotiations, Approaches to Management of complexity, Josey-Bass, California, USA, 1994  
3
 China’s accession to the WTO was approved in late 2001 and Russian accession process in 2012. 
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This capacity constraint combined with the lack of past negotiating experience was 
complicated by the fact that, unlike Tokyo Round results, everything was to be linked at the 
end at the end of the Round of talks so as to form part of a ‘single undertaking’.    The 
single undertaking first appeared in the lexicon of GATT/WTO-speak at the beginning of 
the Uruguay Round in 1986. The idea was to prevent parties from “cherry-picking” results 
or “harvesting” early outcomes from the negotiations unless all parties agreed. By keeping 
the whole agenda joined up, to be settled at the end, negotiators believed they were 
maximizing trade-off opportunities and no-one would be denied negotiating leverage
4
.  
This concept of ‘single undertaking’ was agreed by the developing countries to avoid the 
situation that was created at the end of Tokyo Round when side agreements became the 
centre stage. These side Agreements (codes) not only led to the fragmentation of the GATT 
system but also led to an unbalanced outcome, as the countries that chose not to participate 
in negotiations on these codes also lost the capacity to influence the eventual outcome.   
This concept of single undertaking had a substantive impact on post UR negotiations on 
issues like the ESMs for the cross border trade in services. 
 
 Based solely on the unchallenged analysis made available by the OECD secretariat and by 
a couple of developed countries, the reforms in trade in services were propagated and 
unsuspectingly recognized by a large number of the negotiators to have potential economic 
benefits for almost all the participants irrespective of their stage of economic development. 
Despite this appreciation of importance and value of liberalizing trade in services, 
movement forward in “the Group for Negotiations on Services (GNS) was very slow during 
the first two years of the Uruguay Round
5” and not very meaningful even thereafter.  
4.3 GATS: INTRODUCTION 
                                               
4
 World Trade Organization, Low Patrick, WTO Decision-Making for the Future, Staff Working Paper 
ERSD-2011-05, May 2011 
5
 Croome John, Reshaping the World Trading System, A history of the Uruguay Round, World Trade 
Organization, 1998, p.102 
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 The General Agreement on Trade in Services
6
 (GATS) was negotiated within the 
framework of a broad and comprehensive round of MTNs where almost all of areas already 
covered by the GATT along with new and emerging areas of importance to international 
trade that were as yet alien to the GATT, like; ‘International Trade in Services’, ‘Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)’ and ‘Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS)’ were negotiated simultaneously under the concept of a ‘single 
undertaking’.  The concept of ‘single undertaking’ in practical terms implied that nothing 
will be taken to have been agreed until outcome on all issues being negotiated are agreed 
amongst the participants.  Thus there were strong cross linkages and inbuilt parallelism on 
movement forward and progress in negotiations in different negotiating groups.  The 
negotiating process and negotiations per-se are not intended to be discussed in any greater 
detail in this paper.  
The GATS in its architecture and its building block concepts is fairly analogous to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and “forms part of the expansion of 
GATT into the area of services to take account of changes that have occurred in the world 
economy”7 but it simultaneously also reflects the specificities of cross border trade in 
services. The drafters of the GATS took inspiration from the GATT and used the terms and 
concepts that had already been applied for decades in the international merchandise trade.  
The ‘GATS is a hybrid Agreement, containing combined features of both ‘top down’ and 
‘bottom up’ Agreement8, is extraordinarily ambitious, complex and potentially universal’9 
as the Agreement defines cross border supply of services in an all-encompassing manner 
under its Article XXVIII (b) and it includes production, distribution, marketing, sale and 
delivery of services.     
 Both the Agreements (GATT & GATS) aim to achieve progressive liberalisation of world 
trade, include provisions for most-favoured-nation treatment, national treatment, regional 
trading arrangements and transparency. The two Agreements are part of a ‘single 
                                               
6
 The GATS, Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization that comprises of six 
Parts, eight Annexes, and nine Ministerial Decisions which are appended and integral to it. 
7
 Kennedy Matthew, Services Join GATT: An Analysis of  the General  Agreement on Trade in  Services, Int. 
T.L.R. 1995, 1(1), 11-20 
8
 A ‘top down’ agreement is one in which all measures and sectors are covered unless they are specifically 
excluded, while ‘bottom up’ agreement covers only those measures and sectors that are specifically identified.  
9
 Sinclair Scott, GATS, How the World Trade Organization’s new services negotiations threaten democracy.  
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Ottawa 2000 p.29 
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undertaking’ outcome and thus share the same membership, procedures for consultation, 
dispute settlement and also of enforcement.      The tariff schedules under the GATT, in 
which countries bind their tariff concessions on merchandise imports, find their equivalent 
in schedules of specific commitments under GATS which define the relevant conditions for 
conduct of trade in services
10
.  
 
The GATS, creates disciplines for a Member country that is scheduling market access 
commitments for a specific service sector or its sub-sector separately on the four different 
modes of delivery of the services  which are; cross-border imports (cross border trade: 
mode 1), the consumption of services in another Member’s territory (consumption abroad: 
mode 2), as well as the services-related activities of foreign established suppliers 
(commercial presence: mode 3) and foreign natural persons (presence of natural persons: 
mode 4) in the Member’s domestic market.   The GATS under its current structure, unlike 
GATT, also creates no hierarchy of instruments of protection for the domestic producer or 
supplier of service, both the level and the form of protection are the result of successive 
negotiations amongst Members of the WTO.   
 There are also some notable differences in the scope and also the content of the two 
Agreements. An important differentiating element of the GATS is that many of its 
obligations are triggered only when a member schedules a specific commitment11.   This in 
certain cases seems to make little sense considering that many of GATS obligations have 
general application, including the transparency requirement that members publish all 
relevant laws and regulations affecting trade in services within their domestic markets
12
.    
In GATS there is also an absence of full-fledged counterparts to some important GATT 
rules and the Agreement in its present form does not “contain any equivalent to the trade 
remedy mechanisms like emergency safeguards, countervailing duties, and anti-dumping 
                                               
10
 World Trade Organization A Handbook on the GATS, Geneva, May 2005 
11
 The GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments are undertakings by each member to provide a national 
schedule guaranteeing market access in specific sectors. The market access granted can be subject to any 
conditions or limitations.  
12
 Nicholas Baggaley, Trade Liberalization Under the GATT, the NAFTA and the EU: Selected Topics, 
journal of Comparative International Management, June 1998 
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCIM/bin/get.cgi?directory=vol1_1/&filename=Baggaley.html#1 
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measures that could be invoked by affected trading partners”13 which are available under 
the GATT and are also frequently used as remedies in specific circumstances in case of 
international merchandise trade.  Some of the other central defining concepts and 
characteristics governing liberalization of trade in goods under GATT do not carry the 
same significance or are not applicable under the GATS, for instance, the GATT enshrines 
the automatic right to full national treatment while the GATS does not, and under GATS 
the national treatment14 requirements apply only to the extent that it is allowed according to 
the terms and conditions of a member's schedule of commitments in respect of the specified 
service sectors. While quota-free entry (“market access”) and national treatment are the 
general applicable obligations under the GATT but these only apply under the GATS on a 
sector-by-sector and mode of delivery basis and that too to the extent that no qualifications 
(“limitations”) have been scheduled15 by the binding member country. 
 The member countries assume obligations through their respective schedule of binding 
market access commitments that are negotiated with requesting countries on the basis that 
are agreed multilaterally.  Article XX:1 of the GATS contains only one basic obligation
 
governing the assumption of specific commitments in services:
 
each Member is required to 
submit a schedule of commitments. Pursuant to Article XX:3 of the GATS, the Schedule of 
a Member forms an integral part of the GATS. Hence, the rules of interpretation that apply 
with respect to a Schedule are the same as those applicable to the rest of the Agreement. 
This means that the Schedule of a Member, and the specific commitments contained 
therein, must be interpreted in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘‘Vienna Convention’’). This position was firmly 
adopted in US—Gambling and followed in the footsteps of prior decisions concerning the 
interpretation of GATT Schedules. Accordingly, the specific commitments of a Member, 
like any other treaty term, must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the Member’s scheduled entries taken in their context and understood 
in the light of the object and purpose of the GATS and the WTO Agreement more 
                                               
13
 Adlung Rudolf, The GATS Turns Ten:  A Preliminary  Stocktaking, World Trade Organization, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2004-05, August, 2004 
14
 Article XVII of GATS, (Part III). 
15
 World Trade Organization A Handbook on the GATS May 2005 
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generally. Recourse may also be had to supplementary means of interpretation as 
appropriate. 
Also following in the footsteps of GATT case law is the determination in US—Gambling 
that while a Member’s Schedule only binds that Member, it represents a common 
agreement among all WTO Members
16
. However, as
 
with tariff bindings under the under 
Article XXVIII of the GATT, Members are able to re-negotiate their schedules or what 
may be called their market access obligations under Article XXI of GATS or ignore these 
commitments in specified circumstances.
 
 
  The GATS rules governing domestic regulations are also weak as compared to GATT, for 
example, Member governments would not be prevented from operating excessively 
restrictive standards or licensing and certification systems or subsidize their exports of 
services.   This virtual freedom of national governments to act implies that the commercial 
value of similar market access and national treatment commitments may thus vary 
significantly across different service sectors and WTO Members.  The GATS also offers 
more scope to the Members to deviate from the Most-Favoured-Nations (MFN) treatment 
through their scheduled MFN exemptions; which is one of the few horizontal obligations 
that apply across almost all services, than is the case under GATT.  Moreover, traditional 
and fundamental building blocks of the GATT, including the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions and the automatic guarantee of national treatment with regard to domestic rules 
and regulations, are also open and negotiable under the GATS17.     
 
The GATS has expanded the scope of WTO dispute settlement system, as application of a 
measure by a member country even on merchandize trade, which has broader and stringent 
disciplines, can have implications on country’s commitments in the services sector. The 
retaliation by the affected members may also eventually be cross sectoral, like in EC- 
Bananas, the United States and several Latin American countries claimed that the EC 
                                               
16
 Leroux Eric H., Eleven Years of GATS Case Law: What Have we Learned? Journal of International 
Economic Law 10(4), 749–793 
17
 Members assume market access and national treatment obligations only in sectors they have listed in their 
national schedules ('bottom-up' scheduling) and only to the extent that they have not inscribed limitations or 
specific exclusions under one or more of the four modes of supply.   
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regime for the importation18, sale and distribution of bananas was inconsistent with several 
of the EC’s WTO obligations, including those under the GATS.  The EC tried to argue that 
its banana import regime falls solely under the GATT because; i) the GATT and the GATS 
may not overlap in application to a measure; and ii) the import regime does not touch the 
service providers of the complaining parties in their wholesale service activities, but only in 
their import activities, that is, in their activities in the goods sector. The Panel and the 
Appellate Body rejected both the arguments of the EC. 
 
 The GATS as an international agreement has broader coverage and implications than the 
GATT.  As unlike the GATT, it covers both the ‘service’ and the ‘service provider’. While 
GATT has a circumscribed mandate and is concerned only with the products not with 
individual producers or manufacturing of these products.  The GATS because of its broad 
reach that covers service providers is also regarded by some international economic law 
scholars as “the world’s first Multilateral Agreement on Investments since the Agreement 
also includes the right to set up commercial presence (mode 3) in another country
19”.     In 
short, the reach of GATS is fairly extensive as compared and judged against that which 
exists for the GATT.   The GATS broad reach extends “from cross-border trade to factor 
flows, and from an essentially tariff-only regime
 
to many more permissible restrictions, 
including import-displacing
 
subsidies
20”. 
4.4. ESMs and the GATS  
4.4.1. BACKGROUND 
 
 The important aspect that is perhaps not so readily understood about the GATS is that it is 
an ‘incomplete’ Agreement.  It contains not only a “built-in” obligation for the WTO 
Members to enter into successive rounds of negotiations no later than five years after entry 
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 In the EC-Bananas case, the core issues were the way in which the European Communities established a 
duty free quota for imports of bananas originating from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the 
manner in which the most-favoured-nation (MFN) quotas under Article XIII of GATT were allocated 
19
 Chanda Rupa, Trade in Services & India Prospects and Strategies, CENTAD, New Delhi, 2006, p.52 
20
 Adlung Rudolf , Negotiations on Safeguards and Subsidies in Services: a Never-ending Story? Journal of 
International Economic Law 2007 10(2):235-265 
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into force of the WTO Agreements and periodically thereafter
21
,  but it also calls for 
completion of the GATS framework with specific disciplines on subsidies, emergency 
safeguards,...
22” 
 
 More than twenty five years after the inception of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade 
negotiations, the framework of GATS and development of some important disciplines 
under it are still very much under construction, with work outstanding on a number of key 
issues.   The relevant mandates for continuing negotiations in these four areas are 
contained, respectively, in Articles VI:4, X, XIII, and XV of GATS, this mandate for 
further negotiations is also referred to as the ‘inbuilt agenda’.   The built-in negotiating 
agenda in GATS positively mandates negotiation for the progressive liberalisation of 
international trade in services through additional specific commitments by the member 
countries and also simultaneously instructs negotiators to develop certain GATS rules that 
could not be agreed upon during the MTNs.   The agenda for the continued negotiations 
though charted a time frame, a road map and also indicated the directions which the further 
negotiations may take. By doing so the Members agreed to leave these issues open for 
further negotiations and agreed to agree on the other remaining ruling making aspects later 
and also on the negotiations for continued liberalization.   . This conclusion of inconclusive 
negotiations was not unique to GATS but was also the case in negotiations in some other 
areas, like in TRIMs and TRIPs.  
  
 At its meeting of 30 March 1995, the Council for Trade in Services established a Working 
Party on GATS Rules (WPGR)23 to deal with these outstanding issues from the Uruguay 
Round (UR) of MTNs.    The negotiations on these ‘outstanding issues’ or the  ‘built in 
agenda in the GATS’ were,  till recently,  undertaken at Geneva in the WPGR, which was a 
subsidiary body of the ‘Council for Trade in Services’.  The WPGR had before it three 
negotiating mandates: Emergency Safeguard Measures (Article X); Government 
Procurement (Article XIII); and Subsidies (Article XV).  Of these, only the negotiations on 
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 Article XIX:I of GATS 
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 Macrory Patrick F J, Arthur E Appleton, Michel G Plummer (Ed), The World Trade Organization, Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis, Volume I & II, International Law Institute, Springer, USA 2005 
P. 893 
23
 World Trade Organization Document  S/C/M/2, Para. 22-25. 
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Emergency Safeguards Measures were initially subjected to an agreed time frame with 
specified deadlines. The deadlines were extended repeatedly and now have finally been 
replaced by an open-ended time frame through a decision of Council for Trade in Services. 
The relevant decision now
 
provides that, subject to the outcome of the mandate, the results
 
shall enter into effect not later than the results of the current
 
round of services 
negotiations24.  
 
The GATS in its present shape does not provide for any independent mechanism by which 
WTO members can temporarily depart from their market access commitments in response 
to an unanticipated surge in services imports with harmful effects on domestic service 
suppliers. The establishment of such emergency safeguard measures (ESMs was considered 
during the Uruguay Round, but no consensus could be achieved. The GATS merely calls 
for negotiations ‘on the question of emergency safeguard measures based on the principle 
of non-discrimination’25.  
The motivations, as expressed in the WPGR by the WTO Members that were seeking 
independent ESMs for services sector were essentially the same as were those of the 
drafters of the General Agreement who initially introduced the concept for trade in goods; 
namely the perceived need for some form of temporary ‘safety valve’ in the event of 
unforeseen problems that may be created by the trade liberalisation and ensuing surge in 
imports.  The particular sensitivities surrounding
 
the negotiations on emergency safeguards 
under GATS are substantially reflected in the relevant
 
mandate laid down in Article X of 
the GATS.   The Article X of GATS reads as: 
Article X: Emergency Safeguard Measures  
1. There shall be multilateral negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard 
measures based on the principle of non-discrimination.  The results of such 
negotiations shall enter into effect on a date not later than three years from the date 
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  
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 World Trade Organization Document  S/L/159 of 17 March 2004 
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 Article X:1 of GATS 
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2. In the period before the entry into effect of the results of the negotiations referred 
to in paragraph 1, any Member may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 
of Article XXI, notify the Council on Trade in Services of its intention to modify or 
withdraw a specific commitment after a period of one year from the date on which 
the commitment enters into force;  provided that the Member shows cause to the 
Council that the modification or withdrawal cannot await the lapse of the three-year 
period provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXI.  
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall cease to apply three years after the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 The first sentence of Article X: 1 of the GATS calls upon the Members
 
to conduct 
negotiations ‘on the question’ of such measures based on non-discrimination26, while the 
second sentence seems to presuppose an affirmative
 
answer to the question raised and also 
a tangible outcome.  The second sentence stipulates that ‘the results shall enter into effect ... 
not later than three years from
 the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement’.  Any 
such mechanism, should it be agreed to by the Members, would also need to be based on 
the ‘principle of non-discrimination’ in terms of the negotiating mandate. This stipulation 
of ‘non-discrimination’ under GATT parlance has generally been equated with Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment.
  
 The negotiating history of Article X, however, suggests that the use of the phrase 
“negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard measures” (Article X.1) was meant 
to imply that prior to elaborating specific provisions, Members may wish to consider the 
broader question of whether or not it would be desirable to develop an emergency 
safeguard instrument in the field of trade in services
27” but for a group of important 
developing Member countries, Article X appeared to be clear enough that calls for the 
development and incorporation of an independent and standalone emergency safeguards 
mechanism under the GATS.   For this group of countries the Article X establishes a 
positive and affirmative requirement that “the results of such negotiations shall enter into 
                                               
26
 The agenda for Uruguay Round (Punta Del Este declaration with regards to ESMs had parallel provision 
that reads as; “iii) shall clarify and reinforce the disciplines of the General Agreement and should apply to all 
contracting parties”. 
27
 Croome John, Reshaping the World Trading System, A history of the Uruguay Round, World Trade 
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effect on…” these wordings in the text of the Agreement leave no room for not achieving a 
kind of result that can be put into effect. Therefore, to this group of countries the mandate 
of the WPGR is not to decide whether or not an ESM provision should be incorporated into 
the GATS and, if so, to elaborate disciplines providing for such a mechanism but the 
mandate contained in Article X of GATS is to provide for such a mechanism.   This 
interpretation of the negotiating mandate was crucial to the concern of some members on 
the “desirability” and the entire exercise of developing standalone ESMs under the GATS. 
 The negotiations on the development of standalone ESMs under the GATS in the WPGR 
were complicated for the Member countries as the universe of issues faced by them were 
new, little understood and, above all, the negotiators had restricted themselves to finding 
solutions within the limited framework circumscribed by the paradigm provided by the 
Article XIX of the GATT and AOS while little attention was paid to concerns that were 
historically associated with this paradigm. The negotiators also ignored the fact that the 
GATS was  fundamentally different to the GATT, not only in its scope but also in its 
architecture; the discussions in the WP remained embedded in GATT and confined mostly 
to areas and concepts provided by this model 
4.4.2 ESMs under GATS 
The GATS within its existing construction does not provide for trade remedy measures like 
levying of Anti-Dumping or countervailing duties that are available for the merchandise 
trade under the GATT.    However, under GATT there are also some other different 
provisions that practically have similar end effects as the applications of ESMs, likewise 
GATS also has provisions that if used will have effects that may be similar in the end 
results to the application of an ESM as understood under the GATT paradigm.   Though the 
emergency safeguards provisions that follow the paradigm provided by GATT do not as yet 
exist under GATS but provisions that can be used to serve the purpose or achieve the 
objectives of the conventional GATT escape clause, (discussed in some detail in chapter 5)  
do exist in the GATS framework.   A member can employ these escape clause provisions in 
specified circumstances and subject to specific conditions that may in certain cases even 
involve providing of compensatory adjustments.       
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In addition to using the basic exclusion of keeping the sector out of binding commitments 
or alternatively qualifying the commitments,  the GATS also contains some escape clause 
type provisions that can be used to achieve the results that are normally desired through the 
application of an ESM by the importing country. These provisions have primarily been 
developed on the model provided by GATT and include; (i) invoking exception provisions 
to depart from specific commitments, and even the MFN requirement, in particular 
situations: balance of payments problems (Article XII), threats to life and health, public 
morals, and so on (Article XIV), threats to national security interests (Article XIVbis), and 
problems of financial stability (prudential measures pursuant to the Annex on Financial 
Services, 2(a)); (ii) Withdrawing, or reducing the depth of, existing commitments through 
negotiations under Article XXI of the GATS (Modification of Schedules) or Article IX:3 of 
the Agreement establishing the WTO (Decision- Making: Waiver).  While the former 
approach appears more adequate for
 
permanent
 
changes, the latter is better suited for 
temporary
 
adjustments
 
in response to exceptional circumstances. Article XII of the GATS 
is applicable if a member experiences serious balance of payments and external financial 
difficulties, however, the Article also provides that the restrictions imposed will ‘not 
discriminate among Members’ and has all the basic ingredients of Article XII of the GATT.   
Similarly Article XIV of GATS creates provisions for the Member countries to take action 
if it is “deemed necessary for overriding policy concerns such as protection of life and 
health or protection of public morals” on the analogy provided by Article XX of the GATT.  
While Article XXI of GATS enables a member country ‘to withdraw or modify a 
commitment on a permanent basis’ and almost shadows Article XXVIII of the GATT.  
However, each possible option has its own specific circumstances where it can be 
employed and not all options are equally relevant in all cases
28”.  
Unlike the GATT where national treatment and non-discrimination (MFN) are basic 
general and horizontal commitments that cut across the entire framework of the Agreement, 
a ‘positive-list’ approach has been adopted in the GATS.  This approach implies that 
market access and national treatment obligations under GATS only apply to services that 
have been scheduled by the Member country in the positive list of its commitments, and 
even then only to the extent of limitations, if any, that have been attached to these 
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commitments, these scheduled limitations may even include reservations with respect to 
retain the right to operate discriminatory measures (GATS Articles XVI and XVII 
respectively).  WTO members are also free to designate the sectors, and the extent of 
liberalisation commitments, for each of the four modes of supply through scheduling of 
market access commitments. This fundamental distinction between the GATT and the 
GATS is also directly relevant to the debate on whether or not to have independent ESM 
provisions for cross border trade in services.  
 However, the possibilities to use different provisions that already exist in the GATS to 
achieve results similar to the application of emergency safeguards combined along with the 
immense flexibilities available under the Agreement particularly with reference to the 
scheduling of the commitments, which is not available under the GATT have created an 
interesting framework and a peculiar situation that is not acceptable for trade in goods.  The 
GATS under its present architecture, in case of need offers contingency protection to 
domestic producers through mechanisms that are not trade remedy measures in the 
conventional GATT understanding of the concept and provides for the ‘safeguarding’ of 
the liberalization commitments through means that are different to and other than 
application of  ESMs under the paradigm provided by the GATT.   
 In the absence of any standalone and specific provision for application of Emergency 
Safeguards Measures under the GATS and in a trade flow situation that calls for temporary 
protection to the domestic producers from foreign imports of like products, the different 
options that are available to an individual WTO Member under GATS can be bifurcated in 
to normal or general measures and those measures that have characteristics of the escape 
clause. The normal or general measures include fundamental steps like; (i) individual 
members can refrain from scheduling specific commitments in particular sectors or modes, 
thus retaining full policy discretion, including the right to ban all trade. The only potentially 
relevant obligations in this regards under the GATS are the MFN requirement and some 
‘good governance’ provisions like transparency; (ii) if a sector is bound in the schedule of 
concessions then limitations can be inscribed under relevant modes of delivery so as to 
qualify a commitment to disciplines in the scheduled sectors.  Possible options in this 
regards may include specifying numerical quotas, economic needs tests or foreign equity 
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ceilings in the Market Access column of a schedule or listing discriminatory measures 
(subsidies, minimum size requirements, etc.) under National Treatment;  (iii) GATS is a 
very flexible Agreement and the flexibilities include the lack of  disciplines on subsidies 
therefore exhausting the GATS’ flexibilities and additional scope for action, compared to 
the GATT, is always an option available to members to take measures that are beyond the 
coverage of full commitments. The different types of subsidy schemes, whether these are 
producer-
 
or consumer-focused, essentially serve the same purpose, that
 
is, to strengthen the 
position of a domestic industry vis-à-vis
 
competitors established abroad.  Though the two 
schemes have in practical terms similar objectives and effects, but these may be subjected 
to
 
different disciplines, depending on the interpretation and application
 
of the national 
treatment obligation.
 
This provides countries with the possibility to subsidize import-
competing industries and thus achieve reduction in cross-border supplies of services. 
4.5. GATT/WTO Concepts: Applicability to GATS 
 The discussions amongst WTO Members on the issue of providing specific ESMs in 
GATS have as yet largely been in the abstract.  In the lengthy debates and negotiations that 
stretched for over a decade, the negotiators have not been able to agree and identify a 
precise situation, even by way of hypothetical example, in the cross border trade in services 
that suggest of potential circumstances where application of an ESM might necessarily be 
required.  This state of affairs reflects of the immense gap in the approach and major 
difference of opinion amongst the interlocutors on the issue.  
 The Member countries of the WTO who strongly feel the need for specific ESMs under 
GATS (proponents or demandeurs
29
) consider that the existence of ESMs would provide 
necessary aspect to the solution of the problems in cases where the domestic stakeholders 
suffers serious injury, or threat thereof, as a consequence of liberalization and regulatory 
reforms in the services sector which, have also been bound under respective country’s 
schedule of specific market access commitments.    For this group of countries the positive 
answer to ‘question of ESM’ in Article X of the GATS is an integral component of the 
overall balance of the outcome of the services negotiations and a constructive outcome 
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would provide the essentially required safety net for services liberalization.  These 
countries felt that the “UR services package was simply a beginning in terms of the number 
and scope of services commitments that Members have thus far taken to open markets, 
comparable to the initial limited tariff cutting undertaken when GATT was launched in 
194730” and felt that such a safety net would encourage Members to consider certain 
requests for liberalization, which are not otherwise being contemplated because of lack of 
the lack of escape clause.    
  Member countries of the WTO that are demanding specific ESMs under GATS 
(demandeurs) also regard that it is also simultaneously important that most of the defining 
and substantive features that are embedded in AoS and Article XIX of GATT type 
emergency safeguards measures are also present in the ESMs that are developed under 
GATS.    This transposition of GATT paradigm to GATS for some of the demandeurs was 
fundamental to the integrity and credibility of any ESMs for services sector within the 
framework of the WTO.   To evaluate the possible transposition of the concepts and 
provisions embodied in Article XIX of the General Agreement and the AoS to any possible 
ESMs that may be considered under the GATS, it is of significance to first determine the 
relevance of the key GATT concepts, regarding trade remedy measures in general and 
ESMs in particular, to the dynamics of cross border trade in services.    This determination 
essentially requires the examination of the conditions and governing criterion for the 
application of the ESMs in merchandise trade along with the nature of measures that may 
be applied. It also calls for having a look at the associated issues like that of duration of 
measures, compensation, and the rights of Members affected by application of an ESM by 
an importing Member.  
4.6. GATT PARADIGM: TRANSPOSITION ISSUES 
 For most contracting parties to GATT the comfortable reference point for starting 
negotiations on possible development of multilateral disciplines for conduct of cross border 
trade in the services were the familiar principles and underlying concepts of the General 
Agreement.  The political officials negotiating  the development of  framework agreement 
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for the services had previously worked only in the context of GATT so were only 
knowledgeable about paradigms or different governing concepts of GATT where these 
officials had used the concept of ESMs primarily as a hedge against the possibility that 
certain unforeseen adverse market situation may arise. 
 
The decisions of the Panels and Appellate Body (AB) in different disputed Emergency 
Safeguards actions have brought out some specific pre-requisites or conditions that are 
relevant to any application of the ESMs in the area of merchandise trade.   The defining 
features that are of real substance to the construction of an ESM
31
 under the GATT include 
the concepts like; i) obligations and unforeseen developments; ii) importation; iii) Like or 
directly competitive products; iv) increased imports; v) serious injury; vi) causality; vii) 
compensation; vii); provisions for temporary application, transparency and notifications; 
and viii)  standards of investigation.   The jurisprudence developed under GATT with 
respect to some qualifying provisions for application of ESMs in goods sector like; 
obligations incurred; unforeseen This required analysis of the discussions held in the WTO 
that takes into account the views expressed on the different aspects of possible 
development of standalone ESMs under GATS. This analysis of views from both sides of 
conceptual divide; the demandeurs of the provisions and also of the countries that were not 
convinced of the feasibility of standalone ESMs under GATS let alone their averseness to 
the desirability.   
4.6.1 OBLIGATIONS INCURRED 
It is important to have some common and multilaterally agreed system for product 
classification and its interpretation to provide a common understanding to the obligations 
incurred by individual Member countries; in absence of these common understandings the 
basic reference point for defining the obligations incurred remain vague, therefore, 
predictable application of any ESMs will always be at best elusive.  There is as yet no 
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agreed product classification system for service sectors
32
 at the multilateral level as it is in 
the case for trade in goods in the form of ‘Harmonized Tariff Classification and Coding 
System’.   The negotiations amongst the members on their respective schedule of 
concessions under GATS were conducted without any mutually agreed understanding on 
classifications of different categories and sub-categories for the services sectors.   
Two main instruments that have been used by Members to describe the sectors/sub-sectors 
covered in their specific schedule of commitments were the Services Sectoral 
Classification List, (SSCL) established by the GATT Secretariat in 1991 and the  United 
Nation’s Provisional Central Product Classification. The SSCL is based on, and cross-
refers to, the CPC, categorizes services in twelve sectors and about 160 sub-sectors. 
Members have a broad margin of manoeuvre to define the services they are ready to 
commit on as they are not obliged to use these instruments. This benchmarking flexibility 
made the scheduling of commitments easy but complicated the comparability of schedules 
of concessions and determining the likeness of services transactions. The majority of 
existing GATS schedules are based on the GATT’s Services Sectoral Classification List, 
(SSCL) and follow its structure, headings and codes while some other Members have 
simultaneously chosen to refer to CPC numbers to define the scope of their commitments.   
Despite their widespread use, the SSCL and the CPC are not as reliable and precise for 
identifying and defining service activities as the Harmonized System (“HS”) that is used in the 
respective schedules of tariff concessions bound in the context of GATT for trade in goods and 
has a comprehensive classification interpretation system.  “The SSCL is generally characterized 
by a high level of aggregation; as to the CPC, its definitions remain often broad even at a five 
digit level. To take just one example; services provided by cardiologists and dermatologists 
cannot be considered "like" despite the fact that they fall under the same CPC category of 
"specialized medical services" (CPC 93122) but in some sectors, nevertheless, the CPC 
breakdown refers to clearly-defined activities; of which "taxi services" (CPC 71221) could be 
one of these examples”
33
. 
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 Rapid technological developments have also lead to emergence of new activities which 
may not be specifically listed in any of the two instruments agreed for being used as the 
possible reference for the listing.  Alternatively
34
, a list of services/activities could be done 
in the form of a model schedule.  Some developing Member countries who saw their 
specific interests in liberalization under Mode 4 of delivery of services had submitted 
specific proposals for the harmonization of the categories of services that are used to 
schedule specific commitments on the movement and presence of natural persons
35
.  This 
was important to these countries so that the schedules of commitments are free of any 
misinterpretations and subsequent confusions and thus contribute to the predictability and 
transparency of Mode 4 commitments
36
.   
 
This lack of unified or harmonized and agreed classification and interpretation system for 
the services sector has already started creating complications as the commitments under 
taken through bindings made in the respective schedule of concessions by different 
countries do not necessarily have the common understanding
37
 of what in practical terms 
do these commitments really imply or cover especially in case of dispute where actual 
obligations undertaken have to be assessed. In the US Gambling case; Antigua successfully 
challenged US Gambling laws which prohibited remote Gambling (internet Gambling).  
Office of United States Trade Representative was of the view that US did not schedule 
gambling services and that its schedule was not based on CPC
38
, The Appellate Body 
upheld, based on modified reasoning, the Panel's finding that the US GATS Schedule 
included specific commitments on gambling and betting services. Resorting to “document 
W/120” and the “1993 Scheduling Guidelines” as “supplementary means of interpretation” 
under Article 32 of the VCLT, rather than the context (Art. 31 of VCLT), the Appellate 
Body concluded that the entry, “other recreational services (except sporting)”, in the US 
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Schedule of concessions must be interpreted as including “gambling and betting services” 
within its scope.   
4.6.2 STATISTICAL CONCERNS 
The absence of agreed product classification in the services sector and adequate statistical 
information on imports are factors that pose challenges and invite careful attention,  as 
agreed classifications are essentially required for identifying “like” and “directly 
competing” products/services for constructing any ESMs that are modelled on GATT.  
While compilation of proper import and production data is required to determine injury and 
also ascertaining its causal link with imports. There are also other serious technology 
driven challenges like applicability of the measures to the growing share of trade in 
services taking place over electronic networks under modes 1 and 2 of delivery.  Therefore, 
the WTO members when devising an instrument would also have to provide that the 
measure not only deals with cross border transaction but also with firms that are established 
under mode 3 and even for situations where there is not even a “border” related transaction.  
The correct and timely availability of the statistical information with regards to the trade 
flows is essential to make the application of an emergency safeguards measure possible, 
transparent and predictable.   The compilation of this necessarily required statistical 
information is problematic, at times, even for trade in goods let alone for the cross border 
trade in services. The depth of information, about the trade flow and state of domestic 
producers of like and directly competitive products,  required is greater in services than in 
merchandise trade is straight forward, this requirement emerges from the simple fact that 
GATS covers all the four different modes of supply of services, namely; 1) cross-border 
transactions; 2) consumption abroad; 3) commercial presence; and 4) the movement of 
natural persons and each mode of delivery has its own specificities and requirements.  It is 
thus easily possible that the execution of one single service transaction embraces elements 
that, at subsequent stages, fall under different modes
39
 of delivery of services.  The needs 
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for detailed trade flow data are greater for services sector considering its four modes of 
delivery and undertaking of market access obligations by the countries separately for each 
mode,  but  simultaneously the possibilities of getting this required  latest updated trade 
data separately for each mode of delivery is difficult and much less.             
There is a general lack of detailed statistical information regarding cross border trade in 
services and in most cases specific trade flow data with respect to a sub-sector of a service 
category or sector, given the four modes of delivery of services, is almost impossible to get.    
The “invisibility” of many service transactions and the simultaneity of production and 
consumption, which is typical of most services sector also contribute and partly explain the 
reasons for this lack of reliable statistics.  In many countries several services are grouped 
together and all transactions in the individual services within a group are compiled and 
tabulated under one generic sectoral or group heading.  A common framework of 
accounting and trade flow data on which members can rely for interpretation of specific 
commitments is essential “as without which GATS rights and obligations as reflected in the 
schedules will become so complex that it will become almost impossible to make practical 
and legal sense of them
40”.    The national governments or the multilateral institutions like 
World Bank and the IMF despite major efforts are still simply not geared to collect the 
trade data individually for each service, let alone each subsector or to identify transactions 
separately under each mode of service delivery.         
 
Data-related issues are relevant both to the determination of surge in imports and to the 
determination of injury and also for creating a causal link.  The reliable trade flow data is 
thus the crucial challenge in any attempt to demonstrate whether there has been a ‘surge’ in 
imports of the ‘like or directly competitive’ products.   There exists a structural weakness 
of statistical reporting in the services sector and particularly for subsectors in 
internationally traded services. Working on the GATT structures, which relies heavily on 
empirical information, for a service sub-sector to demonstrate injury or a threat thereof and 
also create a causal link with increased imports is really complicated and appears to be a 
practical impossibility.   
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 However, there are some Member countries (demandeurs), which are not convinced with 
the lack of adequate quality data and problems faced with the possibility of generating it 
and feel that similar data problems also existed in the goods sector during the early GATT 
period when different economies had their own systems of product classifications in the 
goods sector.    It is argued that this statistical deficit had not prevented the creation of trade 
remedy mechanisms under GATT for merchandize trade.   This group feels that lack of 
reliable trade flow data is not a forbidding problem because, individual injury indicators 
might not be fully reliable for a definitive determination but the combination of various 
indicators will provide a reasonably comprehensive picture of the state of injury and also its 
causal link with imports.   This line of argument preaches an open and flexible approach 
towards determination of injury and thus creating subjective grounds for application of 
ESMs. This approach is excessive flexible and may open the door for abuse of the system.   
The Member Countries who seek standalone ESMs under GATS (demandeurs) were of 
the view that issue of statistics can be managed and proposed that the national statistical 
offices of the country, contemplating the possible imposition of the ESMs, would be the 
first recourse and if the statistical figures available with it were not sufficient, then statistics 
that are collated by international organizations and professional associations might be 
useful alternatives or supplements.  It was recognized by these countries that statistics from 
any one source may not be able to provide all the information necessary to justify an 
application of an emergency safeguard and that all possible sources would need to be 
looked at concurrently.  It was also indicated that statistics could also be complemented by 
a qualitative assessment of the injury suffered
41
 and simultaneously opined that it would be 
inappropriate for application of an ESM to aim at the standard of evidence as in criminal 
law cases.  
  Demandeurs of the ESMs also suggested that the firms constituting the domestic industry 
or associations representing the domestic industry seeking temporary protection through 
imposition of ESMs should also provide the data.   The proposals also indicate that the data 
that might be generated by petitioning firms may include elements like decline in profits, 
returns on investment, occurrence of losses, price reductions, reduction in the number of 
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domestic suppliers, decline in the growth of output or sales, change in market share and 
reduced level of capacity utilization. The ASEAN paper submitted to WPGR
42
 had also 
referred to a number of indicators either in absolute or relative terms.   If the petitioning 
industry could not produce data to substantiate their claims, the investigations would 
conclude that the case for a safeguard had not been made and especially in case if the key 
question of increased imports causal link with injury or threat thereof could not be 
addressed by the petitioning industry, the case for a safeguard would fail.
43
  
 Countries not convinced with the desirability or the need of standalone ESMs under GATS 
during the negotiations continuously raised questions in relation to the source of statistics 
that will be used in making a determination of injury and whether data could be provided 
by sectors or with respect to mode of service supply.  This group of member countries was 
also not convinced with the practical validity of the  explanations provided by the 
demandeurs as these clarifications to them do not reflect the ground realities and any form 
of reliable data on which an ESM action on a GATT model can be based was simply too 
difficult to compile in the services sector.    It was apprehended that the confidence in the 
system could be undermined if trade and production data of the relevant service sector was 
not available at the level needed for the credible application of an ESM.  It was feared that 
this lack of credible data might lead to investigations being initiated without a valid or just 
cause being shown and thus burden enterprises with the task of having to react to 
investigations being launched on less than solid grounds which in turn may lead to shocks 
or lack of predictability.  
 
Presently most official data on services is collected through periodic surveys that are not 
equally detailed as customs data for merchandise trade and also suffer from significant time 
lags.  In the most developed country, the US, for example, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
authorities do collect data through surveys on the sale of services through foreign-owned 
affiliates, but such data is reported with a two-year delay while comprehensive benchmark 
surveys are conducted every five years. The sectors covered are also aggregated, as for 
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instance architectural, engineering and construction services are all bundled together as one 
category.  It will be interesting to appreciate here that despite relatively good state of trade 
flow data that is available for conduct of investigations prior to any definitive application of 
an ESM and determination of injury to domestic industry, even in case of trade in goods 
every GATT panel which has scrutinized the application of the safeguards measure had 
found problems associated with trade or domestic production data that has invariably 
prevented the panel or AB from upholding the action taken
44
 by the importing country.  
 
4.6.3. LIKE SERVICES AND TRANSPARENCY  
 
  The concept of likeness is crucial for an application of ESM under the GATT model and 
this notion still has problems in the merchandise trade as is evident from a number of 
disputes that revolved around the issue of likeness of imported products and there were also 
attempts, though short lived and frustrating to introduce the so-called ‘aim and effects’ test. 
The Article XIX:1(a)  and Article 2: 1 of the AoS trigger the process only when increased 
imports “…cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers …of like or directly 
competitive products…” The basic criterions for determining likeness under the GATT 
were initially laid down in the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments 
adopted by the Contracting Parties in 1970.  The criterions included the product’s end uses 
in a given market that included consumers’ tastes and habits; the product's properties, 
nature and even quality.    
 
 However it was in the EC – Asbestos case, that the AB45 articulated and summarized the 
approach for determining likeness under the GATT: “This approach has, in the main, 
consisted of employing four general criteria in analysing ‘likeness’ (i) the properties, nature 
and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers' tastes and 
habits – more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions and behaviour – in respect 
of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products. These four criteria 
comprise four categories of “characteristics” that the products involved might share: (i) the 
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physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of 
serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat 
the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a 
particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff 
purposes”46. 
  
The Appellate Body also went on to clarify that, in the WTO jurisprudence, the 
determination of likeness is “fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of 
a competitive relationship between and among products”.  The important question that 
arises here then is that whether the approach developed under the GATT to assess likeness 
of goods can be transposed to under the GATS so as to assess the likeness of intangible 
services transactions. The criteria developed under GATT case-law for determination of 
‘likeness’ under jurisprudence relating to other trade remedy regimes includes; physical 
properties, classification, end-use and consumer tastes and even substitutability. These 
parameters cannot be mechanically transposed to apply on cross border services trade as 
these may not contribute to establishing ‘likeness’ under the GATS; similarly other 
parameters, such as the regulatory context or an ‘aim and effect’ type approach are also not 
relevant. 
 
 The concept of ‘like services’ and ‘service suppliers’ used in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) is very much an uncharted territory. The few disputed cases 
involving   national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment claims under the 
GATS are vague concerning the criteria which should be used to establish ‘likeness’ “there 
are problems involved in sort(ing) … what constitutes like or directly competitive 
services”47.  Discussions among WTO Members on this subject have remained limited and 
inconclusive. Perhaps the only point on which everybody agrees is that a determination of 
“likeness” under the GATS gives rise to a wider range of questions – and uncertainties – 
than under the GATT.   The intangibility of services, the difficulty to draw a line between 
product and production, the existence of four modes of supply, the combined reference to 
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like services and like service suppliers, and the lack of a detailed nomenclature are some of 
the factors which complicate the task of establishing “likeness” in services trade”48.   The 
concept of ‘likeness’ in the context of the national treatment obligations incurred under 
provisions of Article XVII of the GATS are understood to cover the possible implications 
of the combined reference to ‘like services and service suppliers’, as well as the relevance 
and role of the modes of supply in determining ‘likeness’.   
 
The central issue of ‘likeness’ was touched upon in EC—Bananas and Canada—Autos, 
where Panels seemed to take the general approach that service suppliers that offer the same 
services are ‘like’. In those cases, however, the ‘likeness’ issue was not really 
controversial. The US—Gambling dispute represented the first opportunity for a panel to 
address this question more fully. It declined to do so and a ‘likeness test’, therefore, 
remains to be fully fleshed out under the GATS
49
.  
 
A related issue is the extent to which the MFN and national treatment obligations will 
apply across various modes of supply services.  This is important to determine for instance, 
that services supplied over the Internet under mode 1 will qualify ‘like’ similar services that 
are supplied through a commercial presence under mode 3.  In Canada—Autos, the Panel 
applied the national treatment obligation across modes of supply and was of the view that 
‘it is reasonable to consider for the purposes of this case that services supplied in Canada 
through modes 3 and 4 and those supplied from the territory of other Members through 
modes 1 and 2 are ‘‘like’’ services’. This view of panel is consistent with the fact that 
nothing in Article XVII or II of GATS prevents, as such, the application of the non-
discriminatory standard across various modes of service supply.  This ruling does not 
necessarily mean, that ‘likeness’ will, or should, always be found across modes of supply.  
This will not be applicable if it can be demonstrated that services provided under different 
modes of supply effectively pertain to different segments markets and these do not compete 
mutually than categorizing these services as ‘like’ services will be inappropriate, however, 
                                               
48
 Cossy Mireille, Determining "likeness" under the GATS: Squaring the circle? Staff Working Paper ERSD-
2006-08, World Trade Organization September 2006 
49
 Leroux Eric H., Eleven Years of GATS Case Law: What Have we Learned? Journal of International 
Economic Law 10(4), 749–793 
CHAPTER 4 
 104 
the mode of supply is one factor, among many others, to be taken into account to determine 
‘likeness’ in the services sector.  
  
 The concern for accommodating the concept of ‘likeness across modes of delivery of 
services’ has surfaced in some of the WTO bodies, such as the Council for Trade in 
Services, the Working Party on GATS Rules and most importantly in the US – Gambling 
case.  Pursuant to this concept, services and service suppliers would be regarded to be ‘like’ 
simply by virtue of being the nature of the activity in question, regardless of the mode of 
supply. Hence, all services and suppliers in a given sector would be presumed to be ‘like’, 
or, to put it differently, ‘different modes’ of supply could be used to provide a ‘like 
service’. The main argument in favour of ‘likeness across modes’ was that the text of 
Article XVII of GATS does not suggest that the mode of supply is relevant for defining 
likeness. On the face of it, the concept looks straight forward and, hence, appealing, but 
however, it in turn raises several questions. 
 
The structure of GATS schedules of commitments of individual Member countries,, 
established in the 1993 and followed by all Members, indicates that binding commitments 
made by the Members are mode-specific; which implies that, in a given sector, a Member 
retains the right to bind national treatment for a specific mode and not for another
50
.  The 
concept or puzzle about the ‘likeness across modes’ seems to rest on confusion between 
‘modes’ and ‘means’ of supply. A proper standard for comparison has not been discussed 
and remains yet to be established between foreign and national services and suppliers, 
based on a series of criteria which most likely will have to factor in the means through 
which a service is supplied
51
 as there is no ‘mode’ of supply for national products and 
producers. Under GATS the concept has broader implications and is relevant to different 
provisions or market access limitations which have been scheduled by a Member country 
and above all in the context of the application of an emergency safeguard measure
52
.   
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 In the services sector the concept of ‘likeness’ also has its own specific concerns 
particularly regarding transparency, objectivity, and fairness.  In provision of services it is 
fairly challenging even to objectively identify as similar elements of one service and then 
compare these, an example put forward during negotiations in the WPGR is of writing a 
‘simple memorandum’; that from one lawyer might not be exactly ‘like’ that from another 
lawyer; the quality of the service might be different and following a pure GATT model will 
imply that all services irrespective of quality will have to be treated at par.    The example 
is of fair amount of practical significance as the service activity which is being investigated 
is categorized as same, the quality of the service might be different, not substitutable and 
even be ever-changing.  
 
 The problem confronting WTO members was to first sort out what constitutes “like or 
directly competitive services”.  The very nature of services trade makes this determination 
questionable since most of what is delivered as a service is designed to meet the specific 
needs of the customer.    The concept of “like or directly competitive” assumes greater 
complexity when it is required to be determined that whether a service supplied on a cross 
border basis is similar to the one which is supplied through one of the other modes of 
supply.   The intangible nature of providing a service creates additional difficulties to any 
effort, which tries to compare a foreign service to a domestic service.  However, 
establishing what constitutes the “domestic industry” and “like services” is critical to 
credibly determine whether imports are causally linked to whatever threat thereof or injury 
is suffered by a country’s domestic service industry.  
 
 The model provided by GATT in determining as to what constitutes a “like or directly 
competitive product” is also not very helpful for the services sector, as classification 
instruments currently available for the service sector are less elaborate and reliable than the 
Harmonised System of classification for trade in goods to determine or pronounce on the 
likeness of services.  In many instances, unlike for the trade in goods and the HS, the fact 
that two services fall under the same CPC category will not be sufficient to establish their 
likeness. The CPC defines service activities and is indifferent to the quality or 
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characteristics of the supplier
53
.    However, on the other hand, there are always strong 
presumptions that if two services are falling under two different categories of 
classifications these are bound to be unlike. Hence, CPC can at best be indirectly relevant 
to compare service suppliers. 
 
 The issue of ‘likeness of services’ under the broader framework of GATS is of genuine 
concern, as the concept of likeness is relevant not only for the application of an emergency 
safeguard measure, but also, for host of other elements of GATS, like, for the basic issues 
such as national treatment obligations
54
.   Not having the solution in sight of the issue of 
“like or directly competitive services” during the negotiations in WPGR it was proposed by 
some Member countries
55
, demanding independent ESMs, to leave this question to prove 
also to the domestic authorities. Proponents were of the view that onus to establish 
‘likeness’ of the services should be left to the authorities of the Member contemplating 
imposition of safeguards measures.  They thus proposed a case-by-case approach which in 
turn raised valid concerns associated with such an approach regarding transparency, 
objectivity, and fairness of the determination of the ‘likeness’.     
 
 The only case law available in the service sector on the issue is the  Panel finding on the 
EC – Bananas III, which was subsequently not reviewed by the Appellate Body, which 
addressed the issue of ‘like services and service suppliers’ under Article II of the GATS as : 
“[I]n our view, the nature and the characteristics of wholesale transactions as such, as 
well as of each of the different subordinated services mentioned in the head note to 
section 6 of the CPC, are ‘like’ when supplied in connection with wholesale services, 
irrespective of whether these services are supplied with respect to bananas of EC and 
traditional ACP origin, on the one hand, or with respect to bananas of third-country or 
non-traditional ACP origin, on the other. Indeed, it seems that each of the different 
service activities taken individually is virtually the same and can only be 
distinguished by referring to the origin of the bananas in respect of which the service 
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activity is being performed. Similarly, in our view, to the extent that entities provide 
these like services, they are like service suppliers
56.” 
 
In the Canada – Autos case, the panel assessed – very summarily – the likeness of 
Canadian vis-à-vis Japanese companies against the relevant definition contained in the 
CPC.  The Panel found that, contrary to what was claimed by Japan, the Canadian 
companies cited by Japan did not “seem to be supplying 'wholesale trade services of motor 
vehicles' as defined in CPC 6111”.  Hence, in the absence of domestic “like” suppliers, 
discrimination could not occur.  More generally, using the definition of services activities 
to deduce the likeness of suppliers will lead to the much criticised panel's conclusion in 
Bananas III that “to the extent that entities provide these like services, they are like service 
suppliers”. 
 
The Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) has defined and broadened 
the scope of likeness in the context of cross border trade in services.  Articles 10.2 and 10.3 
of the AUSFTA read as: ‘Each Party shall accord to service suppliers of the other Party 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own service 
suppliers’ or, respectively, ‘ . . . to service suppliers of a non-Party’ (emphasis added.)  
Thus, the concept of ‘likeness’ no longer builds on the notion of ‘like services and service 
supplier’ as in the GATS, but on the existence of ‘like circumstances’. The signatories 
might thus be able to differentiate between foreign and domestic producers/products for a 
wider range of factors than would be permissible under the GATS, including factors related 
to the public policy context in which a service is provided. Furthermore, the explicit 
reference, as in Article XVII of the GATS, to the treatment of both services and service 
suppliers has disappeared from this FTA; and the benchmark, in GATS Article XVII:3, of 
treatment that does not ‘modify the conditions of competition’ has been replaced by a 
simple reference to ‘treatment no less favourable than . . . ’. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
borne in mind that the scope of relevant AUSFTA obligations, specified in Article 10.1, 
extends to measures ‘affecting cross-border trade in services by service suppliers of the 
other Party’, including measures ‘affecting the production, distribution, marketing, sale and 
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delivery’, as well as to measures ‘affecting the purchase or use of, or payment for, a 
service’ (emphasis added)57. 
 
The transformation brought about by the internet in last decade could not be foreseen in 
1994 when GATS was agreed. This phenomenal development has created issues with 
respect to the extent to which different obligations assumed by the Member countries apply 
across various service sectors and also modes of supply. A point of relevance in context of 
application of ESM, for instance, is whether the services supplied over the internet under 
mode 1 of supply can be regarded as ‘like’ similar services supplied through a commercial 
presence under mode 358 and can adverse market circumstances created under any mode of 
supply of service can be regarded as a ‘like’ service  in all modes or in a mode other than 
identified initially; as the Panel in the Canada—Autos, applied the national treatment 
obligation across modes of supply.  The Panel ruled that “it is reasonable to consider for the 
purposes of this case that services supplied in Canada through modes 3 and 4 and those 
supplied from the territory of other Members through modes 1 and 2 are ‘‘like’’ 
services’”59. With such a broad scope of ‘like’ services, the practical application of ESMs 
under the GATS gets further complicated and difficult. 
4.6.4 UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS 
The interpretative gap with respect to the question; ‘unforeseen by whom, at what point 
in time?’ that had developed under Article XIX and also subject of dispute under the AoS, 
was carried forward into the protracted and long debates in the WPGR.  These debates 
particularly focussed on; whether the concept of ‘unforeseen developments’ was 
worthwhile and also; as to how the concept of ‘emergency’ (word used in text of Article X 
of GATS) is different to the concept of ‘unforeseen developments’ (the word used in text of 
Article XIX of GATT).     Some Members countries were of the view that the concepts of 
‘emergency’ and ‘unforeseen developments’ have connotations and both describe the 
general context in which any ESMs that are developed under GATS will require to be 
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invoked. For this group of countries, therefore, it was not necessary to include an explicit 
reference to the concept of ‘unforeseen developments’ in any text which may possibly be 
drafted.  The “situations justifying the invocation of an emergency safeguard measure” or 
the “context” in which an ESM might be applied should anyway be “out of the 
extraordinary
60”. The term “emergency” has both an aspect of suddenness and also of 
having unforeseen elements. In view of some Members the “unforeseen developments” and 
the ASEAN paper
61
 submitted to the APGR uses this term (the wording of Article X of 
GATS).  
 Some other Member countries were of the view that Article X of GATS, unlike Article 
XIX of GATT, only refers to ‘emergency’ and not to ‘unforeseen developments’ and the 
key criterion was a sudden increase in foreign supply as the short-term impact of an 
increase in imports of services could not be anticipated in any objective way.      This group 
of countries felt that if a reference to ‘unforeseen developments’ is made in the text of any 
standalone provisions for ESMs that are eventually developed under GATS then it would 
introduce a fourth condition, which was not desirable as the concept was too subjective and 
would not be operational in practice. It was suggested that the concerns with the concept of 
‘unforeseen developments’ were recognized, a fact that is reflected in the use of the word 
‘emergency’ in the text and considered that the concept of ‘emergency’ should be applied 
on case-by-case basis.  The mere fact that words ‘unforeseen developments’ were not 
specifically used in the Article X of GATS is not sufficient, for some countries, to 
disregard this concept in formulation of any ESMs for services trade.  The group, 
consisting of the countries that are demanding ESMs, was of the view that Article X of 
GATS and Article XIX of GATT cannot be compared since the two are fundamentally 
different; the former is essentially a negotiating mandate, while the latter contained 
substantive rules. It was viewed that the term ‘unforeseen developments’ is more 
appropriate than the concept of ‘emergency62’ as it was important to reflect the idea of 
‘unexpected’ in order to make a distinction with normal trade flows, since an increase in 
trade flows was a logical consequence of liberalization and a reference to ‘emergency’ only 
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was not sufficient.    To these Members the concept of ‘unforeseen developments’ was in 
principle embodied in the concept of ‘emergency’, but whether to make it explicit or not 
was something that required to be discussed and agreed.   
 
Many Members were apprehensive of the fact that the concept of ‘unforeseen 
developments’ has a history of different interpretations in the case law under GATT and if 
this concept is also carried into GATS it will not help but create many  complications in the 
application of any ESMs, if these are developed under GATS. It was also feared in the 
early stages of the negotiations in the WPGR that the case law available for merchandise 
trade might find its way into services trade case-law and be used under GATS. The record 
notes of the discussions held in the meetings and various papers submitted by the members 
to the WPGR demonstrate that there existed an immense divergence of views on these 
basic constituting elements.   
4.6.5 IMPORTS AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, 
 Application of an ESM under the model provided by the GATT has a direct relationship 
with the increased ‘imports’ and the ‘domestic production’ in the specific category where 
the relief through the imposition of the measure is sought.  The likely application of 
emergency safeguards measure is only possible under GATT when imports that cause or 
threaten to cause serious injury through increase of imports in quantitative terms, 
absolutely or relative to the domestic production.  The concept of ‘importation’ though on 
the surface appears to be fairly straight forward and something that can possibly  and 
equally be applied either to cross border trade in goods or trade in services but the practical 
manifestation of the concept ‘importation’ is not similar for international trade in goods and 
the cross border trade in services.  The disciplines provided in the GATT only cover 
international merchandize trade and do not cover facilities for production of these products 
and any regime that relates to the production facilities is detached from products and 
treated as investments
63
.   
While it is not simple to disconnect production from the consumption in most categories of 
the trade in services as there exists simultaneity between the production and consumption 
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of the service but these are profoundly different from goods in that they require a certain 
amount of proximity between the provider of the service and the person receiving the 
offered product.  It follows that even in the situation of cross-border supply of a service 
(i.e. the supply of a service where both the consumer and the supplier remain in their 
respective territories when the product is delivered) cannot encompass the transfer of the 
service itself but rather the result of the service performed. Similarly, consumption of a 
service abroad includes import to the home country of the result of the service that has 
already been enjoyed and consumed. Authorities therefore cannot easily detect cross-border 
movement of services trade and there are statistical concerns.  
The notion of ‘domestic production’, which is fairly straightforward for trade in goods 
but the same simple concept turns fairly complex for the trade in services especially 
considering its different modes of delivery.  The ‘domestic production’ in the case of 
international trade in goods normally and simply refers to all suppliers operating within the 
territory of a Member, irrespective of the fact that whether these are owned by the nationals 
or foreigners in terms of the national treatment provisions
64
. The concept of importation in 
cross border trade in services cannot be regarded to be straight forward and broadly it refers 
to a product crossing the frontier under Mode 1, consumption abroad, under Mode 2, the 
entry or establishment of a service supplier under Mode 3 and Mode 4.  The “concept of 
imports of services is not entirely clear”65 as it also embraces post-establishment trade 
under Mode 3 and Mode 4 of delivery.   The only notion of importation under GATS that 
can be compared with importation of goods and possibly be covered under any possible 
model that can be provided by the GATT is the cross-border trade in services under Mode 
1.   
  The possible application of a safeguards provision first requires dividing the
 
domestic 
industry into a nationally and a foreign-owned
 
segments. The definition of domestic 
industry for application of ESMs in the goods sector is provided under Article 4:1 (C) of 
the AOS and this definition has a possible transposition in case of cross border transactions 
of services under Mode 1 and Mode 2 of service delivery.  However for Mode 3 and Mode 
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4, the situation is fairly complicated, as defining ‘domestic’ production involves two 
different concepts, domestic production under these two modes of delivery refers both to; i) 
national and foreign suppliers domiciled within the country; and; ii) in certain cases it also 
refers to national suppliers only, and foreign suppliers despite having a physical presence in 
the country may be excluded.   After establishment of a service provider in the territory of a 
Member country or in other words when the entry stage has been  passed and the service 
has crossed the border, another issue arises that whether the safeguard action would be 
taken to protect the existing service suppliers against ‘newly established suppliers’ or ‘new 
market entrants’.    In the context of post-establishment operations (mode 3 & 4) of the 
service delivery, if an emergency safeguard action is conceived it would logically 
distinguish amongst national and foreign suppliers and the domestic suppliers, ‘defining  
domestic production’ only in terms of national suppliers will add a new dimension to the 
application of ESMs.   The differentiation on basis of some threshold of ownership will in 
turn be a violation of the ‘National Treatment’ requirements laid down under Article XVII 
of the GATS.  The proponents of the ESMs have in the WPGR suggested that if the 
relevant injury criteria are met by a significant
 
number of national suppliers, whenever
 
governments are able under domestic law to do so, they be entitled
 
to temporarily suspend 
new foreign establishment66.
 
 
 The determination of injury for any investigations under the GATT model is conditional 
on the definition of what constitutes domestic industry, the determination of   serious injury 
and/or the threat of serious injury which are defined in Article 4:1 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards
67
 and establishing causal link between imports and injury.   The mechanics of 
injury investigation
68
 provided in   Article 4:2 of the AOS also uses the concepts of ‘like 
products’ and ‘domestic production’.   Even if the problems of paucity of reliable and 
comprehensive trade flow data in the services sector are, for a time being set aside, the 
criteria defined in the AOS has severe limitations on its application in the context of 
services as  the disciplines provided for in Article 4:2(a) and 4:2(b) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards would apply. 
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 Under the GATT model the determination of serious injury in case of investigations for 
possible application of the ESMs under GATS would have to focus upon; i) cross-border 
service transactions under Mode 1 and;  ii)  the effects on domestic industry of 
consumption abroad under Mode 2.   While at the establishment stage under Mode 3 and 
Mode 4, the notion of increased ‘imports’,  which is required to be taken into account in 
assessing serious injury or threat thereof to a domestic industry, would then presumably 
relate to an investment flow (Mode 3) or to the movement of natural persons (Mode 4).    
Any emergency safeguard mechanisms if it were to be contemplated in the context of 
physical presence of service provider (Mode 3), then the relevant consideration for the 
determination of injury would be the situation of service suppliers of another Member in 
relation to service suppliers of national provenance producing ‘like or directly’ competitive 
products.  Application of this criterion will require substitution of the notion of 
‘consumption of foreign services’ for the concept of ‘imports’ so as to cover supply 
through each of the four modes of delivery of services.    It will also require that the 
reference to “domestic industry” be replaced by the concept of “national industry” which in 
practical terms will imply that despite of having a ‘commercial presence’ foreign service 
suppliers will always have a possibility to be denied the same domestic law considerations 
as a nationally owned entity.    It is interesting to note here that given the scope of the 
GATS, not only industries or service provider (i.e. juridical persons), but natural persons 
will also be subject of an emergency safeguards action.    
 
In circumstances where factors other than increased imports are causing injury to 
domestic industry then in terms of the model provided by GATT this injury should not be 
attributed to increased imports and these factors, which are not directly related to trade, 
would require to be taken into account by the investigating authority
69
.    It is generally 
accepted that macro-economic disruptions and other structural problems that reflect broader 
economy-wide imbalances do not justify the use of emergency safeguards in individual 
categories as stipulated under Article 4:2(b) of AOS.   It is apprehended by some Members 
that the situations which impinge on an industry’s ability to adjust to sudden increases in 
foreign supplies are more likely to arise in services sector than these do in the merchandise 
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trade.   The logical question that arises here is that would it be desirable and technically 
possible to separate such situations from other genuinely import related developments.  A 
causality requirement of this kind though in principle may be possible to be developed but 
in practical terms this causality will be really difficult, rather impossible, to recognize. 
ASEAN’s paper proposed that the determination of domestic industry should largely be left 
to the national laws of each member country.  There have traditionally been concerns about 
the use of the definitions found in Article XXVIII of the GATS but the suggestion to leave 
such an important defining feature to each member to provide its own definition raises 
serious concerns as a purely subjective definition developed by each member and then 
subsequently linking such an individualized definition to the determination of injury and 
thus application of ESM would result in a high level of discretion, confusion, lack of 
predictability and have implications on the type of safeguard measures imposed.  Proposed 
approach was also undesirable because it would encourage Members “to offer definitions 
of domestic industry that would allow for the maximum possible use of ESMs, will thus 
lead to uncertainty and undermine confidence in the ability of the system to deliver 
reasonable outcomes”70.  In the informal discussions in the WPGR it was considered as 
inappropriate to distinguish between established suppliers on the basis of the degree of 
foreign ownership, as even if the model provided by the GATT is followed such a  
differentiation will not correspond to the definition of domestic industry used in the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
   A group of demandeurs of the ESM also suggested that for determination of injury to the 
‘domestic industry’ could be defined in a manner that excludes those segments of the 
industry where the percentage of foreign equity is above a certain pre-specified threshold.   
A question that arises then is that how an established foreign supplier could cause injury to 
local suppliers in a situation where a Member has already limited foreign ownership of, say 
30%.   A number of Members felt that it was inappropriate to distinguish between 
established suppliers on the basis of the degree of foreign ownership.  Another question 
was that if a Member had scheduled a commitment wherein the number of licences for 
provision of a service for the foreigners was limited to three, then would it be possible for 
that Member to apply an emergency safeguard measure to any of the those three foreign 
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suppliers that have been allowed the market access.  The invoking of the possible 
emergency safeguard measures, if these are developed under GATS, therefore, is dependent 
on how the domestic industry is defined.  If the three foreign licensees were part of the 
domestic industry, they would not be subject to a safeguard measure.  If the licensees did 
not fall within a Member's definition of domestic industry, a safeguard measure could then 
be applied
71
.   Partitioning a sector on the basis of ownership seems odd considering that 
now many countries have domestic sectors that are largely foreign-owned.  With regard to 
mode 3, it was difficult to understand how a country’s commercial output in a particular 
service sector be threatened by foreign contributions to that very output and the suggested 
notion of domestic industry seems particularly difficult for Mode 3.  To define the domestic 
industry, one needs to have a clearer idea as to who was to be protected, for what purpose, 
and against what
72
.   
 
The concept of ‘domestic industry’ for trade in goods as defined in Article 4.1(c) of the 
AoS in view of some cannot be used for cross border trade in services. A single set of 
definitional elements will run into difficulties in different sub-sectors and modes of supply 
of the services transaction and investigative authorities will have to use different criterion 
to determine the domestic industry with regard to like or directly competitive products 
which will probably will have to vary from case to case
73
.    Members not convinced with 
the desirability of ESMs under GATS felt that no clear proposal has been put forward to 
establish causality in the injury determination in the same service under different modes. 
There is no methodology suggested to ascertain whether the cross-border supply of legal 
services by fax, mail, e-mail or telephone was the cause of any injury that has been 
claimed.  Members at lower levels of economic development will face difficulties in 
amassing all the information required and, therefore, wonder which Members are most 
likely to use an ESM.   
4.6.6. DETERMINATION OF INJURY  
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The determination of injury in the service sector faces difficult challenges of its own, 
including the concomitant necessity to establish causality with the imports.  The 
determination of injury under the GATT model in terms of Article 4:1(c) of the AOS 
requires information on; i) the quantity of imports; and also; ii) domestic production
74
 
especially where ESMs are being sought on increased imports relative to domestic 
production
75
.  Determination of surge in imports i.e. a sudden increase in the supply of 
services by foreign suppliers of like and directly competitively services is also important to 
gauge but because of difficulties with trade data and précis product classification it is 
difficult to measure.  The proponents of the concept were nevertheless not very 
uncomfortable on this aspect and felt that suddenness should be understood in a relatively 
broad manner, as part of the enforcing authorities’ assessment of the emergency situation 
and in the context of its effect on the domestic industry
76
.  It might, for instance, refer to an 
increase in supply of a particular service over a period of up to three years, although it 
could be shorter for other sectors. Example given of ‘sudden increase’ under mode 2 was 
that if a Member’s ships and other sea going vessels started to get repair and maintenance 
done predominantly in a neighbouring country, thus causing injury to the domestic ship 
repair and maintenance industry.  This might take place over a period of two to three years 
and might be perceived as a ‘sudden increase’ in consumption abroad while under mode 3, 
foreign retailers’ market share might demonstrate a strong surge in supply which caused or 
threatened to cause injury to local retailers. 
 
 There are no GATT type instruments of contingency protection available under GATS and 
there has as yet been no case that has been brought to the WTO dispute settlement system 
with respect to cross border trade in services where injury has been claimed by a member 
country because of the liberalisation undertaken in the sector and some form of temporary 
protection has been sought. Therefore, it is difficult to comprehend that how would an 
injury to domestic service supplier will definitely be determined especially when services 
transactions have myriad problems of statistics, determination of causality and with the 
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very basic agreed understanding of the fact as to what constitutes imports.  The problems 
are further complicated when the ‘goods’ and ‘services’ overlap as most traded 
merchandise have now either services built into them or have strong nexus with them.  The 
fundamental structure and logic of its Article I: 1, in relation to the rest of the GATS, 
requires that determination of whether a measure is, in fact, covered by the GATS must be 
made before the consistency of that measure with any substantive obligation of the GATS 
can be assessed. Article II: 1 of the GATS states expressly that it applies only to “any 
measure covered by this Agreement”. This explicit reference to the scope of the GATS 
confirms that the measure at issue must be found to be a measure “affecting trade in 
services” within the meaning of Article I: 1 
 
Despite long deliberations in the WPGR on the issue, possible sources of injury to 
domestic service sector are still open to questions like; what is the yard stick to measure the 
injury; would it be solely an increase in the number and/or an increase in the value of 
services provided?  Would it be in absolute terms or rather in relative terms compared to 
local service suppliers?  Countries proposing ESMs under GATS are of the view that no 
single criterion might be decisive, the circumstances would have to be examined on case-
by-case basis and it might be useful to assess injury in both absolute and relative terms
77
.   
In view of the statistical concerns combined with the complexity of the services trade and 
its four Modes of delivery the countries not convinced with the desirability of ESMs under 
GATS wonder as to how the proponents of independent ESM provisions under GATS 
propose to determine causality between the service supplier and the threat of serious injury 
or serious injury was being caused by liberalization undertaken according to a Member's 
schedule of commitments as differentiated from other factors. It was also considered by 
some countries that determination of any injury in the service sector should take into 
account the national economic interests of a Member, including the adverse impact of costs 
resulting from the imposition of an emergency safeguard measure. The costs can have 
different forms like, for example, reduction in competition in the retail sector might have 
adverse consequences for consumers, while an increase in the price of financial and 
telecommunication services might negatively impact on users.  
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4.6.7. COMPENSATION, CAUSALITY, PROVISIONAL APPLICATION 
 
The concepts like; ‘critical circumstances’, ‘duration’, ‘progressive liberalization’, and 
‘level of concessions’, ‘review’ and similar other obligations are of critical significance to 
any application of any ESM under the provisions that are available for trade in goods under 
the General Agreement.  The GATT with respects to emergency safeguards permits the 
adoption of provisional safeguard measures in ‘critical circumstances’ and conceptually 
and working on the GATT model, if there are to be put in place any agreed ESMs under 
GATS, then there appears to be no reason as to why provisional safeguard measures could 
not also be made to apply to trade in services.    This is, however, only possible if the 
nature of service transactions under any of the available modes of delivery justifies a 
‘critical circumstance’ remedy.      Similarly other enabling provisions that exist in the AoS 
and relate to the concepts like, ‘the duration of time for which safeguard measures might be 
applied’, the interval before reintroduction requisites, progressive relaxation and mandatory 
review.  All these concepts could also be employed in the context of GATS but this all is 
subject to the proviso that we have a viable emergency safeguards instrument, modelled on 
the paradigm provided by the GATT, for trade in services in place. 
 Members of the WTO when trying to follow the GATT model, on a conceptual basis, have 
no option but to agree that any emergency safeguard measures if developed under GATS 
must be temporary and these should be progressively liberalized during the period of 
application.   The AoS defining the applicable rules details
78
 the length of time for which 
safeguard measures might be applied, and the interval that must elapse before a new 
safeguard measure may be introduced on a product that has previously been the subject of a 
safeguard action.   There was also a general shared perception that safeguard actions, if 
agreed under GATS, like any other trade remedy action under GATT, should only be 
applied to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate 
adjustment
79
 which for in the services sector it can mean temporary market access 
restrictions or temporary suspension of the national treatment principle.  
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 The provisions relating to the other concepts like of ‘compensation80’ and ‘balance of 
concessions’ that exist with respect to application of ESMs in the context of trade in goods 
as such pose little conceptual difficulties if these provisions were also to be transposed to 
any regime of ESMs for trade in services.  The provisions of Article XXI of GATS, dealing 
with the modification of schedules are relevant in the context ‘compensation’ and ‘balance 
of concessions’ on the same analogy as are the provisions of Article XXVIII of GATT 
relevant to its Article XIX.    Article XXI of GATS already provides that a Member may 
modify or withdraw a scheduled commitment at any time after three years from the entry 
into force of the commitment concerned. Compensatory adjustments or what is called 
‘balance of concessions’ should seek to maintain “a general level of mutually advantageous 
commitments not less favourable to trade than that provided for in Schedules of specific 
commitments” (Article XXI: 2). However, pending results of negotiations on the question 
of ESMs under GATS Members are free to modify their schedule of concessions, if need 
be, even after one year in terms of Article X: 2 of the GATS.   A set of procedures were 
also adopted under Article XXI (Modification of Schedules) on 20 July 1999 which have to 
be used whenever a Member intends to modify or withdraw its scheduled commitment
81
. 
 
The concept of compensation was primarily intended to work as a potential deterrent 
against protectionist abuse through the application of emergency safeguard provisions.  
There was a view that ‘compensation’ requirements render the invocation of (temporary) 
safeguards too burdensome and, thus, create a bias in favour of (permanent) modifications 
of scheduled commitments either through negotiations under Article XXVIII of GATT or 
in case of services trade under Article XXI of the GATS.   The concept of ‘compensation’ 
and ‘modifications of schedules’ are fairly different, the underlying economic challenges 
are essentially different in case of sudden import surges as compared to longer-term 
changes in competitive conditions.  It was viewed in WPGR that in the case of ESMs under 
GATS the need for compensation could be made contingent on the type of adjustment 
envisaged and the nature of the services-industry involved, like in the case of digressive 
application might not be compensated. 
                                               
80
 Article 8:1 of the AOS. 
81
 World Trade Organization Document S/C/M/38, section D. The text of the adopted procedure; S/L/80. 
CHAPTER 4 
 120 
In case of trade in goods there are relatively few complications involved  in calculating 
the compensation that may be required to  be extended in case of application of any trade 
remedy measures (anti-dumping, countervailing duties and emergency safeguards).  
However, there are a fair number of technical difficulties involved in case of “trade in 
services under General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and also in some other 
areas like Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”), where working on the GATT model, the 
quantification for seeking of compensation is difficult to determine”82.    During the 
discussions on the issue in the WPGR it was also suggested by some Members that the 
application of any emergency safeguard mechanism, that is developed under GATS, should 
also take into account the wider public interest considerations and not only industry-
specific considerations.  These countries also suggested that Article 3 of AoS could be used 
as a model in this regard, but at the same time it was apprehended by other Members that 
the inclusion of the concept of “public interest” will take away the objectivity of measures 
and also allow for too much leeway to the country that is imposing the measure.   
The exact characteristics of Article XXI of GATS need to be taken into account when 
considering whether the possibilities for modifying commitments provided under Article 
XXI might obviate the need for a specific emergency safeguard mechanism under GATS 
and the simultaneous existence of the two provisions will cause an unnecessary overlap.  
However, in terms of paradigm provided by the GATT the indefinite withdrawal of 
commitments is not similar as temporary withdrawal of commitments that would 
presumably be envisioned under an emergency safeguard provision; these are totally two 
different concepts and have a different basis.  The nature of renegotiations of schedule of 
concessions differs from the concept of ESMs in three important ways; i) in GATS Article 
XXI action is only available three years after a commitment has been undertaken; ii) 
Article XXI action cannot be taken until three months after notification of the intention to 
act; and iii) the obligation to provide compensation for the adverse effects of the 
modification of a commitment exists from the outset under Article XXI procedures. Article 
XXI of GATS has its parallel in Article XXVIII of the GATT.  For some other member 
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countries this was not a problem as in practice Article XIX and Article XXVIII had 
coexisted in the GATT and in early years of GATT many Article XIX actions were settled 
through compensations under the ongoing Article XXVIII negotiations.    In a sense, ESM 
by these countries were seen as filling the gap between a permanent commitment and a 
permanent withdrawal. 
  The proponents’ also argued that it is every Member’s right to modify or withdraw its 
commitments, subject to compensation under Article XXI of the GATS and there is no 
reason why a temporary modification or withdrawal under an ESM could not also be 
construed as a right.  Since the modification or withdrawal proposed was only temporary, 
the corollary obligation of maintaining a general level of mutually advantageous 
commitments may be waived, at least during the initial period (first three years) of 
application. With regards to the duration or life of the ESM, the demandeurs of the concept 
of ESM have generally proposed a three year period from the date of application of an 
ESM. The reason for suggesting a shorter duration than that provided for goods sector 
under the Agreement on Safeguards (AoS) has been explained; “as this might help to gain 
greater support for an ESM among the membership”83 which is a reason that is detached 
from the reasons of structural adjustment and achieving competitiveness by the domestic 
industry that are regarded as raison-de-tere of any application of the ESM.    
Supplementing the proposal it was also proposed that this initial applicable period of three 
years may have a possibility of an extension of the measure for an additional three years for 
developing countries which could be seen from the perspective of S&D treatment.  
However, it was proposed that such an extension may not be automatic but be subject to 
prior review by the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) confirming that reasonable 
grounds existed and situations where a longer suspension of commitments was needed, this 
should lead to the initiation of Article XXI procedures.  
  
4.6.8 CHOICE OF MEASURES AND MODAL ISSUES 
The model for the application of an ESM that is provided by GATT does not prescribe 
any particular ‘choice of measures’ that may be used to provide relief to the domestic 
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producers. However, in practice in case of merchandise trade mostly two kinds of 
emergency safeguards measures have been used; i) quantitative restrictions (import quotas); 
and ii) tariff increases
84
 (price based) or a mixture of both.    Working on the GATT model 
the choice of options between quantity-based and price-based measures available for 
imposition of emergency safeguards should also theoretically exist for trade in services in 
case if an emergency safeguard instrument is developed under GATS on the GATT model.   
However, any ESM under GATS cannot always be applied on “imports” in the meanings or 
dimensions that are currently understood for trade in goods.   The discussants of the issue 
in the WPGR felt that ESMs under GATS, because of specificities of services sector, will 
require to be expressed in regulatory terms and that such regulations will in effect have to 
be conceptually equivalent to a quantity-based limitation (import quotas) in goods sector 
and there was a visible focus towards the imposition
 
of quantitative restrictions. To the 
discussants it was conceptually possible that under Mode 1 of supply of services, a concept 
of imports equivalent to that used in the Agreement on Safeguards would nearly apply.   
But under Mode 2, a safeguard measure would need to be in shape of a tax (price based), a 
quantitative limitation or a regulation of some kind affecting consumption abroad.   If 
consumption abroad were to involve the physical movement of consumers, then it might be 
the consumers, if they can be identified as user of a specific service. The consumers would 
be taxed or restricted in some way or a regulation might seek to ration or restrict 
consumption abroad of the service concerned.   If the physical movement of consumers 
were not involved, then the transaction itself will have to be the target of any application of 
the ESM.    
 Merchandise is traded through only one mode of supply that is equivalent only to cross 
border supply of services (mode 1), but despite being tangible products and having one 
mode of supply circumvention of an applied measure is of a substantive concern for any 
country taking any trade remedy action including application of an ESM.  The cross border 
trade in services is recognized in GATS as being conducted by four different modes of 
supply.  There is also the possibility for circumvention by service providers on the analogy 
of trade in goods. For example, a safeguard action taken by an importing country under 
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mode 3 might lead to circumvention and increased supplies through modes 1, 2 or 4
85
.    
Modal issues relating to the application of emergency safeguard measures in GATS have 
always been subject to concerns and questions.  Explaining safeguard measures envisaged 
for mode 2  the proponents of the concept under GATS felt that like for example in case of 
ship repairs and maintenance in another country, emergency safeguard measures may range 
from the imposition of fees to outright prohibition so as to reduce the propensity to 
consume abroad. Thus a safeguard measure will logically be sector-specific and, to the 
extent possible, mode-specific
86
. 
  If the GATT model is to be followed for creating ESMs for the services sector, then the 
possibility that imports through circumvention of applied measures will take place. This 
circumvention is comparatively much easier in services sector than the goods sector. In 
cross border trade in services an ESM applied on ‘import’ through one mode of delivery of 
a particular service can be comfortably circumvented by the suppliers of the service by 
entry through another mode of delivery.  For example
87
, if an ESM was imposed on legal 
services through mode 1, the same legal firm may simply setup an establishment through 
mode 3 and continue its operations. In addition circumvention is also possible when the 
ESM is applied to all foreign service providers supplying services through any mode, and a 
foreign service supplier registers as a domestic company to circumvent the measure.  
 In the absence of explicit import tariff barriers, as compared to goods, over the years, the 
countries have more intensively regulated services on grounds of protecting consumer 
interest and ensuring quality and excellence of professional services provided as “most 
professions are closely regulated and certified, and often self-regulated, usually though 
sectoral trade associations”88.  The application of ESMs to mode 1 of delivery in light of 
examples provided by proponents is doubtful.  For example in the case of legal services it 
is almost impossible to ascertained as to how many memoranda, destined for how many 
citizens would need to be supplied  across border to  cause threat of injury or injury to the 
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domestic industry.  A more complicated picture is created when for example a consumer 
decides to seek legal advice from a national lawyer who had moved and established a 
practice abroad under mode 3.  That practice might have many clients in its owner’s 
country of origin and might therefore affect other lawyers there. Similarly how would a 
lawyer’s service be placed especially when a country where he is physically located treats 
him as a foreign service supplier with limited acquired rights.   
 Exploring whether under mode 4 it might be easier to transpose a goods-type safeguard 
mechanism and also considering that mode 4, given its scope, could benefit from various 
regulatory safety nets shows that it makes effective application of a safeguard more 
difficult as in this case measure like a quota being imposed on top of a quota may be the 
only possibility.  There are unanswered questions about how a safeguard measure could be 
applied to mode 4 suppliers, which are already present in the territory of a country and only 
on a temporary basis.  Would they be prevented from entering the country in the first 
place?  What measures would be taken regarding persons that had already entered the 
territory, and how would such measures be enforced?   Member countries that are exporters 
of manpower felt that implications of possible application of any ESM for mode 4 is very 
important as this mode of supply of service was an extremely important issue for them and 
they stressed that the focus on mode 3 is not proper and the fact that the specific issue of 
defining domestic industry might not be as much of a problem for modes 1 or 4 as for other 
two modes of delivery did not mean that there were no other problems in regard of these 
modes of supply
89
.    
 An interesting hypothetical example of a situation that amply brings out the specificities of 
the services sector and limitations of the GATT model was placed before the WPGR, 
wherein the advertising sector of a country is liberalized and no limitation exists on any 
mode of entry for foreign suppliers. As a consequence of the inadequacies in the domestic 
advertising industry, foreign advertising agencies have started supplying services through 
all modes and these results in closure of a number of domestic advertising agencies. The 
consortium of the domestic industry requests an investigation and application of an ESM.  
In terms of the application, a quota of US $ 1 million is placed on mode 1 imports. This 
leads domestic firms to label advertising expenses as consulting fees towards the end of the 
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year when the limit is reached, and consequentially mode 1 imports are not affected. 
Advertising services are not exported via Mode 2.  A cap is fixed on the total sales revenue 
of foreign advertising agencies operating in the country based on their average revenue in 
the past three years of operations. In addition, no new agencies are permitted. This causes 
the MNCs to register as domestic firms. In mode 4, a quota of 5000 visas is placed on the 
advertising professionals. Thus, in this hypothetical scenario, mode 1 can be circumvented 
using a legal loophole, mode 3 was not affected on account of registration as a domestic 
company, while the number of foreign service providers via Mode 4 declined considerably, 
resulting in a lack of equivalence in application of an ESM in all modes
90
. 
It was also opined that discriminatory measures like subsidies could instead be feasible 
and such subsidies could be effective under any mode of supply, provided that the service 
suppliers that are to be safeguarded (temporarily protected) could be clearly identified.  
There is, however, problem with seeking solution through subsidies as these are costly and 
clearly more affordable for some Members and thus biased against developing countries. 
Another possible discriminatory safeguard measure can consist of discriminatory taxes, 
which might be less costly than subsidies and may be technically feasible for any mode of 
supply
91.  Overall, “mode 3 (commercial presence) is estimated to account for about 50% of 
all services trade falling under the GATS.
 
From a public policy perspective, there may be 
less need for
 
national treatment limitations under this mode than under modes
 1 and 2”92.  
A number of other concerns were also expressed on how to ensure that safeguard 
measures would use the least trade restrictive option and be applied for as short a period of 
time.   The members interested in creating ESMs under GATS viewed that the imposition 
of fees and charges would be less trade restrictive than an outright restriction and where 
resources were available, this could also be complemented by subsidies in favour of local 
suppliers.  The demandeurs also proposed that in the case of an application of an ESM 
under mode 3 of delivery of service, a Member will not restrict entry of foreign suppliers as 
a first option, but might impose, as appropriate, additional conditions for establishing 
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commercial presence, e.g., a requirement of joint-venture with local co-operatives of 
smaller local suppliers and where the duration of the safeguard measure exceeded one year, 
the measure should be progressively liberalized at regular intervals during the period of 
application. 
 Mode 3 of delivery of service relates to ‘physical presence’ of the service provider in the 
country contemplating application of an ESM.  Under this Mode regulation will require to 
be applied at the establishment stage and will imply that the investment flow in to that 
service sector would be taxed or restricted.   Similarly under Mode 4 similar action at the 
establishment stage would mean that the physical movement of a natural person would be 
taxed or restricted.   In respect of cross border service trade, under Mode 3 or Mode 4, 
which has already crossed the establishment stage i.e. it is already established.  Then output 
of the foreign provider will be the most likely target of safeguard action, although measures 
could conceivably be applied elsewhere also e.g. on purchases of inputs.  
4.6.9 CONDITIONS OF APPLICATION 
 
Regarding the ‘Conditions of Application’, it has been accepted in the case of trade in 
goods that the onus of proving the need for the application of an emergency safeguards 
measure rests with the Member choosing to invoke the ESM.  In terms of Article XIX of 
GATT, AOS and also in light of the WTO jurisprudence developed over the years on the 
subject the invoking country has to prove the need for application of the provisions.  The 
relevant provisions under AOS stipulate that an emergency safeguard measure may only be 
applied following an investigation, and also prescribe the procedures that must be 
followed
93
 but as yet no detailed views by any member in the discussions in WPGR have 
been expressed on ‘applicable procedures’ for ESMs under GATS.  For the determination 
of injury, the concepts contained in Article 4.2(a) of the AOS have been proposed as 
relevant model and it is viewed by the proponents that the causality requirement in the area 
of goods, i.e. Article 4.2(b) of the AOS, could be translated into the services context, 
provided some key terms were modified.  The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of GATT (Antidumping Agreement) was also cited in the WPGR as a possible approach, 
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which can be taken when following a GATT model because it provides for the some 
flexibility in injury determinations and allows for action based on “best information 
available” and for the possibility of consultations with affected Members during an 
investigation.    
4.7. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS 
 
Public Policy concerns are normally taken into consideration by the domestic investigating 
authorities when contemplating imposition of a definitive trade remedy measure under 
GATT.  The accommodation of public policy concerns and importance of considering the 
broader picture when contemplating any imposition of an emergency safeguards measure 
was brought out and considered as important. The rationale behind giving this importance 
is that considerations of the consumers’ needs to be taken into account when assessing 
injury are essential as there is always a possibility that the imports which a domestic 
industry might consider to be damaging could on the other hand be providing the 
consumers with more choice and lower costs.  
 
 Proponents of the concept of ESMs also did not discount the factor and agreed with the 
importance of the public policy consideration when imposition of some definitive measure 
is being considered and viewed that any investigating authority when considering to impose 
any ESM that may be developed for the services sector would during the investigations also 
consult and take into account the broadest range of views possible, including those of 
consumers
94
.    The views expressed on the issue were simply within the model provided by 
GATT for accommodation of public policy concerns. The proposal was that these concerns 
can be taken care of through enabling regulations and the responsible investigative 
authority of the country considering imposition of the ESMs can be mandated to consult 
and take into account the broadest range of views possible, including those of consumers.  
The investigation should involve as many potentially affected sectors as possible
95
.  
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4.8. CONCLUSIONS 
The GATS has as yet limited life span, practically little jurisprudence on it has developed 
and the Agreement is still carrying the burden of important unfinished business from the 
Uruguay Round.  However, due to strong opposition from major developing countries; that 
were opposed to creating multilateral discipline on cross border trade in services, especially 
with reference to mode 3 of delivery, ‘the GATS could only be finalized in the form of a 
significant compromise that embodies a weak set of rules and a very fluid mechanism for 
services liberalization
96’.  The negotiators in the context of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) faced significant challenges when they tried to craft a 
comprehensive set of multilaterally agreed disciplines governing trade in services within 
the context of GATT, and the result is fairly complex and difficult to comprehend. Some 
obligations, in particular the most favoured-nation treatment (MFN) obligation, apply 
across the board. Others, ‘like the market access and national treatment obligations, apply 
only in respect of service sectors of a Member’s choosing. There is overlap between the 
market access and national treatment obligations, and the relationship between these two 
disciplines and those on domestic regulation is not clearly established
97’.  
 In short, the application of an ESM that is developed on the model provided by the GATT 
for the services sector under GATS will  require to take into account conditions that are 
similar for applying the measure in case of trade in goods like;  i) the situation faced by the 
domestic industry concerned must result from the implementation of a Member’s 
commitments undertaken under Part III of the GATS;   ii) there is a sudden increase in the 
supply of the services by supplier(s) of another Member;  iii) injury or threat of serious 
injury must have be  determined in the relevant domestic industry;  iv)causality between the 
injury or threat thereof and the increase in supply of the relevant service must be clearly 
established and; v) the situation must be of the nature of an emergency. 
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The analysis undertaken as yet in the context of this thesis brings out the fact that given 
the intangibility of services; dynamics of cross border trade in services, its four distinct 
modes of supply there are major issues involved transposing the pure conventional model 
of ESMs provided by the GATT model to GATS.  The work done in the Chapter not only 
recognizes the almost impossibility with transposition of GATT concept of ESMs to under 
the GATS but the paradigm being explored also has severe limitations for it to be 
transposed.. 
  
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
   CHAPTER 5: ESMS UNDER GATS 
5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
The Chapters briefly revisits and analyses and then judges the various viewpoints put 
forward by different countries on the question of ESMs under GATS in the 
deliberations held in the Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR).  The Chapters then 
goes on to look at the specificities of the cross border trade in services and evaluates the 
provisions in the Services Agreement that substantially substitute the need for 
independent ESMs under GATS but simultaneously remaining within the universe 
provided by the GATT paradigm. The GATS’s nexus with investments under mode 3 of 
service delivery has created complications with the concept of ESMs under GATS and 
rapid proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The Chapter also tries to 
analyse the proposals, undertakes a ‘situational analysis’ through hypothetical examples 
and tries to identify circumstances for which ESMs type safety valves are already 
provided in the Agreement circumstances and also those for which ESMs may be 
required under the GATS.   An effort has also been made to briefly highlight the 
possible conflicts and impact of the BITs with respect to the application of any ESMs. 
 
The different possible models for ESMs under GATS that had emerged in the 
discussions or mentioned in the WPGR have been briefly evaluated followed by a 
succinct look at the different RTAs. The RTAs have been explored with the intention of 
finding some form of model that can be helpful for development of independent 
provisions for application of ESMs under GATS. The Chapter near the end looks at all 
the possible models that were found under the GATT concept and briefly judges these 
models for their suitability to ESMs under GATS. The Chapter closes by noting     that 
despite strong reservations for undertaking market access commitments in absence of 
ESMs under GATS, the developing countries have started exploratory meetings for 
further liberalization and are also taking major liberalization commitments under the 
RTAs and BITs.  
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5.2 GATS: RELEVANT PROVISIONS RECALLED  
 
The case made by the countries demanding standalone provision for application of 
ESMs under GATS had largely been based on ‘political economy’ grounds; that their 
existence would promote undertaking of more liberal commitments by the member 
countries.  The assertion was made on the premise that the existence of emergency 
safeguards provisions in case of necessity will provide the ‘breathing space’ for 
domestic industries to adjust to import surges created by the trade liberalization.  
However, within the framework of the GATS, the concept of trade liberalization, unlike 
for GATT,  has a much broader connotation and  it covers not only improving market 
access conditions and extending national treatment to foreign services but also the 
foreign owned service suppliers a broad and an increasing range of sectors and modes 
of delivery of services.  The GATS in its existing structures, does not necessarily entails 
domestic deregulation as it recognizes the right of governments to regulate and also to 
introduce new regulations in order to meet national policy objectives and in that manner 
the Agreement does not places any new involuntary regulatory demands on the 
countries and thus can be regarded to lacking the real depth. While on the other hand 
the trade liberalization in the context of GATT primarily refers to the border measures 
whereas issues like MFN and National Treatment are dealt and taken care of 
automatically.   
 
In the services sector an individual WTO Member country has a fairly large number of 
diverse options to be free and to undertake any measures that it may desire to provide 
protection to an entire specific domestic service sector or its sub-sector which is 
delivered through a certain specific mode of delivery of service.  Some of the options 
available to a country for providing protection to its domestic industry and avoid 
application of the safeguards measures are fairly straight forward, like a Member 
country may; simply refraining from scheduling any specific commitments in particular 
sector or its modes of delivery, thus the country will retain full policy discretion, 
including the right to ban all trade through all modes.  The only potentially relevant 
obligations to such unscheduled service sector are the MFN requirement and provisions 
relating to transparency, which horizontally cut across all sectors and are enshrined in 
the Agreement; inscribe limitations under relevant modes of delivery of service and thus 
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qualify a market access commitment made in the scheduled sectors.  In this context 
there are a number of possible options that can be used by a country to circumscribe its 
scheduled commitments; these options include measures like specifying some sort of 
numerical quotas, laying out economic needs tests or foreign equity ceilings in the 
Market Access column of its schedule of commitments. Some other discriminatory 
domestic policy instrument like economic size requirements can also be listed as 
qualifications under the National Treatment in the schedule of commitments. The 
countries can also take other measures that are beyond the scope of GATS like targeted 
subsidies and the possibility of subsidizing
 
import competing
 
industries with a view to 
reducing cross-border
 
supplies (mode
 
1) or consumption abroad (mode 2) of the services
 
concerned.
 
 
  
5.2.1 ONE VIEW POINT: NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Despite the flexible structure of GATS and availability of different provisions in the 
text of the Agreement there is a group of WTO member countries, mostly comprising of 
advanced and rapidly developing countries from South East Asia, which continued to  
demand the development of specific ESMs under GATS (demandeur)
1
 as this group 
strongly believes that given the binding nature of commitments
2
, some form of ESM is 
needed to address on a ‘temporary’ and ‘extraordinary’ basis  any possible adverse 
consequences that may arise in the course of implementation of the new market access 
commitments.  They believe that lack of specific emergency safeguards provisions in 
the Agreement may have adverse consequences for the service sectors that have been 
committed in the market access schedule of concession. These adverse effects may take 
the form of actual injury or threat of serious injury and which may manifest itself 
through the severe loss of profits or loss of market share of the affected competing 
domestic service providers, closure of businesses, loss of employment and similar other 
end effects. 
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A large number of developing Member countries of the WTO, which are at different 
levels of economic development including most of the ASEAN member countries, 
during the initial negotiations in the WPGR claimed that the existence of an explicit 
provision or non-existence of  specific provisions providing a ‘safety valve’ in the form 
of ESMs under GATS will be the core determinant that will provide the required 
comfort level to the developing country members for undertaking of any new trade 
liberalizing commitments the member countries might be able and willing to undertake 
in the services sector.   To these countries, development of specific ESM provisions 
under the GATS is an integral component of the overall balance in the UR outcome on 
the services negotiations and would provide an essential safety net for services 
liberalization.  In view of this group of members such a safety net was necessarily 
required to encourage Members to consider requests made on them for liberalization, 
which would not otherwise have been contemplated
3.    The existence or not of a ‘safety 
valve’ in the form of ESM under the GATS was categorized by these Members almost 
as a precondition for undertaking new commitments in services
4
.  The proponents of the 
concept of ESMs, asserted that the development of specific ESMs would make it easier 
for them to persuade their domestic constituencies to accept greater liberalization in the 
services sector and also encourage the developing country Members to ‘bind’ the 
service sector liberalizations that they have already undertaken autonomously. To this 
group it was this combination of assurances and liberalization that will help them in 
achieving the essential objective of emergency safeguard action which is primarily to 
facilitate market adjustments.  Development of ESMs would, thus, help governments to 
alleviate concerns of their constituents with respect to making of new binding 
commitments
5
. 
The debates in the WPGR mostly revolved more around the assertions made by the 
demandeurs that the emergency safeguard measures developed in the specific or 
standalone form can be the only real reprieve; these assertion precluded consideration or 
employment of other complementary policy measures, regulations or solutions on the 
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part of the Member invoking a safeguards measure, or even on the part of the affected 
private stakeholders themselves.   In this context the countries proposing standalone 
ESMs under GATS argued that in the broad universe of situations that domestic private 
stakeholders may face consequent to market liberalization and undertaking of regulatory 
reform
6
, there may exists a subset of possible situations where these stakeholders may 
suffer from injury or the threat of serious injury, for which existence of independent 
safeguards provision will provide a necessary component of an overall solution
7
.  The 
proponents, however, did recognize that in certain instances, the adverse consequences 
may nevertheless occur which may not necessarily be caused, directly or indirectly, by 
the commitments undertaken by a Member and, therefore, such situations cannot be 
intended to be addressed by any safeguards measure as the requirement of causality 
provided by the GATT model will be flouted, as under the GATT model ESMs are 
required to address emergency situations where there is an actual injury or threat of 
serious injury that can be attributed to binding commitments undertaken under the 
GATS and resulting in injurious imports.  
5.2.2 VIEW POINT WITH A DIFFERENCE: NEGOTIATIONS 
 Simultaneously another group, comprising mostly of important developed country 
members, questioned the appropriateness of even having the possibility of recourse to 
an emergency safeguard measure in the international trade in services.  Members of this 
group of countries argue that any adverse market situations faced by some domestic 
stakeholders of the service importing country any way should be addressed through 
structural adjustments policy efforts or domestic regulatory measures rather than 
through the application of ESMs that will result only in the temporary withdrawal or 
modification of a Member’s market access commitments.   It was argued, that the nature 
of redress offered by an emergency safeguard measure developed on the GATT 
paradigm is temporary and applicable only for a relatively limited period of time while 
most of the untoward or adverse trading situations faced by domestic stakeholders often 
arise from inherent inefficiencies in the economy which require long term structural 
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adjustments policy initiatives and such problematic situations essentially require long 
term policy support.  These assertions were based on the premise that most of the 
injuries or threats thereof that confront domestic stakeholders are caused by intrinsic 
problems, which amongst others relate to the production, distribution or market 
structures of that specific service sector or any of its particular modes of supply.  
Therefore, the simple existence of independent emergency safeguard provisions in the 
services agreement will not be helpful.  This view point had its own weaknesses as it 
appears to assume that domestic regulatory support measures are of themselves 
unfailingly sufficient to redress the injury or threat thereof faced by domestic 
stakeholders in all situations.   
  Most of the developed countries, during the discussions in the WPGR, expressed their 
s doubts on the feasibility and also the desirability of standalone ESM under the GATS.  
For these countries the question of desirability of standalone ESM under GATS was 
linked to the feasibility of incorporating the specific provisions in the services 
Agreement and  their concerns were not restricted simply to the form of any standalone 
emergency safeguards provisions under the GATS as was being advocated by the 
demandeurs.   The developed country members were of the view that before concluding 
and moving towards the formulation of any ESM under the GATS the question of the 
‘desirability’ or the ‘need’ of these independent safeguards provisions in the Agreement 
should be addressed and resolved.    This group also felt that even if all or most of the 
technical issues being encountered in devising of emergency safeguards provisions for 
services are resolved even then these countries would still be reluctant to agree and 
accept the standalone provisions for the ESMs under the GATS since in their analysis, 
even if feasible, emergency safeguards in services trade are not desirable anyway
8
.   
 
The rationale behind the linkage created by some members of development of ESMs 
with the undertaking of further liberalization commitments was not clear to countries 
that were not conducive to the idea of separate ESM provisions, as they felt that the link 
between a possible standalone provision of an ESM under GATS and further market 
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access has unnecessarily being over-formalized
9
.   These countries did not agree with 
the argument that existence of ESMs under GATS is a precondition for undertaking 
further liberalization and failed to appreciate as to how Members advocating the 
concept find it compelling to have ESMs in place before they decide to undertake 
liberalization or even offer to bind their existing market access policies, as an ESM 
would, at best, only allow rollback of liberalization commitments on a temporary basis.    
To this group, the demandeurs, by making existence of ESMs a precondition, were 
making a negative link between the development of specific ESMs and market access 
negotiations; whereas a more positive and concrete link could be made by identifying 
the commitments that they were prevented from undertaking because of the absence of 
an ESM, this positive linkage will also help in the construction of the ESMs.  
 
 These Members felt that though separate ESMs may be important for some countries so 
as to provide comfort to their domestic constituencies but these cannot be made a 
precondition for further market access commitments because the GATS already had 
other mechanisms under GATS that provided additional flexibilities
10
 to the countries 
and that are expressly denied and forbidden under GATT.  The demandeurs, however, 
did not find these arguments very convincing and look at the things in a different 
context, as to them certain commitments already made were also conditional on creation 
of ESM provisions in terms of provisions created in Article X of GATS and felt unsure 
that new binding commitments might be offered in the absence of an ESM
11
.  
There were strong divergences of the views in the Working Party on GATS Rules 
(WPGR) on “various fundamental issues, including the very desirability, feasibility and 
also on the possible elements for an ESM”12. However, countries like Canada, EU, US, 
Japan and Norway during the discussions viewed and reiterated theirs position that the 
desirability of negotiating an ESM under GATS should be strongly linked to the 
feasibility of its application. There were two strong opinions among the members, on 
the one hand there were the countries which felt that ESMs in GATS are neither 
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feasible nor desirable and on the other hand there were the countries
13
 which felt 
strongly about need to development of standalone ESMs under the GATS that are based 
on the model provided by GATT while very few countries tried to explore a possible 
middle ground.   
The negotiators
14
 had by mid-2006 realized that strong divergences of views exist on 
the issue and there is almost complete lack of any progress
15
 on the agreement towards 
the feasibility or desirability of ESMs under GATS or on possible elements or structure 
of their constitution.  With such level of divergences and no common grounds it was not 
possible to undertake formal discussions in the WPGR let alone conduct meaningful 
negotiations.  The discussions on ESMs in the WPGR came to a stalemate and were, 
through a consensus decision, moved out of a formal structure to an informal mode and 
were conducted without prejudice either to the desirability of ESMs, or the form that 
any ESMs under the GATS, if agreed, might possibly and eventually take. The 
discussions in the WPGR were inconclusive and unresolved. Therefore, the members of 
the Working Party agreed that it will be more efficient for the present not to further 
discuss basic conceptual issues involved but rather focus on common principles which 
might need to underlie any emergency safeguard mechanism if developed under GATS.   
5.3 SITUATIONS: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES   
  With no common understandings or convergence of ideas on any standalone ESMs 
under the GATS, the Members of the WPGR, suggested that the proposals made for 
possible structures and also the constituting elements of these ESMs be evaluated 
against some concrete real life situational examples.  Such exercises are any way 
essentially required especially when developing disciplines in conduct of international 
trade with respect to creation of some ‘provisions for contingency measures’ because it 
is “always wise to try and imagine the possible sorts of scenarios in which the problem 
could arise in practice and to address them ex ante through a relation clause which 
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governs that relationship a priori?”16 The findings were expected to help assess the 
treaty needs within the framework of the GATS to address ex-ante the adverse market 
situations resulting from liberalization commitments and resultant unforeseen import 
that are causing or threatening serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products. In the ultimate analysis the findings were expected to establish 
the feasibility and desirability or otherwise of the standalone emergency safeguards 
under the Agreement and, if found feasible, define its contours.  
The exercise could only draw examples from two possible sources; through real life 
experiences of jurisdictions seeking ESMs or, in the absence of these, by way of 
hypothetical examples.  These analyses, however, had to be worked out against the 
backdrop of the various provisions and other possibilities that are already available 
under the GATS and that can be alternately be used to address and manage any adverse 
market situations for which any independent emergency safeguard provisions were 
being sought.  A preference was expressed for examples from the real life situations of 
market disruption that individual countries faced because of the autonomous 
liberalization measures
17
 undertaken by them and before these measures were bound in 
their respective schedules of commitments.  It was useful to see whether any of the 
countries in their experience with liberalization had given rise to some situations that 
called for or were justifying an application of an ESM
18
.  
  The WPGR felt that regulators in Member countries which had faced problems with 
the autonomous liberalization of their service sector were ideally placed to help identify 
and formulate concrete examples of real life situations that required an application of an 
ESM, in case real life examples were not available some hypothetical examples can be 
then be developed to spell out scenarios that may justify application of an ESM.  While 
some developed country Member countries suggested that provisions already exist in 
the Services Agreement  that render the need of specific emergency safeguard measures 
redundant, therefore examples from real life situations may be few, but they felt that it 
will still be useful to consider why this was the case.  To this group of countries the 
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answer perhaps lay in the fact that services sectors were already sufficiently protected, 
or that such safeguards measures simply did not make practical sense.   Services sector 
are normally not protected through border measures but mostly through domestic 
regulatory mechanisms. It was hence desirable that the analysis should also explore 
whether   internal legislation of any Member countries contain some safeguard-type 
provisions or not. Members were also expected to examine their own schedules of 
specific commitments to indicate the type of situations where liberalization had been 
stalled by the absence of a safeguard provision
19
.   
   The onus of presenting concrete real life examples of situations where domestic 
regulators felt the need of application of ESMs primarily rested with proponents of the 
concept under GATS.  As all efforts to find and present any concrete real life examples 
failed, therefore to substitute the real life examples, some hypothetical examples were 
constructed by a group of countries that were the demandeurs of standalone ESMs and 
placed before the WPGR.   
 
The first possible hypothetical scenarios articulated by the demandeurs which in their 
assessment potentially required an application of an ESM, was the sudden substitution 
of modern foreign owned departmental
 
stores and shopping malls for more traditional 
small domestic corner sales outlets.  The ASEAN Member Countries reinforced their 
proposal for standalone ESMs under GATS using this example that became to be 
known in the context of discussions in the WPGR as the Shangri-La case
20
.  The 
hypothetical example was of Shangri-La, an imaginary developing country with a 
largely agrarian society and population scattered across small villages and as like in 
many other countries, the distribution sector is an important segment of the economy. 
Many workers in this country are low-skilled; receive relatively low wages, work 
mainly part-time, and the share of females exceeded men. The retail/distribution sector 
acted as an entry point into the labour market for many such workers. The dominant 
marketing channel was a general store in small towns, while in larger cities small 
conveniently located corner stores specialized in a narrow range of items with perhaps a 
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few large departmental stores selling a much wider range of goods. The livelihood of 
low-wage households depended on small independent stores in villages and small 
towns, which were not only major employers, but also performed a vital role in 
providing food, basic amenities, etc. Shangri-La then liberalised its distribution sector, 
both wholesale and retail and granted to foreign distributors full market access and 
national treatment under modes 1 to 3 of delivery of services. Within months, vast 
numbers of foreign majority owned retail chains opened in the country and directly 
impacted on the small independent shops. Consumers began buying more from discount 
or superstores in suburban areas, forcing closure of small shops. In villages, small 
independent shops lost customers to 24-hour service shops and also had to close down.  
Only few former employees could immediately obtain jobs in modern 24-hour shops as 
they often required higher education, such as computer skills. As a result, shortly 
following the full liberalisation by the country small independent shops collapsed 
nationally and a large number of unskilled rural workers lost jobs as the market share of 
foreign owned retail businesses jumped dramatically
21
. 
  
Proponents of the ESMs under GATS regarded this “Shangri-La” case in the retail 
sector as an appropriate example of a situation where an importing country may be 
justified in imposing an emergency safeguard action
22
. This group of countries felt that, 
in the Shangri-La example, the authorities might not have foreseen the pace and extent 
of impact of the foreigners on the domestic market.     The decision makers scheduling 
the market access in the sector might have anticipated that, at worst, foreign suppliers 
will reach a maximum market share of 50% over 5 years, but could not have foreseen 
60-70% market share going to foreigners over a period of three years.  This rapid 
growth of foreign owned service supplier would have social consequences in form of 
loss of jobs; no doubt, some of the employment loss may be compensated by new hiring 
by the foreign suppliers that had caused injury
23
 but definitely not most of the losses. 
The definition of injury in such a context would thus focus
 
on the economic situation of 
the small domestic sales outlets, in terms of sales,
 
turnover, profitability or employment, 
and, possibly, on a more
 
widely defined public interest that takes into account regional
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or social policy implications.  An ESM would therefore provide some comfort in cases 
where the extent or pace of committed liberalization had been misjudged
24
.  
 
 
However, developed country Members, opposed to the desirability of ESMs in services, 
felt that the Shangri-La example implied basic structural problems with the economy 
rather than a situation soliciting application of an emergency safeguard measure and 
they did not regard it proper that an ESM should be used in such situations, which could 
be anticipated or in other words ‘foreseeable’.   The demandeurs were not in agreement 
with this strand of argument and felt that not all emergency situations were structural in 
nature as it was often not clear from the outset whether a structural problem was 
affecting the domestic industry or the situation could be alleviated through temporary 
protection.  They felt that any efforts in trying to characterize situations that are 
structural in nature or not could lead to endless debates and it seemed preferable to 
leave this to the investigating authorities of the country contemplating imposition of the 
measure.  If the authorities subsequently realized that a real structural problem existed, 
they would decide whether to invoke Article XXI procedures
25
. 
 
 The demandeurs of the ESMs during discussions in the WPGR also provided with 
some other examples of possible situations which in their perception warranted the 
application of emergency safeguard measures.  The second hypothetical scenarios 
sketched related to the optometry
26
 profession, which has traditionally been practiced by 
small optical shops.  The sketched scenario was something like; “with liberalization, 
large foreign-owned optical shops entered the market and diluted the share and 
profitability of local suppliers, particularly with regard to the most lucrative part of the 
profession, i.e., the preparation, manufacture, and sale of prescription glasses and 
lenses.  While foreign-owned optical shops engaged local optometrists to perform 
refraction services in-store, these foreign shops had a limited capacity to absorb local 
optometrists suffering injury of loss of jobs because of the liberalization.  This 
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phenomenon had occurred over a relatively short time span and had not been 
anticipated by optometrists
27” or the decision makers who had drafted the market access 
schedule of concessions in the liberalizing country.   
 
 This hypothetical example relating to optometry profession attracted interest along with 
a number of comments from the Members.  Some members were of the view that it was 
difficult to distinguish between foreign and domestic suppliers when both were 
supplying the services from the same territory.  Some others felt that a Member still 
could, however, impose qualification and licensing measures to regulate the persons 
who could perform certain activities.  The issue was viewed differently by some other 
Members who saw classification issues in the example and they were of the opinion that 
in a commitment binding the ‘optometry profession’ the main professional services 
provided by optometrists, i.e. ‘eye examination’, were not covered and subject to any 
commitment and were, therefore,  not affected by the influx of foreign services.  On the 
other hand, the business of preparing and selling glasses was covered by the 
liberalization commitment under retail services and should have been foreseen.  This 
example was also regarded to provide an analogy that might draw parallels with 
pharmacists’ profession28, where the dichotomy between services of advising on the 
need for medicine and the more lucrative business of selling medicine often called for 
regulatory responses, such as ensuring that the sale of medicines was accompanied by 
proper expertise.  
 
 There was also a public interest dimension to the arguments with respect to the 
hypothetical examples that were developed, as to some Member countries, not 
comfortable with specific ESMs, consumer interests were also highly important and 
appeared to have been ignored when developing these hypothetical examples; since 
liberalization had also led to lower prices.  It was argued that the suggested scenario in 
the ‘optometry’ example did not make a compelling case that a domestic industry had 
been injured or that this was due to trade.  From the scenario presented one could infer 
that a group of opticians had experienced a decline in profitability due to competition 
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from more efficient suppliers.  In the process employment, wages and sales volumes 
could have increased for the sector as a whole instead of decreasing.   
 
 The proponents of the concept of ESM in addition to the market access situation also 
presented another hypothetical example to the WPGR of a type of regulatory reform 
that related to telecommunications sector that might be suspended by way of a 
safeguard measure.   The example presented a scenario where a Member might have 
undertaken a commitment under Article XVIII of the GATS to use a particular criterion 
for regulating the interconnection rate charged.  If the criteria deviated substantially 
from the previous criteria in place, an increase in cross-border supply of certain 
telecommunication services could occur, without the commensurate increase in 
revenues from interconnection anticipated by domestic service suppliers.  If such 
expected increase in revenues was intended to assist domestic suppliers in providing 
universal service, the additional commitment might make them unable to viably comply 
with such obligation.   
 
Simultaneously there was another view that in a manner balanced this view point, which 
suggested that more competition, not less, was the most effective means to achieve 
universal service objectives
29
.  If such a scenario occurred, the appropriate regulatory 
action would be to adapt the mechanism providing for universal service, and not to limit 
the cross-border supply of services.  Ensuring the viability of such programmes was 
certainly laudable, but not if done in a discriminatory manner or in a way that only 
served to protect a revenue stream for incumbent operators.  A proponent said that, in 
this example, a safeguard measure was not intended to restrict competition, but to 
temporarily modify the interconnection regulations bound so as to ensure the provision 
of universal service that a government might want to achieve.  In such cases, 
governments had to intervene
30
.  The ASEAN paper
31
, however, indicated that 
competition from foreign suppliers will somehow undercut the ability of domestic 
suppliers to fulfil their universal service obligation.   
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 The developed country members were not convinced and prepared to regard the 
situations put forward by the proponents in the three hypothetical examples to be 
convincing enough to justify an application of an ESM especially considering the 
immense flexibilities already provided in the services Agreement. This group believed 
that the proponents when developing the examples had not appropriately evaluated the 
alternative measures already existing in GATS and other WTO Agreements to address 
the kind of situations that they had identified and that the examples had not even 
clarified the fundamental issues like as to why an application of ESM was called for, 
what were the circumstances justifying an application of emergency safeguard and the 
linked prerequisites like who was going to be protected, and against what exactly would 
the protection be provided by the measures.  It was felt that the examples cited did not 
refer to any need for development of horizontal ESMs concept, but rather these 
examples, at best, reinforced the case for scheduled sectoral safeguards
32
.  Interestingly 
all hypothetical examples presented related to mode 3 of delivery of services and the 
question remained unanswered whether the proponents had thought of any example of 
situations demanding application of emergency safeguard the measures envisioned
33
 for 
any of the other modes of the cross border delivery of services.  These members felt that 
demandeurs of the ESMs have not succeeded in articulating any convincing examples. 
To this group of countries, the examples depicted situations where some Members 
might want to use an ESM, but not where the use of an ESM would be justified and that 
none of the examples provided by the proponents justified an application of a safeguard 
measure but such situations could comfortably be dealt with through domestic 
regulations or could have been foreseen when undertaking the market access 
commitment and dealt through the use of available scheduling flexibilities and the 
option of withdrawing a commitment through Article XXI of GATS any way always 
remained
34
.   
 
Though technical it is advisable that in case of developing ‘contingency measures’ the 
negotiators should “try and imagine the possible sorts of scenarios in which the problem 
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could arise in practice and to address them ex ante through a relation clause which 
governs that relationship a priori
35” but this exercise was futile when the contingency 
protection measure that is being contemplated is the possible development of 
Emergency Safeguards under the model provided by the GATT. The model has 
limitations as under it the application of ESMs by definition requires ‘unforeseen 
developments’ that cannot be predicted and for which any convincing examples by 
definition should not be able to be provided.    However, the development of 
hypothetical examples was useful in their accord.  Firstly, all the examples related to 
only one mode of supply; mode 3. Which showed that proponents quest for independent 
ESMs was rooted essentially in retaining the possibility of defending domestically 
owned companies against an influx of foreign
 
competitors and as distinguished from the 
need of undertaking structural reforms. Secondly, these examples also brought out more 
glaring the existing scheduling flexibilities available under GATS, the rights that must 
accrue to the service supplier after crossing borders under mode 3 of supply, also called 
as acquired rights. The discussions on the examples were limited and practically 
ignored the changing dynamics and new realities of the global economic relations. 
Important amongst those that were overlooked included Regional Economic Integration 
Agreements and the emerging investment relating regimes in for of BITs and Regional 
Arrangements covering services and investments. 
 
The deliberations in the Working Party to GATS Rules (WPGR) were very vague and 
fairly superficial.  However, despite the limitations of quality some possible issues that 
could have a bearing on the development of ESMs for services sectors were discussed 
but some very important emerging realities in the international trading relations were 
also ignored.   The issues were unique to services sector and fairly diverse. These issues 
cannot be looked into purely under the paradigm provided by the GATT for the ESMs. 
These included; i) the  concept of limited window for application of ESMs; ii) 
desirability of standalone or independent ESMs despite the existence of enormous 
scheduling flexibilities already provided in the Agreement; iii) Economic needs test as a 
substitute for ESMs;  iv) protection of “acquired rights” of established suppliers and its 
fall out; v) the proliferation of International Investment Agreements and their impact on 
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development of ESMs  under the GATS especially with reference to Mode 3 of delivery 
of service and; vi) interface between Regional trading Arrangements and services and 
obligations of members within circumscribed context of ESMs under GATS.   
 
5.3.1 THE CONCEPT OF LIMITED WINDOW 
 
 A proposal by the ASEAN member states (2004) excluding Singapore introduced a 
concept of a “Limited Window” for ESMs under the GATS. This was novel idea with 
respect to any contingency protection measure that may be developed under the 
paradigm provided by the GATT.  It was proposed that a ‘limited window’ of time 
period for application of ESMs may be created for countries undertaking market access 
commitments. The concept simply envisages a certain period, say, ten years during 
which a safeguard like mechanism could be used to protect domestic services suppliers.  
The proposed duration of the limited window could be seen as addressing the concerns 
expressed by some member countries in relation to the sanctity of the agreement and the 
need to preserve the legal certainty
36
 of market access commitments undertaken by a 
country especially during the period of limited window that during the negotiations was 
proposed to be ten years.  
 The rationale behind their proposal, was that adopting a multilaterally agreed limited 
time period (named as ‘limited window’) may help restrict abuse or mis-use of the 
provisions, since to all probability adverse circumstances for a domestic industry to the 
extent of   causing injury or a threat thereof would occur when the industry is in process 
of adjusting to the realities of new liberalized market conditions created by virtue of 
undertaking of market access commitments. the proponents of the concept viewed that 
any injury beyond this ‘limited period’ of adjustment would be less likely to have been 
caused by an import surge resulting from the liberalisation measures undertaken in 
terms of newly assumed market access commitments.  This line of argument  suggests 
that any injury or, threat thereof arising as a result of market liberalization would 
presumably manifest itself within a concrete period of time and that injury occurring 
later would probably not be attributable to the market liberalization measures 
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undertaken because of commitments.  To alleviate the concerns associated with 
liberalization especially in the early periods, immediately following undertaking of 
commitments, the group, spearheaded by the ASEANs, proposed that the WPGR should 
consider providing a limited window of time that should be available to a Member 
country after undertaking liberalization commitments during which an ESM could be 
invoked.    The proponents of this proposal thought that this was a reasonable 
compromise that could address concerns regarding the need to preserve the legal 
certainty of the commitments that have been undertaken while simultaneously provide 
necessary comfort to decision makers to undertake new liberalization obligations.   
 This proposal, like most others, had their share of problems as to some other 
delegations the occurrence of injury outside such a limited window could not be ruled 
out and some other very pertinent questions were raised
37
;  like whether the provision 
for the limited window for application of an ESM will apply to all commitments, 
including those commitments that are below or at the existing levels of market access 
prevailing in the service importing country, in which case practically no actual 
liberalization would have taken place but a window of time period created to distort the 
traditional trade flows.  A corollary of the question created a related concern that was 
whether the limited window would only be applied to commitments made in the future 
and not to existing commitments. The market access commitments of a country, 
therefore, would need to be analyzed and bifurcated between those that are made above 
the levels of prevailing market access and those commitments that actually deliver 
liberalization and opportunities for enhanced trade flows.  
Moreover, if the role of ESMs is seen to provide temporary relieve from a surge in 
imports resulting from trade reforms, this would require actual and tangible 
liberalisation, as distinguished from just commitments.  The demandeurs had 
consistently asserted that independent ESMs under GATS will provide the comfort 
levels to reform and undertake liberalization of their service sector. Any mechanism 
that will not promote any actual liberalisation will always associate valid concern. 
Similarly establishment of a causality link that any adverse market situations are 
consequential to the import surge that was directly caused because of the recently 
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undertaken market liberalisation commitments
38
.  There are obvious contradictions on 
this negotiating stance taken by some countries, as applying the limited window to 
existing commitments seems to run counter to the rationale put forward for having the 
mechanism in the first place, namely to induce more liberal commitments and checking 
the market behavior in the initial period, therefore, would be unjustified in case of past 
commitments since previous negotiations for trade liberalization were conducted on the 
basis non-existence of any emergency safeguards provisions
39
. 
   The concept of ‘limited window’ has never been used in the GATT context. However, 
a parallel concept of a ‘limited window’ already existed in the context of certain 
economic integration agreements including the EC.  The EC Agreements with new 
countries acceding to the EU do provide for a limited space to the acceding country to 
apply some emergency safeguard measures on their imports of services but these 
Agreements essentially use a positive list approach for providing a limited window for 
invoking such provisions. The EC agreement, for example with Slovenia 
(1February1999), allowed Slovenia to derogate from commitments regarding 
establishment of EC companies in specified sectors during a predefined transitional 
period of six years. Interestingly, in two of the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
signed by the United States with its “BIT partners - Georgia and Bahrain – the partners 
countries have reserved the right to exclude certain services from national treatment 
during an implementation period. While Georgia remained entitled for three years from 
the date of entry into force of the treaty to deny US investors national treatment in 
financial services, Bahrain excluded the purchase of shares on its stock exchange from 
national and MFN treatment until January 2005”40.   
  
The underlying rationale for incorporation of these ‘limited window’ provisions in the 
EC Agreements and the US-BITs may appear to be same as that were put forward by 
the ASEANs for the services agreement but the context is totally different. The concept 
as used in the EC Agreements and the two US BITs comes closer to using the 
scheduling flexibilities to create a sector specific ‘limited window’ in which binding 
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market access commitments have been made.  The ASEAN proposal was strange and 
unique in a manner as the concept of ‘limited window’ had never been introduced 
before in the context of GATT/WTO
41
 system. There is no legal basis in the existing 
GATT/WTO system to underpin a conditional and/or sector-specific approach to 
safeguards.   The proposal was, therefore, not in harmony with the basic assertion made 
by the ASEANs that, if agreed, any ESMs under GATS should be developed on the 
paradigm provided by the GATT.   
5.3.2 SCHEDULING FLEXIBILITY 
 
Market access commitments in the area of merchandise trade that are bound by the 
respective WTO Members in their respective schedules under GATT refer only to one 
type of transaction (cross-border imports) and also largely with respect to one 
legitimate, preferred and predominantly used instrument of protection (tariffs).  The 
scheduled market access commitments mostly have mostly a single dimension of the 
tariff except in the case of the agricultural sector.  The other GATT obligations like 
grant of MFN status and National Treatment is obligatorily and automatically 
implemented. The conduct of international trade in goods is simple and straight forward 
and there are clear distinctions between border measures and internal measures
42
.   
There is no possibility under GATT for Members to incorporate in their commitments 
some form of any other market access limitations, for example, those that relate to 
prohibition on buying goods abroad or creating linkages or barriers to market access for 
products of any locally established foreign owned company.  
   
 However, barriers to international trade in services are structured in a totally different 
manner and are characteristically imposed behind the borders of a country and 
fundamentally have a regulatory nature. These barriers to cross border flow of services, 
however, have the same ultimate effect as those of border measures for trade in goods 
as these also lead to increase in the cost of services in the domestic market and reduce 
competition.  There are, however, no ‘import duties’ in the services sector and GATS, 
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unlike its counterpart agreement for trade in goods.  The services agreement has a much 
broader scope of application and almost all national regulations (regulatory measures) 
that may be regarded as appropriate to be promulgated with respect to the entire 
services sector or to some of its categories by any Member country government in 
pursuance of any of its policy objectives can possibly be covered by the Agreement.   
  Article XX: 1 of the GATS
43; titled as ‘Schedules of Specific Commitments’, contains 
the only basic obligation that governs the assumption of specific market access 
commitments in the services sector by a Member country.  This requires each Member 
country to submit a specific schedule of commitments that is annexed to the GATS. The 
Article XX goes on to clarify and lists the elements that the schedule of commitments 
may specify.  The Article is not concerned with  other factors like the number of 
commitments, their scope, modal coverage, levels of access, or use of particular 
restrictions, irrespective of the fact whether these are quantitative limitations, or price-
based or regulatory discriminations.   Schedules of concessions submitted by the 
member countries, because of the vast scope provided by the available flexibilities in 
bindings, vary widely both in coverage and also amongst individual groups of 
Members.  While  in the WPGR it was also argued by some members that  GATS 
market access obligations target traditional instruments of national regulations, but the 
possible adverse impact of any market liberalization can comfortably be limited through 
careful scheduling of the market access commitments and if specific provisions for 
application of ESMs are created under GATS, some countries may not make full 
utilization of the flexibilities already available under the GATS framework and instead 
apply easy to use the trade distorting instrument of ESM.   
 The market access commitments made under the GATS cover a broad variety of cross 
border service transactions and almost an infinite range of permissible trade barriers 
including unlimited range of conceivable departures from national treatment excluding 
only the six types
44
 of market access restrictions which have specifically been indicated 
in the Article XVI.2 of the GATS.  To put it more simply, GATS provides Member 
countries immense flexibilities to “schedule limitations on number of service suppliers, 
value of service transactions or assets, number of service operations, quantity of 
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services output, number of natural persons, and even participation of foreign equity”45.    
Each one of these possibility of limiting the market access can be regarded as 
quantitative restrictions on its own that can, however, even be scheduled in a manner so 
as to be gradually relaxed either independently or in combination which practically 
implies progressive liberalisation timetables or even to minimize any market 
liberalization that may trigger shocks and create import surges that are injurious to 
domestic producers of directly competing services.  The widespread flexibilities 
available to the members also include scheduling of safeguard-type measures, which in 
term of Article XVI. 2 of GATS provides that; “the Member shall not maintain or adopt 
either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless 
otherwise specified in its Schedule”.  The positive list of scheduled services with 
possibility to include associated limitations to market access and national treatment by 
each mode of supply is central to this flexibility.  Governments thus not only have the 
discretion to choose which sectors to include in schedule of commitments, but also to 
determine which mode or modes of supply to liberalise along with the flexibility to 
predetermine the extent and pace of any market liberalisation by listing limitations to 
market access or national treatment, and on the top of all these the governments can 
even provide specific phase-in time tables for certain liberalising measures. 
 This sector specific and flexible scheduling of safeguards entails domestic regulatory 
institutions to predict precisely as to what these circumstances will look like and also 
the architecture of specific safeguard provisions that will help mitigate any possible 
adverse market circumstances that may occur.  This possibility to qualify the scheduling 
of market access commitments demands skills on behalf of the public officials 
committing market liberalization to take into account the entire regulatory structure for 
a given service sector and scheduling of horizontal limitations requires conceptual 
clarity on the restrictiveness of these regulations. It was argued by some countries that 
the possibility of
 
qualifying market access commitments in the services sector by way
 
of 
limitations in the Member’s schedule of concessions precludes the desirability of a 
separate and independent provision for application of emergency safeguards measures 
under the Agreement.  For the countries that are not convinced with the desirability of 
specific ESMs under GATS this scheduling flexibility under which governments can 
                                               
45
 Mattoo Aaditya, Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: From a Defensive to a 
Pro-Active Role. The WTO/World Bank Conference, Geneva,  September 1999 
CHAPTER 5 
 152 
virtually negotiate de facto emergency safeguards  measures in their market access 
schedules is enough and this possibility dispenses with the need for separate or specific 
provision for ESMs under GATS, because there are already adequate provisions in the 
Agreement to deal with services trade flow situations that may solicit imposition of 
emergency safeguards measure as understood under the GATT paradigm.  
 In other words, the scheduling flexibilities that exists in the GATS provide an 
expansive latitude to the member countries for ex-ante scheduling of their market access 
limitations, thus, eliminating the need or scope for ex post emergency safeguard 
measure or action.  However, the use of a sector-specific concept of scheduled 
safeguards presupposes the existence of some advance information on the nature and 
scope of all possible future emergency situations which will require imposition of the 
safeguards measure. There were obvious problems associated with these presumptions 
that the public officers have the capacity to foresee all the possible scenarios that may 
create adverse market situations calling for application of an ESM. The country that is 
using scheduling flexibilities to qualify its market access commitments would also 
require to have the ability to gauge the impact of scheduling of the commitments and 
will also be expected to identify in advance the nature of emergency safeguards that 
may be required to be applied to mitigate the adverse market situations created by the 
predicted situations.  
This proposal, based on the scheduling flexibilities available under the GATS was fairly 
demanding as this required that the enabling rules for application of measures also be 
developed for Members who include such safeguard-type provisions in their schedules.  
A conceptual distinction was also required to be understood and maintain in this context 
between the ‘sector-specific safeguards’, which will have to be negotiated on case-by-
case basis for inclusion in schedules of commitments and other safeguards provisions 
which would be made available generally. The negotiations with regards to inclusion in 
the country’s schedules of concessions in turn will require to be based on some 
commonly agreed principles.    
In the discussions on the pros and cons of horizontal sector-specific safeguards versus 
general safeguards it was considered in the WPGR that a ‘horizontal mechanism’, based 
on generally applicable criteria would be available to all Members whenever the 
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emergency market  situation arises in a given sector,  and wherever possibly, the mode 
of supply meets the relevant criteria. The members favouring a sector-specific 
mechanism recognized the need or usefulness of some commonly accepted principles.   
Member countries that endorsed a horizontal, generally available mechanism had 
doubts about the need for sectoral variants without, however, totally precluding such a 
possibility.    If the existence of a horizontal safeguards mechanism are presumed, 
Members might be free to forgo its use in individual areas by way of an Additional 
Commitment under Article XVIII of GATS, and that it might be possible to link the 
availability of such a mechanism to the quality of commitments scheduled under 
Articles XVI and XVII; as the dividing line between the two concepts is not very sharp. 
To create a balance between liberalisation and the possible need of any country for 
space to undertake structural adjustment reforms, it was proposed by some members 
that the enabling rules, whether these are general and cut across all sectors, or are 
sector-specific, or even mode-specific, could include the requirement that a Member 
that is including a safeguards-type provision in its schedule of commitments in a given 
sector must also combine this measure with a proportionate commitment to liberalize  in 
that particular sector.   It was argued that it is the extent of liberalization that would only 
justify inclusion of a safeguard provision in the schedule and that these scheduled 
safeguards will have to be determined through negotiations alongside the negotiations on 
the schedule of market access commitments. This proposal, for the proponents of the first 
option, of linking ESMs with level of commitments was also an explicit departure from 
the model for the development of the ESMs provided by the GATT where no such 
linkages exist or were ever contemplated.     
The argument put forward, in the context of scheduling flexibilities by the countries 
desiring specific ESMs under GATS, had its own merits. These countries argued that a 
specific safeguards mechanism is needed precisely to induce countries to abandon the 
many ex ante restrictions that they currently maintain or are being convinced to make 
through use of flexibilities.  The development of ESMs will make the disciplines under 
GATS uniform and predictable and will also simultaneously shield the regime created 
by GATS from possible fragmentation.  Moreover, these countries were also of the 
view that the scheduling flexibilities may only be helpful to more advanced of the 
developing countries and the developed countries in mitigating the needs for existence 
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of specific provisions for application of separate ESMs as for the national trade 
administrations of small, resource-strapped and low capacity countries it is not possible 
to meaningfully anticipate at the
 
time of scheduling of commitments and make 
provisions for all conceivable
 
emergencies that might arise in the future that  call for 
application of an ESM.   A classic example of this lack of analytical capacity is 
reflected in the fact that “in the previous negotiations, Gambia and Guyana were among 
those who had committed to allow unrestricted cross-border trade in financial services 
and the required mobility of capital, but the United States and the European Union did 
not
46”.  For the demandeurs countries the available flexibilities do not foreclose the case 
for emergency safeguards under GATS.   
 
  The rulings of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body on the US – Gambling dispute 
between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda brought out the potential overreach 
problem of market access commitments under GATS. Even though the Appellate Body 
substantially reversed the Panel ruling but both bodies agreed that the US prohibition of 
internet gambling was inconsistent with the specific commitments the US had made on 
market access.  The US prohibition, in principle, applied equally to foreigners and US 
providers, but the inconsistency arose because specific commitments on market access 
preclude even non-discriminatory prohibitions. In this specific dispute, the Appellate 
Body found that most of the non-discriminatory measures could be justified under the 
GATS exceptions provision (Article XIV) but the more general issue remains that; a 
Member that has made full market access commitments is not free to impose certain 
non-discriminatory measures, such as prohibitions, unless these measures can be 
justified under the exceptions provision. This vagueness complicates the matter further 
with respect to the identification of market access commitments and application of 
ESMs.  
5.3.3 ECONOMIC NEEDS TEST (ENT) 
Linked to the possibilities of scheduling flexibilities within the GATS was the 
possibilities created by its Article XIV, Article XII 2(d) and Article VI: 4 for the 
different standards and conditions that a member country may incorporate as the 
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requirements that are necessarily to be met by a foreign service provider to qualify for 
the eligibility of the market access. These provisions are in the context of ‘necessity 
tests’ that are provided under the Agreement to the members primarily reflect the 
balance in the WTO agreements between two, at times conflicting but nevertheless very 
important goals; i) preserving the freedom of Members to set and achieve regulatory 
objectives through measures of their own choosing, and simultaneously also; ii) 
discouraging Members from adopting or maintaining measures that unduly restrict 
trade.  Necessity tests typically achieve this balance by requiring that measures, which 
restrict trade in some way (including by violating obligations of an agreement) are 
permissible only if they are “necessary” to achieve the Member's policy objective.  In so 
doing, the necessity tests confirm the right of Members to regulate and to pursue their 
domestic policy objectives.  Though there are similarities between the wordings of 
necessity tests in under  different WTO agreements, however, an interpretation that is  
developed in the context of one case cannot be automatically transposed for 
interpretation as each provision has to be interpreted in the light of the object and 
purpose of the Agreement of which it is part
47
.  
 
The context of Article XVI shows that the necessity provisions thereunder serve to 
define what a full market access commitment of a Member really is by specifying the 
types of measures which the Member shall not adopt or maintain in sectors in which it 
has undertaken the commitments
48
.  Those are the measures specified in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (f) of the Article XVI which stipulates, however, that a Member may 
maintain any of those measures provided the measure is “specified in its Schedule”49 of 
commitments.    The Article XVI.2 also lists six types of measures that WTO Members 
have agreed not to maintain, or adopt in the services sector where full market access 
commitments have been undertaken, unless these measures have been specified in the 
country’s GATS schedule of commitments. The measures that are otherwise forbidden 
under the Agreement unless these are specifically mentioned in the market access 
commitments are; (i) limitations on number of service suppliers; (ii) total value of 
service transactions (including any form of ‘economic needs test’) or assets; (iii) 
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operations or total quantity of service output; (iv) value of transaction; (v) type of legal 
entity; or (vi) foreign capital
50
, these otherwise forbidden measures came also to be 
known as ENTs. Therefore, in order to clarify the meaning and application of ENTs for 
GATS purposes, it is particularly relevant to consider the context of Article XVI, taking 
into account the object and purpose of the agreement.   The term "economic needs test" 
is not defined in the GATS.  Nor does the term have a well-defined meaning in standard 
dictionaries or in the economic literature.   
The application of ENTs differs amongst Members, in some cases, the schedule reveals 
that the test is to be conducted on a case-by-case basis, as each application for licence or 
a permit is submitted, whereas other entries seem to indicate that tests are periodically 
conducted.  In one instance, the applicant is required to submit a “feasibility study 
justifying the economic need for the establishment”.  Most ENTs that have been 
included in the schedule of concessions do not clearly indicate the criteria that will 
guide their application, which has made it difficult to assess whether such criteria were 
similar to the factors governing the use of an ESM.  Some of the forms taken by the 
ENTs  are detached from the very concept of ‘economic needs test’   but in effect these 
tantamount to and result in almost prohibition while few others countries have tried to 
pre-empt some trading partners from benefiting from the market access commitments. 
ENTs indicated in the Members schedule of commitments lack transparency and the 
criteria used by the countries for their application in most cases will probably be totally 
different from what might be relevant for an ESM
51
.    
 Viewed with respect to the exchange of binding commitments under Article XVI of 
GATS, the criteria to be used in ENTs would need to be specified in a Member's 
schedule of commitments.  Since Article XVI creates binding commitments for each 
Member based on the wording of the Member's market access schedule, the entries in 
the schedules would require to be inscribed with sufficient precision to allow the 
verification of the Member's compliance with its commitments
52
. For ENTs in 
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particular, the Scheduling Guidelines confirm that they “should indicate the main 
criteria on which the test is based, e.g. if the authority to establish a facility is based on 
a population criterion, the criterion should be described concisely.”  A Member 
scheduling,  a limitation on the number of service suppliers, would need to specify the 
exact number of suppliers, and not merely state that a numerical limitation exists. 
Otherwise, the legal certainty and predictability necessary for Members to exchange 
scheduled commitments and secure their rights and obligations, which is the purpose of 
Article XVI, would be undermined. However, as general practice, the references to 
ENTs in the schedules point to a ‘real test’ involving the determination of whether there 
are economic needs in the domestic market that would justify, for example, recourse to 
services or to services suppliers from abroad or of foreign origin.  
 
 In practical terms the incorporation of such an ENT in fact constitutes application of an 
emergency safeguard measure that is without any discipline as to its application.   It 
would be difficult to argue that an ENT that lays down a limit above which there will be 
a cut in the permitted flow of services or service suppliers is very different from 
application of an emergency safeguard measure and can be seen as an import quota.  
For example in the case of mode 4, the main objective of the scheduled ENTs, are in the 
context of provision of protection to the local workforce through quantitative 
limitations.  The inscription of an ENT provision in the market access schedule will 
constitute almost a blank cheque for the competent authorities to decide whenever they 
please, and that too, without having to comply with a bare minimum of indicators being 
present, criteria or tests of a broader ranging nature, on the plain subjective interruption 
of any flow of services or services suppliers.  In that sense an ENT is not a trade remedy 
safeguard measure, but it is a market access limitation and delivers a subjective 
discretion for the domestic authorities to allow trade.  
 
   Member countries, which were not agreeable to the need of providing specific ESMs 
under GATS, were of the view that although serving different policy objectives and 
purposes  Economic Needs Test (ENT) could elaborate and suggest some sort of clues 
so as to develop answer to the question of feasibility or otherwise of building standalone 
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and  specific ESMs under GATS.  To this group of countries ENTs in essence entailed 
almost the same type of measures as an ESM because most of the issues pertaining to 
the application of an ENT could be very similar to those market situations that also 
warrant the application of an ESM.   In all probability the factors that are relevant to the 
determination of injury or threat thereof in the context of an application of an ESM 
would invariably also arise in the determination or threat of economic harm in the 
context of identifying an ENT. In short, the concepts of ENTs and ESM were regarded 
by this group of countries, to be similar to the extent of being mutually substitutable 
concepts.   
The overwhelming use of this flexibility and legally permitted subjectivity associated 
with the concept is reflected in the fact that some 50% of WTO members had scheduled 
ENTs in at least one mode of supply and/or sector, usually without supplying 
information on the type of test, how it is applied or the criteria used.  The forms taken 
by the ENTs are varied and most of these appear to have to do more with industry 
protection then assessment of economic needs as such.  Economic Need Tests (ENTs), 
for example, scheduled especially for modes 3 (commercial presence) and 4 (temporary 
movement of people) serve as ESM-type measures.  Under mode 4 the main objective 
of any possible ESM can be to protect the local workforce through quantitative limits, 
therefore, there is an “equivalent effect” between an ENT and a generic ESM. It can, 
however, be argued that an ENT constitutes an emergency safeguard without any 
disciplines on use, and that a generic ESM would be therefore be a lesser problematic, 
more predictable and less trade distorting and thus a better option because, if agreed, it 
would be subject to clearer rules and disciplines.  
 
Member countries demanding specific ESMs in the GATS, however, disagreed with 
analogies drawn or similarities identified between ENTs and ESM.  This group of 
countries emphasized that ENTs are absolutely different from ESMs and doubted 
whether comparisons could usefully be made as ESMs unlike ENTs are to be applied 
neither on a discriminatory basis nor in response to an emergency  and that the 
development of   specific emergency safeguards provisions would reduce the need for 
ENTs.   The group also had objections to points made in relation to existing 
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commitments and felt that shifting the debate to such issues will not provide answers to 
the technical questions raised
53
 with respect to an ESM. 
To the demandeurs development and incorporation of specific ESMs in GATS were 
positively preferable because these would be multilaterally agreed upon, with clear and 
transparent criterion and they argued that existence of an ESM will strengthen 
arguments for keeping ENTs in the schedule of concessions to the minimum.    With 
respect to points made in relation to safeguard-type entries in schedules, some members 
felt that such questions were not relevant for the Working Party’s discussions on ESMs.    
ENTs contemplated under Article XVI of GATS, highlight the flexibility of the GATS 
rather than militating for an ESM
54
.     
5.3.4 ACQUIRED RIGHTS 
   The disciplines governing international trade in goods under the GATT has no 
conceivable parallel to the Mode 3 of cross border delivery of service that is covered 
under the GATS. Mode 3 of delivery of service relates to the commercial presence of 
the service provider in the importing country. With no parallel under GATT, there is, 
however, a definite “overlap between ‘mode-3’ services supply (that is, supply through 
the establishment of a commercial presence) and investment disciplines. More 
specifically, “for instance, the definitions of ‘commercial presence’ and ‘service 
supplier’ in the GATS resemble the definitions of ‘investment55’ and ‘investor’ under 
the NAFTA”56.   Under the mode 3 of delivery, a service is inherently accompanied by 
some form of capital investment; and dealing of investments under the WTO has been 
an extremely contentious issue (discussed latter in the Chapter); therefore treatment of 
commercial presence (mode 3 of service delivery) was one of the most complex and 
divisive areas for negotiations under the UR of the MTNs. The acceptance of disciplines 
with respect to Mode 3 of delivery in practical terms meant accepting multilateral 
disciplines for cross border investments.  
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  Conceptualising application of an emergency safeguards measure for any specific 
service sector and the measure to also target mode 3 of supply of services raised 
pertinent concerns. Working within the GATT paradigm an application of an ESM by 
an importing country will imply that the foreign owned service suppliers physically 
located in the host country will be required to reduce their supply of service that is 
being provided by them domestically.  In such a situation  the service providers  will in 
fact be forced to disinvest and any ‘rights’ that had been ‘acquired’ by the service 
provider by virtue of investments and physical presence in the country applying the 
measure will be either be diluted or nullified.  Employing a nationality definition for 
application of ESMs had its problems as this practice would exclude established foreign 
owed firms from the definition of the domestic industry and these can then be targeted 
for application of any ESMs. A dichotomy is created here, as excluding established 
foreign firms from the definition of domestic industry will imply that they are also 
excluded from any ‘acquired’ rights for application of an ESM concurrently the 
investments already made by these firms will be protected by application of any ESM.   
 The ASEAN submissions touched this conundrum of the ‘acquired rights’ and 
application of ESMs. The paper, working on the GATT paradigm, suggested that when 
dealing with the issue of acquired rights a nationality definition of domestic industry 
will be required to be developed, agreed and used, it will have to be decided whether or 
not the resident but foreign owned service suppliers are included and treated as part of 
the domestic industry. However, if any agreed ESMs are applied under a practice that 
uses residency definition of the domestic industry than in practical terms it amounts to 
excluding foreign owned but domestically located service suppliers from the mode 3, 
this will make the whole exercise of the application of ESMs redundant; as even the 
‘expansionary rights’ of such firms will remain intact. Establishing of causality would 
also be impossible given that any injury to domestically owned industry can only be 
caused by already established resident foreign suppliers that are benefiting from the full 
protection of acquired rights.  .   
 There were conflicting concerns in the WPGR with respect to the protection of the 
rights of pre-established foreign owned service suppliers in the domestic market of the 
country contemplating imposition of an ESM.  For some of the proponents of specific 
ESMs, it was acceptable that the acquired rights existing at the time of application of an 
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emergency safeguard measure may be protected but, for them, all expansionary 
activities of a foreign owned service suppliers would not fall within the ambit of 
acquired rights and should, therefore, be able to be subjected to safeguards measure.   
The ASEAN
57
  provided a listing of examples of such expansionary activities that may 
be restricted and  included; i) establishment of branches or subsidiaries; ii) acquisitions; 
iii) merger or consolidation; iv) infusion of additional capital and; vi) acquisition of 
entities.  ASEANs and some other developing countries viewed that the listed 
expansionary activities would not qualify as an ‘acquired right’ but simultaneously the 
listings were also not sacrosanct and that these countries were open to negotiations
58
 on 
this listing.   While another group of member countries had their own exclusive views 
that the foreign owned suppliers already established in a country should neither be 
affected by application of an emergency safeguard measure by a country (i.e. vested 
rights should be protected) nor on balance should these foreign owned supplier of the 
service be eligible to file an application for any reprieve through an emergency 
safeguard measure
59
. 
The relevance of the concept of  ‘acquired rights’ with respect to the other three Modes 
of cross border supply of services (other than mode 3) were also discussed.  Regarding 
supply of services under Modes 1 and 2, proponents of the ESMs viewed that some of 
the existing levels of services supplied should at least be respected in the event an 
emergency safeguard measure was contemplated to be imposed on the analogy of the 
existing concept of protecting current trade flows under GATT.  ‘Acquired rights’ for 
these modes of supply were considered very relevant in the light of investments made in 
developing countries for the purpose of servicing business process outsourcing 
requirements
60.   Proponents of the proposal felt that the concept of ‘acquired rights’ 
could also be used for ‘Mode 4’ (movement of natural persons) as it can  possibly also 
be undertaken  for other modes, however accepted the fact that the proposals need to be 
refined which can be done through the negotiations. They explained in the WPGR that 
any form of a quantitative restriction placed on supply of services under Mode 4 should 
be so structured so as not to curtail the number of Mode 4 suppliers to a level below the 
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average number providing that service for a representative period prior to the measure 
being imposed.   
  This proposal was based on the paradigm provided by the GATT and was a broad 
extension of the concept of acquired rights to the Mode 4 of cross border supply of 
services.  Some other Members had serious concerns about the proposal that the concept 
of ‘acquired rights’ as defined for Mode 3 can even be extended to Mode 4.  To these 
countries Mode 3 and Mode 4 of delivery of services had totally different and opposing 
dynamics.  For mode 3, stability and predictability were essential and important as this 
Mode of supply also requires making long-term investment decisions.  While Mode 4 
implied temporary movement of natural persons, therefore, the concept of Emergency 
Safeguards Measures and ‘acquired rights’ cannot carry the same implications, as by 
definition foreign natural persons were not permanent part of the host country’s labour 
market
61
.   
 The ASEANs were the initiators of the concept of acquired rights and the study 
undertaken within the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services” drew the 
conclusion that “distinguishing between ‘acquired’ and ‘expansionary’ rights is 
somewhat arbitrary and superficial.   The ‘expansionary’ rights are very closely 
associated to both the ‘post-establishment’ rights and the need to protect ‘acquired’ 
resident rights and in practice these should also be linked to both.   Foreign investors 
considering establishment of a commercial presence are likely to be put off knowing 
that if they become  successful they could be targeted by ESMs that would restrict their 
possibilities to and expand, this factor will all the more be really discouraging in the 
case when the initial investment was considered risky with uncertain profitability and 
chances of success. Similarly limiting a resident foreign owned firm’s capacity to 
undertake activities of merger or acquisitions through imposition of an emergency 
safeguards measure, for example, may prevent rationalization, and as result, could lead 
to reduced profits or continued losses and potential closure. The developed country 
members were of the view that the establishment of new branches or acquisition of 
companies and mergers are integral   to the business activities for any company that is 
investing in a foreign country and that such activities were essential not only to recoup 
the initial cost of investments but also to maximize returns on investments and create 
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efficiencies.  ESMs that ignore the ‘acquired rights’ of expansion will, therefore, be of 
disadvantage to domestic consumers and even other suppliers, including those that are 
locally owned. Restricting ‘expansionary’ rights could thus, in short, severely curb 
economic activity, be anticompetitive and create investor uncertainty.  
 Restricting ‘expansionary rights’ also contravenes Article IX of GATS that requires 
WTO Members to enter in to consultations with a view to eliminating business practices 
restraining competition and that restrict services trade. Such an approach also implicitly 
assumes a nationality and not a residency definition of the domestic industry. This is 
because under the latter resident foreign firms would be included in the domestic 
industry, and hence would be treated the same as locally-owned firms. There would be 
no legal basis for curtailing any post-establishment rights, including ‘expansionary’ 
rights
62”.  The possible anti-competitive effects resulting from the application of an 
emergency safeguard by the importing country in such a context was repeatedly 
discussed in the WPGR.   The link between ‘acquired right’ and other GATS specific 
concepts like ‘Economic Needs Tests (ENTs)’ also required clarification and were 
discussed by way of elaboration through an example. The example given in this regard 
was from the distribution services; where a supplier that was granted a license to 
establish a supermarket in an importing country under a market access commitment that 
was scheduled as subject to an ENT, would like to expand its activities to other parts of 
the territory in the country;  the question that arose here was that should this expansion  
be considered as permissible by virtue of being the ‘acquired right’, or should this 
proposed expansion be subjected to the economic need tests.  The ‘acquired rights’ as a 
concept may appear to be fairly straight forward but are not easy to demarcate and 
evaluate in practical terms. The answers to such important questions were difficult
63
 and 
left open and no conclusions could be drawn
64. However “the concept of ‘acquired 
rights’ despite prolonged debates in WPGR remained vague”65.  
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   A number of member countries had serious concerns with respect to the practical 
implications of the views with respect to the ‘acquired rights’ and explanations put 
forward by the demandeurs of standalone ESMs under GATS. The concerns expressed 
included elements like; i) not protecting acquired rights, and their impact on long term 
investment decisions; ii) unpredictable investments and business environment and; iii) 
negative effect on employment and the overall economic growth.  This proposal had 
major difficulties and, if agreed, was likely to rebound badly on the economy of the 
country and its attractiveness for FDI and BITs for which developing countries 
especially the proponents of the concept of independent ESMs under the GATS are so 
desperately looking for. Moreover, if the GATS definition is used and established 
foreign firms with minority domestic ownership (up to 49%) are to be subjected to 
ESM, then domestic interests are likely to be adversely affected almost as much as 
foreign interests.  
The ASEAN proposal had inconsistencies; the paper acknowledged that any safeguards 
provisions developed need to protect acquired post-establishment rights of resident 
foreign owned firms, the paper simultaneously also proposed applying ESMs to restrict 
the ‘expansionary’ rights of these foreign firms consequent to an application of an 
emergency safeguards measure by the host country.   However, the idea of separating 
the expansionary rights from other ‘acquired post-establishment rights’ in order to 
target resident foreign owned firms with application of a safeguards measure raises a 
series of complications  on its own, including consistency of the applied measures with 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that generally protect post-establishment, including 
‘acquired’ and ‘expansionary’, rights of resident foreign firms.  Application of ESMs 
will limit the ‘expansionary’ rights of resident foreign firms and would therefore be a 
violation of BITs and expose the country applying ESM to potential compensation 
claims.  Protecting ‘acquired’ rights of established foreign suppliers while prohibiting 
new foreign entrants also raises MFN (discriminatory) concerns
66
.  
Following the GATT paradigm and accepted standards for BITS, once established the 
foreign provider of services acquire certain rights and deserve to be accorded full 
‘national treatment’ in terms of Article XVII of GATS read with its explanatory 
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footnote.  However, this national treatment is limited in the context of GATS to the 
scheduled market access commitments of the country but in the context of BITS it is 
slightly more broader and in most cases open ended and invariably mandatory with 
respect to the National Treatment provisions. National treatment under mode 3 implies 
that foreign established
 
suppliers are entitled to the same benefits, including financial
 
incentives like subsidies, as their domestically owned counterparts.  The situation
 
is 
somewhat different under modes 1 and 2, where the foreigners
 
compete with domestic 
producers from a different geographical jurisdiction.    
5.4 BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITS) 
 
 There are currently no all-encompassing multilaterally agreed treaty disciplines or rules 
concerning foreign direct investments (FDI). Several attempts were made in this regards 
in last couple of decades to draft an international agreement on investment
67
 but all of 
these failed. The recent past has, however, experienced a proliferation of international 
investment agreements (IIAs) which comprise of a universe that is multilayered, i.e. 
composed of various treaties that, at times also overlap, are at different levels; bilateral, 
sub-regional, regional, interregional, sectoral and even plurilateral.     Though the universe 
of investment agreements is increasingly becoming complex and diverse but these can 
still generally be bifurcated and made to fall into two groups. The first group consists of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that are negotiated bilaterally between two 
countries to protect and promote investment of investors of one party in the territory of 
the other party. The second group of Investment Agreements consists of expansive 
economic integration agreements (EIAs), which are broad agreements, intended to 
facilitate the cross border movement of goods, services, capital, people or information
68
. 
 
Core elements found in most BITs include provisions on the scope of application, entry 
and establishment of investment, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and 
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MFN treatment, expropriation and compensation
69
. Only a few of the agreements that 
contain investment promotion provisions go one step further, for instance, by 
specifically seeking to promote the transfer of technology, to provide for training and 
capacity building, to improve conditions.  Investment Agreements like BITs have been 
largely irrelevant to trade law emerging out of the historical pre-Uruguay Round GATT 
system.  Even today the BITs technically exist outside the realm of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)
70
.  Most countries, interestingly, that have entered into BITs are 
also WTO members.  However, within the World Trade Organization some 
unsuccessful efforts were made to initiate a process of bringing   ‘investments’ under 
multilateral disciplines. Singapore Ministerial Meeting decided
71
 in 1996 to set up 
working groups on; trade and investment and on competition policy,. The negotiations 
were mandate to start after the 2003 but there were massive disagreements and 
ultimately the members agreed on 1 August 2004 to drop the Singapore issues (except 
trade facilitation) from the Doha agenda
72
.   
 
The GATS is the first multilaterally agreed treaty that cuts borders into international 
investment law as it contains obligations on the treatment of foreign investors. The 
Agreement does not cover investment policies per se but it does to the extent that they 
relate to the cross border supply of services including under mode 3 of delivery of 
service (physical presence
73
).   The disciplines of BITs in certain areas, therefore, 
overlap with some GATS provisions insofar as both apply to “measures by Members 
affecting trade in services” within the meaning of Article I: 1 of the GATS. “The 
relevance of BITs in governing international trade in services, as captured by mode 3, is 
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obvious, given that more than 60 per cent [sic] of world FDI [foreign direct investment] 
stocks (2004) pertain to service-related investments
74”.  
 
Mode 3 of delivery of service is the most important cross border mode of delivery with 
regards to trade in services and the trade under this mode exceeds all the remaining 
modes of service delivery put together
75. Since “the coverage of investment treaties 
tends to be broader in many aspects, it might be difficult to find scenarios falling under 
mode 3 (commercial presence) of the GATS that are not captured by such treaties
76”.    
It is estimated by the WTO Secretariat that on a global basis, and putting measurement 
problems for the moment aside; most of the service trade occurs through Mode 3, and 
forms almost 55 per cent of global services trade; while cross-border supply (Mode 1) is 
estimated to account for 35 per cent; consumption abroad (Mode 2) around 10–15 per 
cent; and presence of natural persons (Mode 4) a maximum of 1–2 per cent of service 
trade
77
.  
 
 The rapid spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host 
countries – typically developing countries – for foreign direct investment78. Invariably 
BITs typically provide various non-discrimination commitments, and expressly 
embrace the old customary law standard of payment of a ‘prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation’ for expropriation. They provide investors with the right to take 
investment disputes to neutral international arbitration, and commit each party to 
enforce arbitral awards (including an award of damages) and adhere to 1958 - 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – the 
‘New York’ Convention.  
 The developed countries were of the view that relevance and importance of mode 3 of 
service delivery with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) in services and 
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development of the economy has not been sufficiently highlighted in the discussions 
held in WPGR.  FDI in services not only brings external capital, but also new skills and 
technology and are helpful in linking countries to the global value chain.   Certain 
services are also built in to the manufactured products or serve as inputs and create 
enabling environment for other sectors to develop. FDI in services has grown rapidly 
over the recent past and now accounts for the largest part of global FDI.  In that context, 
it was pointed out by the countries seeking broader liberalization that better 
commitments on mode 3 by a country will improve the investment climate for that 
country by providing legal certainty and stability to the investors.  The positive 
relationship between the liberalization of mode 3 and growth of trade under other 
modes, especially modes 1 and 4, was repeatedly emphasized
79
. 
 An associated and equally important recent development is the surge in Economic 
Integration Agreements or other treaties on economic cooperation with strong 
investment provisions that either complement or override traditional bilateral 
investment treaties. These Agreements now deal with a broad range of related matters 
such as trade in goods, services, investments, competition policy, intellectual property 
rights and industrial policy. A number of Members especially those developing 
countries which are demanding standalone ESMs under GATS, like ASEANs, have in 
parallel to the negotiations in the WPGR undertaken broad and binding market access 
commitments under bilateral, regional or inter-regional trade and investment 
agreements. The commitments made by these countries under BITs, mostly entered into 
with developed countries, or under the framework of some Regional Economic 
Integration treaty covering investments, are far in excess of the commitments 
undertaken by these countries multilaterally under the WTO.  Interestingly these 
commitments are more pronounced under Mode 3 of delivery of service which pertains 
to physical presence of the service suppliers or simply put, cross border investments in 
the services sector.   
 The negotiating mandate detailed in Article X.1 of GATS provides for “multilateral 
negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard measures based on the principle of 
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non-discrimination
80”, the mandate narrows down the scope of negotiations; which put 
simply means that if the answer to the question of ESMs is agreed to be in affirmative 
and if  ESMs are found desirable and feasible and developed under GATS then these 
would necessarily need to be non-discriminatory and their application will be on a MFN 
basis which in turn implies that the safeguards measures taken cannot be source specific 
or discriminatory in any aspect.  Therefore, a Member contemplating to invoke any 
emergency safeguard measure under GATS in the context of mode 3 will have to do it 
on a nondiscriminatory basis; doing so would then be derogation by that member from 
the obligations under the BIT which invariable do not incorporate trade remedial 
measures.  In such a scenario the Member would have to decide whether to comply with 
the MFN obligation under the GATS and risk legal challenge under the BIT or, 
alternatively, to exempt the counter party to the BIT from the application of the 
safeguard measure and risk legal challenge under GATS. The Member would have to 
make a judgment as to what legal challenge it would want to risk facing:  one under the 
WTO for violation of the MFN obligation or one under a BIT.    The violation of WTO 
provisions is not an available option and will not be possible as it has already been 
decided under Article X.1 that any ESM which is developed under GATS would have 
to be applied on a non-discriminatory basis.  The practical application of an ESM by a 
WTO Member country, which is also a party to a BIT, therefore, will create a direct 
conflict between the country’s obligations under the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
and its obligations under the WTO.   
  Most of these BITs have almost standard formats that guarantee full national 
treatment, post-establishment,
 
to foreign investors in foreign majority-owned or 
controlled
 companies in other words all ‘acquired rights’ are fully protected.  Even if a 
BIT’s national treatment guarantee is confined only to established suppliers, the concept 
seems difficult to reconcile with the basic rationale of a GATT-type safeguards 
mechanism. The authorities would need to exempt precisely those companies
 
from 
safeguards that had caused the injury and triggered the
 
action
81
.
  
It will not be possible to 
justify the guarantee of continued national treatment to one group of foreign investors 
that includes those companies that have caused the injury.  These companies will be the 
                                               
80
 Article X:1 of GATS 
81
 Adlung Rudolf, Negotiations on Safeguards and Subsidies in Services: a Never-ending Story? Journal 
of International Economic Law 2007 10(2):235-265 
CHAPTER 5 
 170 
ultimate beneficiaries of the safeguards measures that are imposed on new entrants
82
.  A 
large number of Members have, therefore, already and practically relinquished their 
right to impose ESMs, under the GATS, because of the BITs entered into by them that 
forbid discriminating against the foreign established suppliers. 
 The imposition of a possible non-discriminatory emergency safeguard measure under 
the WTO on mode 3 would affect treatment that has been accorded by the ESM 
applying Member to the country with which it has signed a BIT.   The ASEAN group of 
countries in their informal paper had also conceded that the application of an ESM 
could conflicts with the provisions of BITs.  The invoking Member has limited options 
and would have to either exempt that Member with which it has entered into a BIT from 
the safeguard measure or subject the Member to the safeguard measure or assume the 
risk of a legal challenge under the BIT.  The field of international investments has its 
own dispute settlement structures including under the International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the 
ICSID or the Washington Convention).  Most BITs also incorporate specific provisions 
along with very elaborate dispute settlement systems that include full compensation 
provisions. These provisions are unlike the WTO dispute settlement procedures which 
provide possibilities limited only for retaliation through withdrawal of concessions. 
This option of retaliation under WTO, anyway, has not much relevance for the small 
developing countries that have little capacity to retaliate through withdrawal of market 
access concessions.  
 Interestingly it is the same developing countries that are demanding ESMs under 
GATS; that are simultaneously extremely eager to enter into broad ranging and deep 
BITs with the developed countries.  These standalone ESM demanding countries under 
GATS prefer to enter into BITs and other deeper Economic Integration Agreements on 
bilateral or regional levels than under WTO. These countries have shown a preference 
for regional cooperation over market liberalization under the multilaterally agreed 
treaties
83
 under which benefits if any will accrue, on an MFN basis. This approach 
reflects of a definite bias towards bilateralism and regionalism over multilateralism 
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when it comes to extension of tangible benefits.   In short a preference is for carving out 
of markets and discrimination over global trade liberalization and non-discrimination.    
  GATS provisions, in particular the MFN requirement pursuant to its Article II that 
provides that a member must “accord immediately and unconditionally to services and 
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords 
to like service suppliers of any other country”, for the Member countries that have not 
listed relevant exemptions in their schedules, the Article provides that any BIT 
disciplines that exceed the parties' GATS obligations are to be extended on a 
multilateral basis. However, BITs that have been concluded in the context of broader 
PTA negotiations; these may fall under Article V of the GATS under economic 
integration initiatives. The demandeurs of the specific of ESMs under GATS during all 
the formal and informal meetings of the WPGR were not able to clarify the relationship 
between the proposed approach for acquired rights, i.e., the possibility to impose 
discriminatory measures on expansionary activities of established suppliers, and the 
obligations (e.g., national treatment) under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or other 
obligations not falling under Article V of the GATS
84
.  
 
Continued and rapid proliferation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) has now 
added new dimensions to the deliberations held in the WPGR relating to the 
compatibility of restrictions imposed through any ESM type measures that may be 
developed under the GATS with the BITs entered into by the country that is intending 
to apply an emergency safeguards ‘measure’. The term ‘measure’ has a fairly broad 
coverage or connotation under GATS as the Appellate Body, in EC - Bananas III, with 
respect to ‘measures [...] affecting trade in services’, as provided by Article I:1 of the 
GATS, viewed that these are not necessarily measures ‘regulating’ or ‘governing’ trade 
in services, nor measures taken ‘in respect of' trade in services’, rather, ‘any measure 
bearing upon conditions of competition in supply of a service, regardless of whether the 
measure directly governs or indirectly affects the supply of the service’ falls under the 
scope of the Agreement. From this perspective, although most disciplines created by the 
BITs may not be directly aimed at governing services trade, but they may fall within the 
purview of the GATS to the extent that they affect trade (and investment) in services. 
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The MFN obligation pursuant to Article II is no different in scope, since the Article 
applies to ‘any measure’ covered by the GATS. Accordingly, any preferential treatment 
effectively granted to investors from one BIT partner would need to be extended not 
only to other, less privileged BIT partners, if any, but to all WTO Members as well
85
.  
5.5 ESMS IN SERVICES SECTOR: RTAS 
 
Regional and Bilateral Trading/Integration Arrangements (RTAs) on the international 
economic scene have proliferated rapidly in the recent past. During the early years of 
WTO (1994-2001) all RTAs that were notified to the WTO related only to trade in 
goods and there was not a single RTA that either had a chapter or independent 
provisions on trade in services.  However, the trends have changed and now the 
“attempts to incorporate a services chapter in the RTAs have now found a new 
fervour
86”.  Though regional trade agreements in services are a relatively recent, but 
these are a rapidly expanding phenomenon
87, however, “unlike trade in goods, RTAs 
that are specific for the services sector and exclusively cover trade in services are still 
rare
88”.   Between 2001 and 2008 around forty RTAs that were notified to the WTO 
under GATS Article V
 89
  had separate chapters or provisions relating to trade in 
services.  These RTAs mostly cover cross border trade in services as a component of a 
broader and comprehensive package of economic relations covering wide range of areas 
including trade in goods, services, investments and Intellectual Property Rights.      
 
The conduct of international trade in last couple of decades has become more complex; 
that now demands more intricate international trade rules.  World Trade Organisation 
has failed to provide any new up-dated or substantive rules in last twenty years which 
are relevant to contemporary international economic relations.  This inaction has created 
a vacuum and governance gap, which is being bridged by the collection of 
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uncoordinated and in certain cases unconnected developments outside the WTO through 
the evolution of new regionalism. Using their new dataset, WTO concludes that RTAs 
have been getting increasingly ‘deep90’ with most of the provision being legally 
enforceable.  The WTO acknowledges that the; “pattern observed suggests that 
deepening commitments in these areas, i.e., going beyond commitments in the WTO, 
continue to be a major driving force for recent RTAs
91”.  The World Trade Report 
2011, also had to recognize that RTAs in the 21st century cover more areas outside the 
WTO (referred to as WTO-X) than earlier RTAs. The main policy areas covered are 
competition policy, intellectual property rights, investment and movement of capital. As 
these WTO-X provisions are largely regulatory in nature, their growth is “testimony to 
the growing importance of behind-the-border measures in RTAs
92”.   
 
 Trade in services is now featuring prominently in the RTAs especially in those that 
were concluded during the last decade.  It was of immense value to analyse any 
provisions that may have been created under these RTAs for trade remedy measures in 
general or specifically with respect to emergency safeguards measures in area of 
services. The structures of ESM in the service RTAs could be possibly helpful in 
answering the question raised in Article X: 1 of the GATS.  This structuring of ESMs 
for services sector would not only had resolved the debate about the feasibility and 
desirability of the ESMs but also provided cues to challenges being faced by the 
negotiators on the multilateral front.   The provisions for application of ESMs in RTAs 
potentially could also be transposed partly or entirely to the GATS. It was, therefore, 
worthwhile to explore the possibility that whether some inspirations for developing 
GATS specific ESMs can also be drawn from the plethora of RTAs so as to find a 
coherent and acceptable answer to the question of ESMs under GATS as raised in its 
Article X.     
 
The RTAs in defining the conduct of interstate economic relations primarily employ the 
same concepts as these are embodied in different Agreements under the WTO.  With 
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regard to the application of ESMs on merchandize trade the RTAs  do not purely 
replicate the model provided by GATT  but some do contain clauses titled ‘Emergency 
Safeguard Measures’ but the provisions for application of any emergency safeguards 
measures are not prescribed or elaborated and the relevant provisions simply provide for 
exploratory mechanism on case by case basis like “request consultations with the other 
Party for the purposes of taking appropriate measures to address such adverse impact. 
The Parties shall take into account the circumstances of the particular case in such 
consultations
93”. Many RTAs in case of merchandise trade provide only for 
consultations in a trade flow situation that will solicit a possible application of ESMs 
under the GATT model, while these RTAs in the context of trade flow of cross border 
trade in services under the Preferential Trade Agreement in some cases simply create a 
linkage with the negotiations under the WTO and “take note of the multilateral 
negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard measures … pursuant to Article X 
of the GATS. Upon the conclusion of such multilateral negotiations, the Parties shall 
conduct a review for the purpose of discussing appropriate amendments to this 
Agreement based on the results of such multilateral negotiations”94.  This reference to 
negotiating mandate contained in GATS suggests that in developing any disciplines on 
ESMs in the area of services under RTAs the governments confront the same 
conceptual challenges, data limitations and implementation impossibilities at the 
regional level as they do on the multilateral front under the WTO. Another reason for 
this cross reference is deliberate choice of not creating a model for GATS or lack of 
capacity to create a model.  
 
The ASEAN Member countries discussed the possible application of ESMs in the 
services sector in their trade liberalisation agenda in March 2005 held under the 
auspices of ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)95. The ASEAN 
countries, despite being strong advocates of standalone ESMs under GATS, themselves 
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failed when it came to articulating, refining and adopting some acceptable specific 
emergency safeguards provisions under the AFAS.  There were other explanations 
floated for this lack of agreement on ESMs, as to some ASEAN Members this exercise 
seemed premature as any regional application of ESM under AFAS would had 
prejudice the outcome under on ESMs under the WTO. Another explanation seems to 
suggest that practically the application of ESMs will hinge critically on the adoption of 
agreement on ESMs in the WPGR under the WTO.  As all ASEAN Member Countries 
also belong to the WTO, therefore, the regional application of an ESM without WTO 
consistency would not only be at odds with their multilateral commitments, but would 
also mean that application of any ESMs will practical impact discriminate against 
ASEAN Member Countries and thus restrict intra-ASEAN trade
96
.  In the ultimate 
output the AFAS also, like many other RTAs, simply recognizes that ‘the GATS permit 
economic integration agreements and for the application of ESMs provides that Article 
X of the GATS will apply’97.   Interestingly, “the India–Singapore Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (ECA) expressly forbids the initiation of safeguards 
investigations and the imposition of safeguards measures
98”.   
 
 FTAs signed by ASEAN Member countries with countries outside the trading block or 
by other Asian countries who were the main advocates for the establishment of ESMs 
also do not provide for any ESMs in the services sectors.  Some of these agreements do 
not even contain a reference to emergency safeguard provisions for services.  Such 
Agreements include the; Japanese-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JPEPA) signed in September 2006 and the Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(TAFTA) signed in July 2004. India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (CECA) has some interesting features with respect to trade in services; 
CECA retains the current state of GATS disciplines in almost all areas of rules, 
including Emergency Safeguards; while, simultaneously, both countries are also  
disallowed to take ESMs in the services sector though scope to revisit the provisions on 
the ESMs exists but these too are based on developments in the stalemated negotiations 
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under the GATS on the subject.   The same situation exists in China-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement (1 January 2009) Article 71; Agreement between Japan and the 
Republic of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership (1 July 2008) Article 89; and 
Agreement on Trade in Services of The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-Operation between the People's Republic of China and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (1 July 2007) Article 9.  All these provisions are almost 
identical and read as: “The Parties take note of the multilateral negotiations on the 
question of emergency safeguard measures based on the principle of non-discrimination 
pursuant to Article X of the GATS. Upon the conclusion of such multilateral 
negotiations, the Parties shall conduct a review for the purpose of discussing 
appropriate amendments to this Agreement based on the results of such multilateral 
negotiations
99”.   
 
ASEAN as a group do not have an agreed single policy approach to the issue of ESMs 
in RTAs. Some of the RTAs concluded by the member countries like Thailand-New 
Zealand (2004) and Philippines-Japan (2006) do not contain or even refer to 
international developments with respect to ESMs in services while some other RTAs 
concluded with other countries do refer to developments under the GATS. Only one 
agreement—the Japan–Malaysia EPA—foresees the development of guidelines and 
procedures for the application of ESMs within 5 years of the entry into force of the 
agreement.   FTAs concluded by the Singapore with developed countries generally 
make no mention of emergency safeguard provisions for cross border trade in services, 
and just oscillate between a positive list and negative list approach, while a few, 
especially the US and Singapore FTA (USSFTA), adopt both approaches. The 
agreement with Australia (Singapore Australia FTA) specifically states there are to be 
no emergency safeguards provisions, despite being based on a negative list, similarly 
FTAs with South Korea (2005), New Zealand (2000), EFTA (2002) and Japan (2002) 
have no provisions for emergency safeguards or even reference to international 
developments under GATS or elsewhere on the issue. 
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 The cursory analysis suggests that the “RTAs have in general, made little progress in 
tackling the rule-making interface between domestic regulations and creating 
disciplines on international trade in services.  RTAs have also made little headway in 
tackling the key “unfinished” rule-making items on the GATS agenda. This is most 
notably the case of disciplines on emergency safeguards and subsidies for services, 
where governments confront the same technical challenges or political sensitivities at 
the regional level as they do on the multilateral front”100.   Overall, RTAs appear to 
“offer limited value added over GATS disciplines with respect to the rules areas, e.g. 
safeguard mechanism, disciplines on subsidies or domestic regulation
101”. Despite a 
proliferation of RTAs there appears to be little progress in the area of rulemaking in the 
services sector and in case of some of the RTA’s.  However, the Australia–United 
States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) contains a variety of features that reach 
beyond the parties’ GATS commitments, including sectoral coverage and levels of 
liberalization. Also, concerning subsidies, AUSFTA provides more definitional 
precision than the parties’ GATS schedules or the GATS itself insofar as the term 
‘subsidy’ is delimited to include government supported loans, guarantees, and 
insurance. Although the wording of relevant AUSFTA obligations differs conspicuously 
from their counterpart GATS provisions, it might be argued that for most practical 
purposes, the differences do not matter strongly.   
 
It will be worthwhile to study the approach towards the issue of emergency safeguards 
measure for the services sector has been adopted in the regional context by the two 
largest economic players in the world; the EU and the NAFTA. The ‘NAFTA is a 
significantly different model of regional integration than the EU. “NAFTA follows a 
free trade area structure and lower level of political accommodation than the EU 
customs union model; however, the NAFTA and EU are substantially similar regarding 
the general basis of services, investments and capital movement. The EU provides for 
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free movement of workers, while NAFTA provides for limited free movement for 
professional and managerial personnel”102.  
5.5.1 EC’S APPROACH: ESM IN SERVICES  
 
The European Community and all of its Member States simultaneously are also the 
Members of the WTO.  The WTO Agreements under the EC law for the individual 
States are ‘mixed agreements’ which are concluded both by the EU and by all of its 
member States being on one side, and by the third country or body, on the other side. 
This in practical terms means that “the subject-matter of an agreement or contract falls 
in part within the competence of the Community and in part with that of the Member 
States” 103.  Due to the shared competence, there are two issues of the direct 
applicability of the WTO Agreements in the EC: first, agreements relating to trade in 
goods (the 1994 GATT) which are implemented by the Community at the EC level.  In 
the Opinion
104
 1/94, the ECJ held that the European Community has the exclusive 
competence relating to trade in goods, but shares the competence with Member States 
relating to Agreements pertaining to trade in services (GATS) and trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) implying that the two Agreements under the WTO 
are jointly implemented by the Community at the EC level and the Member States at 
national level.  The EC approach to the regulation of trade in services is, however, 
somewhat different to that of the GATS and NAFTA. In the EC the market in services 
is based on the fundamental principle of ‘free movement of services’ dealt within Title 
III of the treaty of Rome as amended, alongside ‘free movement of persons’ and ‘free 
movement of capital’.     
 
 The European Commission (EC) in the deliberations held in the WPGRs was not 
favourably inclined towards development of standalone and specific ESMs under the 
GATS. The EC, like most of the other developed countries, felt that the latitude 
provided by the scheduling flexibility is sufficient to dispense with the need for 
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standalone ESMs.  During the discussions undertaken in the meetings of WPGR the EC 
always maintained that there is no history of existence or application of any Emergency 
Safeguards Mechanisms or Measures in the area of cross border trade in the services 
sector and that the international community has no experience in devising or applying 
such a measure.   This assertion
105
 made by the EC was, however, questioned by some 
developing country Members of the Working Party and they quoted instances where the 
EC had included Emergency Safeguard type provisions in its trade and economic 
integration agreements or those covering specific sectors of services.    To this group of 
countries, that challenged the EC’s assertion about the lack of any history of existence 
of ESMs in the International Agreements, the EC treaty itself and some other economic 
integration agreements concluded between the EC with certain third countries contained  
examples of the enabling provisions that related to application of some form of 
‘emergency safeguards measures’. These enabling provisions either specifically covered 
application of safeguards measures in some specific services sector or its mode of 
delivery.   These provisions were mostly general in character and were not necessarily 
specific to services sector but these were so structured that these could equally be 
applicable to the services sector as well as to the merchandise trade.   To this group of 
developing countries these provisions in the EC’s trade and economic agreements 
tantamount to be the manifestations of the concrete examples of the ESMs for the 
services sector. To this group of countries the existence of these examples of ESMs also 
confirmed the feasibility of developing independent provisions for application of 
emergency safeguards and also the desirability of incorporating these provisions for 
application of emergency safeguards measures as independent clauses under the GATS.  
 
 With respect to lack of experience and provisions about the emergency safeguard 
provisions the specific examples cited in the WPGR by the proponents of the concept 
ESMs under GATS was the EC’s directives on ‘gas and electricity106’, which was a 
sector specific provision.   The directive provides the space for the EC Members to take 
the necessary safeguard measures in case of an emergency.  Though the provisions 
under the directive have never been used but the mere existence of such provisions was 
interpreted as an example of ESMs for services sector.  This directive was interpreted to 
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mean that some form of provisions for application of ESMs are required especially 
considering the sensitivities which are specific to any particular sector or for the 
services sector
107
 as a whole.   
 
The Member countries that were demanding specific ESMs under GATS argued that the 
provisions in the EC directive on ‘gas and electricity’ were in practical terms 
emergency safeguard measures, the provisions have all the relevant attributes of the 
GATT type  emergency safeguards provisions and it had also been notified as such.  
The demandeurs argued that the fact that these rules had not been invoked by the EC 
did not mean that these provisions were not useful and relevant, but it needed to be 
examined as to why the EC had introduced these in the first instance anyway as it is 
very normal for a legal provision for a applying a specific measure may exist although 
the measure may not have been applied as yet.  For the Demandeurs the existence of 
emergency safeguard type provisions in the directive partly answered the question 
posed in Article X of the GATS and established both the feasibility and desirability of 
specific standalone provisions for ESMs for services sector as a whole.      
 
 The EC, however, did not share the perception of the demandeurs of the ESM with 
respect to the ‘gas and electricity’ directive. To the EC the provisions in the directive 
were a totally different concept of “safeguards” than those which are perceived as such 
under the concept of the emergency safeguards measures as understood in the context of 
the provisions already existing in the GATT, the AOS and those being contemplated 
under GATS.   The provisions in the EU internal directive on ‘gas and electricity’ takes 
into consideration two important elements of the energy sector which relate to the facts 
that the; i) transmission of energy was a natural monopoly; ii) the risk to a national 
economy and this allowed Member States to impose public service obligations to ensure 
the security of supply along with consumer and environmental protection, which in the 
view of EC member countries, free competition without intervention  cannot necessarily 
guarantee.    The EC was also of the view that in its more than fifty years of existence 
the Community has undertaken very intense liberalization of trade in services both in 
the context of deepening of economic integration amongst the  EU countries and also 
within the framework of free trade or economic  association agreements with outside 
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trading partners.  The EC despite massive liberalization has never applied any 
emergency safeguard measure to trade in services, with the sole and notable exception 
of the application of ESMs by one member on the movement of natural persons (mode 
4).    
 
 Member countries advocating development of specific safeguards also raised questions 
in the WPGR regarding the criteria for applying the safeguard measure and the form of 
the measures that were contemplated to be applied under the provisions of Article 59
108
 
of the treaty establishing the European Community.  The EC representative in his 
response tried to explain that “…[t]he interpretation of the criteria would be, in the final 
analysis, a political question decided on the basis of the circumstances in the particular 
sector of the economy concerned at the time the problem arose
109”.    The explanation 
given by the EC regarding Article 59 of the Treaty of the EU was not convincing 
enough for the countries demanding ESMs but rather it strengthened their assertion that 
this provision was for all intents and purposes an emergency safeguard, which was 
considered to be feasible and desirable, may be for at least for six months and in 
practical terms provided a ‘limited window’ for application.   
 
Though there is no history of application of ESMs in international trade in services but 
the European Communities has, in the context of emergency safeguards, historically 
recognized that a country might introduce safeguard measures
110
.      Paragraph 7 of the 
three notifications containing the EC’s bilateral Agreements with the then partner 
countries namely Hungry, Poland and Slovakia which were submitted by the European 
Communities to the WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreements111  in late 1990s 
contained provisions on safeguards that read as: 
“7 Safeguards; The provisions in the Agreement concerning the application of 
safeguard mechanisms do not provide for the exclusion of one or other Party 
from safeguard measures applied to third parties.  Under specified and restricted 
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circumstances, the implementation of the provisions on establishment in certain 
sectors may be delayed as provided for in Article 50.  This safeguard clause has 
no effect on service suppliers from third countries.”   
As explained by the EC to the WPGR the provisions were included in these Agreements 
to ensure that the implementation of the ‘Partnership Agreements’ do not give rise to 
social problems or create untoward hardship and cause long-term damage to the partner 
economies caused by rapid progress and liberalization.  However, the very presence of 
the clause nevertheless raised questions regarding the conditions which were 
contemplated by the EC for the application of measures.  
 
The European Communities in its Agreements with countries like Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
112
 had also provided for similar clauses and its Agreement 
with Latvia read as “During the transitional period referred to in Article 3, Latvia may 
introduce measures which derogate from the provisions of this Chapter as regards the 
establishment of Community companies and nationals if certain industries  
   
 are undergoing restructuring; or 
 are facing serious difficulties, particularly where these entail    serious 
social problems; or 
    face the elimination or a drastic reduction of the total market share held by 
domestic companies or nationals in a given sector; or 
 are newly emerging industries in the country concerned113”. 
 
The EC’s bilateral Agreements had contemplated provisions for application of 
emergency safeguards measures of some sort that were specific for the services sector. 
The EC’s bilateral  Agreement with Latvia as seen above, contained provisions relating 
to trade in services along with safeguards provisions for balance-of-payments 
difficulties in the Community or in Latvia (Article 65:2).  The Agreement with Latvia 
provided for limited derogations (or escape) from the provisions  of the Agreement in 
special cases which included factors as diverse as Latvian industries undergoing 
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restructuring, facing serious difficulties or elimination/drastic reduction of the total 
market share, or for newly emerging industries in Latvia (Article 51)
114
.  Almost exactly 
similar provisions were likewise included in some other agreements that were notified 
to the WTO by the EC, like; (i) Agreement between the European Communities and 
Estonia –February 2002; (ii) the European Communities and Lithuania 2002; (iii) the 
European Communities and Slovenia– 11 February 2002115.   The European Economic 
Area (EEA) Agreement concluded with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (1 January 
1994) also included a provision on safeguards that also covered services sector 116.  
However, Liechtenstein is the only country which has also once used the safeguards 
provisions applied on mode 4 of delivery of services.  Liechtenstein had imposed 
quantitative restrictions through restricting  the right of foreigners to take up residence 
in the country and the safeguards were applied pursuant to provisions of  Article 112 
EEA and Protocol 15 to the EEA; the protocol provided for certain quantitative 
restrictions on free movement of natural persons, till the end of the transitional period. 
 These Emergency Safeguards type provisions or criterion for application were generic 
in character, therefore these were equally applicable to trade in goods and services 
trade. According to the explanations given by the representative of the EC during the 
meetings of the WPGR these clauses were basically designed to reflect the realities of 
considerable structural and economic changes underway in the partner countries. These 
provisions were also to ensure that the implementation of the integration agreement 
does not give rise to social problems, unpleasant hardship or long-term damage to the 
partner economies caused by too rapid progress.  The EC also explained that 
interpretation of the criteria would be, in the final analysis, “a political question decided 
on the basis of the circumstances in the particular sector of the economy concerned at 
the time the problem arose"
117
 and that ultimately the Commission and not the member 
state has to decide the specific conditions and modalities under which the emergency 
provisions are put in place.   
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  Article 56 of the EC Treaty provides that all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between Member States, and also between Members States and third countries were 
prohibited.   Such an obligation put the EU in an extraordinary situation with respect to 
its unilateral commitment to free capital movements with the third countries.  Moreover, 
this obligation could not be changed, including in emergency situations.  In this context, 
Article 59 provided for safeguard measures for a period of up to six months only with 
regard to third countries in exceptional circumstances where movements of capital 
caused, or threatened to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of European 
Monetary Union.  This provision had to be assessed in the unique context of the 
creation of the Euro and no measures had ever been taken under this Article of the 
treaty since its entry into force on 1 January 1994. 
 The EC during the negotiations clarified that these Agreements were simply and 
essentially horizontal by nature, in the sense that all disciplines applied equally to goods 
and services. The bilateral Agreements were based on a top down approach and did not 
entail any possibility to withdraw commitments and the safeguard provisions in the 
Agreements primarily attempted to accommodate concerns relating to Balance of 
Payment and the infant-industry. The EC also explained that the provisions in the 
Agreements were time bound with sunset periods ranging from one to six years 
following the date of entry into force of the Agreement
118
 and the provisions have never 
been used and are not of the same nature as the model of emergency safeguards 
provided under the GATT.   EC delegation further explained that Article 73 of the EC 
Treaty provides for the free movement of capital, which went far beyond the GATS, 
and the safeguard provision in the ‘Commercial Policy’ chapter of the Treaty had been 
used only for trade in goods and the fact that it was applicable to services was a 
different matter
119
.   
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5.5.2 NAFTA APPROACH: ESMS IN SERVICES  
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is fairly similar to the GATS. 
Building on the experience of the earlier Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA) which it largely superseded, NAFTA contains general provisions with 
respect to (cross-border) trade in services, i.e. “measures respecting… the production, 
distribution marketing sale and delivery of a service; … the purchase, or use of, or 
payment for a service” and “the presence in its territory of a service provider of another 
Party”.   As it is in the case of the GATS, Chapter Twelve of the NAFTA sets out the 
basic principles that governs trade in the services, together with a number of sector-
specific annexes, which contain extensive reservations, including reservations relating 
to professional services (especially the legal and engineering professions) and 
transportation (especially land transportations).  There are also some service sectors or 
other substantive issues that are excluded entirely from coverage under the NAFTA, 
namely air services, public procurement and subsidies. Just as in the case of the GATS 
and the EC Treaty, two specific service sectors are treated separately in the NAFTA due 
to the recognized sensitivity of the sectors and their pivotal role in the economy and 
these are covered under sector-specific chapters. These two services have been dealt 
independently in Chapter Thirteen of NAFTA covers the telecommunication sector, 
while Chapter Fourteen of NAFTA deals with financial services. 
 
 The NAFTA adopts a ‘negative list’ approach to the listing of obligations under the 
Agreement, i.e. reservations are noted only in respect of those services sectors, and for 
those measures within certain sectors, to which one of the parties does not want that 
certain obligations should apply. This is, prima facie, the reverse of the ‘positive listing’ 
approach taken in the GATS, in which Members undertake no obligations to liberalize a 
particular sector unless it has been specifically itemized in the member’s schedule of 
market access. In fact, the GATS approach is “hybrid” of the two, for once a positive 
sectoral commitment is made, and it is considered to be a full commitment, which is to 
permit unqualified delivery of services through each of the four modes of delivery; 
unless limitations are further specifically itemized.  While the ‘negative’ listing 
approach can at times facilitate ‘carve-outs’, but this approach is generally considered 
most conductive to liberalization because all items that are not specifically identified are 
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automatically liberalized. This approach also corresponds to that used most widely in 
relation to foreign direct investment, and is thus one with which government officials 
are familiar. 
 
The NAFTA, however, differs from the rules under the EC Treaty with respect to the 
“right of establishment” (Article 43 of the EC Treaty) in not requiring that a service 
supplier from another NAFTA partner maintain a residence or office in its territory as a 
condition for supplying a service (Article 1205).    However, the NAFTA provides for 
avoidance of use of measures such as professional listing or certification procedures as 
a barrier to entry in their respective services market (Article 1210), thereby applying the 
principle of non-discrimination as in EC law. Even so, parties to the Agreement are 
entitled to maintain certain existing discriminatory measures, subject to liberalization 
commitments, as set out in Annex I to NAFTA, as well as to adopt and maintain certain 
other discriminatory measures, which are not subject to future liberalization, in 
accordance with Annex II to the NAFTA
120
. 
 
Another aspect of the NAFTA, which is not reflected in either the EC or the GATS, is a 
“federal clause” in Article 1206. In particular, this allows the United States and Canada, 
where state and provincial governments respectively may be extensively involved in the 
regulation of services (for example professional services), to list reservations in as 
Annex that reflect the regulatory competence of a state or provision in the matter. By 
contrast under GATS, where individual states and/or provinces in the territory of a 
WTO Member retain a degree of regulatory competence, the Member in question 
cannot make such a reservation but must list the geographical scope of the measure (and 
related restrictions for the territory) as a limitation on the national treatment under one 
of the modes of supply (often mode 3---commercial presence).  
 
In the case of both the GATS and NAFTA, measures relating to trade in services are 
determined in accordance with the means (or mode) by which they are supplied
121
. 
Trade in services under the EC Treaty is allocated discrete coverage under Articles 49 
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and 50 but the subject matter has always been considered subsidiary, even residual in 
character to the free movement of goods, free movement of capital and the right of 
establishment, in contrast to the NAFTA
122
 and the GATS. However, a similarity 
between the three regimes is that each recognizes that there may be a need to provide 
for more specific rules in certain sectors, which have been in existence for some time or 
are particularly sensitive or constitute key infrastructural sectors. In the case of both 
GATS and NAFTA telecommunications, transportation and financial services are 
accorded separate treatment with more detailed rules in separate chapters or annexes 
respectively. In the case of the EC Treaty transport is the only service sector that is 
covered separately (Title V).     
 
Provisions to apply Emergency Safeguards Measures exist in North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) but these are primarily with regards to trade in goods (already 
discussed in some detail in previous chapters) and the application has not been specified 
for the services sector.   Though a reference has explicitly been made in NAFTA to the 
ESMs but these are fairly different from the paradigm provided by the GATT.   The 
NAFTA concept includes a system of ‘scheduled safeguards’ in financial services that 
could be applied to stop capitalization of foreign-owned banks at a certain level; the 
measure could only prevent capital participation from further increasing, but could not 
reduce that level
123.   The emergency safeguard provisions in “Annex 1413.6 – Section 
B - Payments System Protection of NAFTA” were limited to financial services and 
those too primarily because of precarious financial position of one member country, 
namely Mexico in the 1990s. The provisions cannot anyway be regarded as blanket 
scheduled emergency safeguards as these were country, product and even measure 
specific. The provisions provide for consultation and if no consensus is reached, any 
Party may request the establishment of an arbitral panel under Article 1414 or Article 
2008
124
. The entire architecture of ESMs under NAFTA is totally different from the 
ESMs as understood under the model provided by GATT. The GATT structure does not 
provide possibilities for any third party intervention in that form. 
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5.6. MODELS FOR ESMS UNDER GATS. 
 
  The discussions held in the WPGR, though had a deficit in commitment but yet these 
were interesting and reflected the genius of the negotiators to improvise articulation and 
lack of convincing arguments.  Member countries
125
 made several individual or 
collective submissions in the Working Party’s meetings that articulated their 
perspectives on the possible approaches that can be adopted towards development or 
otherwise of standalone or the specific provisions for application of ESMs under GATS. 
The country’s representative expressed their views either verbally in the different 
meetings of the Working Party, or these were presented in some form of written 
submissions like ‘formal’, ‘informal’, ‘non’ or ‘room’ papers.  These submissions 
combined with long and protracted discussions in the WPGR and compilations created 
by the WTO secretariat suggested different possible alternative models or their 
variations for a possible standalone safeguard mechanism under the GATS.  The 
discussions in the WPGR were marred by the enormous differences. However, there 
were some parallel strands of thoughts in the views that were common to some 
particular groups of countries
126
  that suggested of definite formation of negotiating 
coalitions amongst the members. These coalitions advocated their own preferred 
possible approach or options to the resolution of question posed under Article X of 
GATS.  
  The view of the member countries that were demanding specific provisions for 
application of ESMs under GATS, and can be regarded as their primary option was, that 
any emergency safeguards provisions under GATS should necessarily and strictly be 
modelled on the concept and framework provided by the Emergency Safeguards 
Mechanism that is already available for international trade in the goods under Article 
XIX of the General Agreement and the AoS.  During the discussions this position was 
maintained and repeatedly advocated by the proponents that the safeguards mechanism 
that is developed should follow the model provided by GATT.  The provisions creates 
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should not only follow the GATT paradigm but also necessarily should contain most of 
the constituting elements of Article XIX and also of the AoS along with conditions that 
are identical to those that are applicable in case of imposition of the safeguards 
measures for the trade in goods.  This model and possible transpositions of its 
individual building blocks to the GATS has been discussed in detail under the Chapter 
3.  The crux was that cross border trade in services and trade in goods are not 
comparable in most of their dynamics.  Similarly the two Agreements, GATT and 
GATS, are also different and transposition of GATT concepts to GATS was not straight 
forward, simple or even possible in most areas.  The discussions in the WPGR failed 
even to clarify the issues involved and that may lead to some sort of agreeable 
outcomes, rather this created unresolvable confusion because of the efforts to treat two 
dissimilar products and Agreements in a similar dimension.  
 A second view put forward by some member countries recognized that it may not be 
feasible to develop an independent safeguards provisions under GATS that is generic 
and cuts across all the service sectors and thus applicable to all the services as well as to 
all modes of service delivery.  It was suggested that some mutually negotiated and 
agreed emergency safeguard type provisions may be included with respect to specific 
service sectors or its mode of delivery in a Member’s schedule of market specific access 
commitments.  This approach was favoured by the US
127
 and also by some other 
developed countries that tried to explore the possibility of inclusion of sector specific 
safeguards in their schedules of commitments.    This option was also referred to as the 
scheduling flexibilities. This alternative of scheduling as already been discussed in some 
detail earlier in the Chapter..  The ‘rights’ under this model, to resort to an emergency 
safeguards measure were to depend on the negotiated and scheduled safeguards alongside 
negotiations on market access and thus these were to vary from Member to Member. This 
variation in ESMs provided for one service sector in the schedules of different countries 
will in turn depend on the specific interests of pressure groups or domestic lobbies 
involved along with the bargaining power of the individual Member to schedule an 
emergency safeguards provision in that particular sector.  This proposal also implied that 
the onus of defining an emergency safeguard either generically for the entire service 
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sector or in some sort of a mode specific context depended on the Member country; thus 
leading to subjectivity in definition.   
In terms of this model it will be a tedious to balance the multilaterally agreed safeguard 
measures, if developed, simultaneously with the scheduled safeguard measures that may 
be incorporated by some members in their commitments.  Moreover, in the event of a 
situation where scheduling is agreed a common understanding on the language of the 
emergency safeguards would still inevitably be essential that does not exists at present, 
therefore, will be required to be negotiated amongst Member countries; or “else multiple 
approaches with multiple understandings will further enhance the ambiguity with respect 
to the application and interpretation of the emergency measures
128”.   Simultaneously it is 
conceptually and politically impossible for the economic managers of a member 
country either to identify sectors where “unforeseen circumstances” are likely to occur 
or otherwise and earmark potential areas for application of emergency safeguard 
measures and then also offer these sectors for market liberalization. 
A third model of ESMs that already existed in the universe of the WTO agreements 
and that was mentioned to be explored for providing the possible paradigm for 
development of the independent ESMs under GATS was the Article 5 of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).  The model provided by the Agreement on 
Agriculture does not require either the establishment of any causality between any 
injury and surge in imports or even a demonstration of injury to the domestic industry 
as a basis for application safeguard measure.  The application of safeguards measures 
under this model are triggered or allowed to be imposed simply because of increases in 
import volumes or import price reductions, and this factor alone permits the imposition 
of additional import duties up to specified limits that provides sufficient protection to 
the domestic producers.  The volume trigger, which leads to the non-discriminatory 
application of additional duties, is sensitive to the degree of import penetration, while 
the price trigger, which may result in additional duties on a consignment-by-
consignment basis, is related to certain base year prices of the products.   
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 The model provided by the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is already overly complex 
and the complications associated with it are further compounded by the fact that the 
market access barriers in the services sector are not transparent or easily observable. In 
case of AoA only very rough tariff equivalents can be worked out using complex 
calculations and high quality and up to-date statistical information.  There are serious 
and valid doubts, however, whether such non-predictable approach to supplies and also 
intense data requirements could be met in the context of cross border trade in services. 
There are no injury requirements under AoA and invocation of its Article 5 relies 
primarily on a considerable amount of regularly updated empirical information that is 
mostly lacking in the case of services or there are also immense time lags between the 
imports and availability of trade flow statistics.  There were valid strong reservations 
and doubts about applicability of Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture to 
international trade in services as the policy backgrounds and structures of international 
trade are very different in the agriculture sector from that for the services.   
 A possible fourth alternative was to develop ESMs under GATS on model that was in 
first place itself derogation from GATT and never accepted by the developing countries. 
The model was discriminatory in character and allowed application of source specific 
ESMs. This was provided by Article 6 of now defunct Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC).  Under the ATC special treatment was envisaged when applying 
safeguards against small exporters, least-developed countries, wool producers, outward-
processing trade and cottage industries.  Members contemplating application of the 
special safeguards measure in textile sector needed to demonstrate that a particular 
product is being imported from the country in question in such increased quantities as to 
cause serious damage, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or 
directly competitive products.  The safeguard measures applied, could only be in form 
of quantitative restrictions on imports. The safeguards in form of import quotas, under 
the ATC, were essentially to be applied following a stringent exercise which had 
significant data requirements
129
. The measure was, however, applied selectively to 
exports of a particular exporting country. This possibility of source specific application 
of the ESMs contravened the non-discrimination or MFN principle of GATT.  The 
model also went against the objective laid down in the preamble to GATT 1947 and 
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also to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
both provide for “elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade 
relations”. The discriminatory approach of the model also contradicted the basic 
stipulation in Article X: 1 of GATS that aimed at negotiations towards development of 
“Emergency Safeguard Measures based on the principle of non-discrimination”.   
A fifth option suggested during the discussions in the WPGR was to have mixed or 
hybrid emergency safeguard mechanism that is developed by combining elements that 
are contained in Article XIX of GATT 1994, Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
and Article 6 of the defunct Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
130
.  This hybrid model 
was a non-starter. The WPGR never discussed the proposition seriously.  The 
constituting elements of this possible fragmented structure that was to use pieces from 
different Agreements each having its own fundamentals and dynamics were never 
debated.  
 Another possibility was to make Article X:2 GATS permanent which was originally  
conceived  to compensate for absence of any multilaterally agreed ESMs and allowed 
Members to modify their schedule of concessions, if need be, even after one year in 
terms of Article X: 2 of the GATS that provides that “…any Member may, 
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XXI, notify the Council on 
Trade in Services of its intention to modify or withdraw a specific commitment after a 
period of one year from the date on which the commitment enters into force;…131”.    
The reduced time frame from three to one year was to compensate for lack of existence 
of ESMs under the Agreement is also fraught with concerns, as but for the shortened 
time span of one year, the entire requirements as laid down in Article XXI of GATS and 
those adopted by the Council for Trade in Services in 1999 will require to be 
followed
132
.  Under the GATT paradigm Article XXVIII and XIX of the General 
Agreement have always co-existed with their own objectives and functions; and their 
objectives are different.   
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Similarly if it is agreed to retain the provisions of Article X: 2 of the GATS
133
 as a 
permanent fixture of the Agreement and accept the renegotiation of the schedule of 
market access commitments as a substitute for standalone ESMs under the GATS, in 
such a situation in addition to the concerns already discussed in the context of agreed 
Procedures for the Modification of Schedules of concessions in terms of Article XXI
134
 
of GATS.  In terms of Article XXI procedures there will be no scope for emergency 
measures and the lengthy modification process may convert the ‘threat of injury’ to 
‘permanent injury’ to the domestic producers.   
 The analysis of structures of ESMs in the service RTAs that could have been helpful in 
answering the question raised in Article X: 1 of the GATS was not productive.  The 
study of bilateral and regional trading arrangements was not much of a contribution to 
the debate about the feasibility and desirability of the ESMs or provided any cues to 
help resolve challenges being faced by the negotiators on the multilateral front.   There 
were no provisions for application of ESMs in RTAs that could possibly be transposed 
partly or entirely to the GATS.  
 However, the brief analysis of evolving disciplines on cross border investments within 
the context of BITs or broader Economic Integration Agreements has  brought out some 
interesting facts. The countries that were treating the existence of standalone emergency 
safeguards as prerequisite for making any binding commitments of their existing market 
access regime had made really deep and unconditional commitments under the BITs 
and/or RTAs.  The BITs regime in certain ways is more demanding than WTO system 
because of the differentiated dispute settlement and compensation structures.  
The demandeurs of ESMs, however, regarded that certain other provisions that have 
been incorporated in the schedules of market access commitments by a few Member 
countries can also be regarded as concrete examples of emergency safeguard measures 
in the international agreements that are specifically for the services sectors. To support 
                                               
133
 Article X:2 of GATS reads as: “In the period before the entry into effect of the results of the 
negotiations referred to in paragraph 1, any Member may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 
of Article XXI, notify the Council on Trade in Services of its intention to modify or withdraw a specific 
commitment after a period of one year from the date on which the commitment enters into force;  
provided that the Member shows cause to the Council that the modification or withdrawal cannot await 
the lapse of the three-year period provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXI”.  
134
 World Trade Organization Procedures for the Implementation of Article XXI of  The General 
Agreement On Trade In Services (GATS) (Modification Of Schedules)  Adopted by the Council for Trade 
in Services on 19 July 1999 S/L/80 29 October 1999 
CHAPTER 5 
 194 
and to substantiate their argument the examples cited were; i) the Schedule of Specific 
Commitments of Japan
135
 that contained in its section 11.F, a restriction titled 
“emergency safeguard measures” for mode 3; ii) the report of the WTO’s Working 
Party on the Accession of Bulgaria mentions that Bulgaria was allowed, under certain 
conditions, to suspend certain of its specific commitments
136
; and iii) NAFTA Chapter 
relating to the Financial Services. All these contained some sort of a mechanism that 
has the basic characteristics of an ESM as understood and available under GATT 
model.  Some accession protocols of new acceding countries to the EU and regional 
trading arrangements that were notified to the Committee on the RTAs also contain 
stipulations which can be regarded as emergency safeguards.   
 
5.7. WRAPPING the DISCUSSIONS  
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is fairly ambiguous and 
unpredictable and in addition to that it is also structured to be fairly flexible. It provides 
the member countries with a substantive and broad regulatory space to incorporate, 
desired flexibilities by way of limitations; in their schedule of market access 
commitments.  The flexibility in scheduling of the emergency safeguards, have 
practically dispensed with the need for development of an ex-post facto mechanism of 
ESMs under GATS, on the pattern of GATT, to cope with unforeseen adverse 
circumstances which might arise over time because of the commitments undertaken.  
However, the possibility of pre-empting the need to impose an ESM through effective 
use of the scheduling flexibilities, as already discussed, have their own practical 
problems as the Scheduling
 
Guidelines
137
 only refer to the treatment of a foreign-based 
service
 
supplier and not to the treatment of the service, once it has entered
 
a country's 
jurisdiction (mode 1) or is consumed abroad under
 
mode 2 of delivery. Scheduling 
flexibilities have limited practical utility as “states simply cannot anticipate every 
circumstance and cannot identify all possible behaviours by another Member country 
that it may undertake in future and which they would like to prevent.  Thus, for 
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example, the parties to a trade agreement might wish to permit the use of safeguard 
measures when domestic industries are threatened, but it may be impossible to verify 
when that is the case
138”.   
The Hypothetical examples developed to identify the circumstances that may require 
application of ESMs in case market liberalization in the services sector. These 
hypothetical examples in practical terms created more questions than it provided the 
answers. The examples highlighted the associated issues that will shoot out in case of 
application of an ESM.  These issues will include the determination of the nationality       
of the industry and the linked concerns about its ‘acquired rights’.  All the examples 
were developed in the context of mode 3 of service delivery, reflecting paranoia of the 
demanders of the concept of ESMs with the investments. However, the contradictions 
have arisen between the obligations assumed by the countries under the BITs and 
deeper Economic Integration Agreements and obligations under the WTO. All the 
models that could have possible been looked at from within the broader paradigm of the 
WTO were deficient and not able to provide the foundation on which structure of 
standalone ESMs under the GATS could possibly be built. 
The EU and NAFTA have very intelligently managed the issue and the two agreements 
do not provide any clues or leads for developing ESMs under GATS, rather the two 
Agreements suggest of a scheduling flexibility if necessarily required and 
implementation of Agreement in ‘good faith’. However, interestingly despite the strong 
stands taken by some countries for provision of specific emergency safeguards 
provisions under GATS as a pre-requisite for them to make market liberalizing 
commitments, these countries have joined the negotiations towards possible future 
liberalization. 
5.8 NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE: DESPITE 
 International commerce is fast becoming more complex in the contemporary world – in 
particular with reference to rapid development of the trade-investment-services nexus. 
The exporters of foreign direct investments have signed BITs with countries seeking 
foreign investments. There may well have been a sort of domino or “race to the bottom” 
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element in the BIT proliferation, as FDI seekers felt they had to sign BITs to guard their 
locational competitiveness against rivals who had already signed BITs with the major 
source-nations of FDI
139. In today’s world, it is really difficult to establish a company’s 
nationality and it is more difficult to create any provisions that may only apply to 
companies of any particular nation, this problem has frequently led RTAs to define the 
affected firms simply by the place where these are incorporated.  This determination of 
origin and application of any discriminatory punitive measure can comfortably be 
circumvented as it allows firms from third nations to free ride on bilateral opening by 
incorporating affiliates in one of the nations
140
 that is party to a bilateral or regional 
trading arrangement. 
Continued negotiations on the market liberalization under GATS, emergence of BITs 
and rapidly developing phenomenon nexus amongst trade-investments-services apart 
there is also simultaneously a linked and equally fast moving but fairly deep  process of 
developing countries entering into Regional/Preferential Trading Arrangements (RTAs) 
with developed countries and also other developing countries. A recent OECD “report 
examines services schedules of commitments in 56 regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
where an OECD country is a party. The preferential content of RTAs is assessed 
through an analysis of market access and national treatment commitments at the level of 
the 155 sub-sectors of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Sectoral 
Classification List. Partial commitments are broken down according to nine categories 
of non-conforming measures.  The report confirms that on average RTAs in services go 
beyond GATS with commitments in about 72% of sub-sectors, among which 42% 
correspond to preferential bindings (GATS-plus commitments)
141”.   The  development 
of interface of GATS with  the emerging RTAs  especially those that contain some form 
of market access commitments or preferably some trade remedial measure with respect 
to international trade in services has been discussed in some detail in the latter half of 
this Chapter. 
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 Interestingly and despite developing a strong and causal linkage between development 
of ESMs and market access, members in accordance with Article XIX of GATS have 
also entered into consultations for progressive liberalization of the markets  and the 
process has not only been moving forward but the Members have agreed to adopted 
specific instruments to guide these market liberalization negotiations.   The instruments 
adopted in this regards include the 'Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services', which, recalls the provisions of Article XIX of GATS and its 
objectives to progressively achieve higher levels of liberalization. Members also held a 
Services Signalling Conference in July, 2008 that was followed by the Services Cluster 
meetings in March/April, 2009 to take account of the progress in the Services 
negotiations.  During the signalling conference Members, including many developing 
countries, that were stanch proponents of the ESMs under GATS, have signalled not 
only the improvement in their existing offers of market liberalization commitments but 
have also indicated the possibility of bindings some new services sector
142
.  Though the 
Conference only required signals from the individual members for the possible 
liberalization but the process did establish the fact that developing countries including 
the demandeurs of the ESM in practical terms do not necessarily want to hold the 
liberalization process hostage to the development of the specific emergency safeguards 
provisions under GATS
143
.    
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6.   ESMs UNDER GATS:  CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. THE CHAPTER INTRODUCED & BACKGOUND  
 
 To put the conclusions drawn in the thesis in right perspectives, the Chapter briefly recalls 
the background, the negotiating process and different issues involved in development of 
Emergency Safeguards Measures (ESMs) under General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).  The Chapter then tries to explore and find solutions to the question of emergency 
safeguard measures posed in Article X through some other domestic trade policy 
instruments, not brought under discussions before, that can possibly have nexus with the 
conduct of cross border trade in services, particularly with respect to mode 3 of delivery.  
The two areas explored in this context were the Subsidies and Competition policies because 
these, though, not part of the GATT model but these do belong to the box of contemporary 
domestic economic policy instruments.  
 
  The Chapter goes on to draw its own reasons and tries to briefly analyse as to why the 
negotiations in the WPGR went the way they did.  The Chapter first tries to look at the 
structural problems that are inherently present in the GATS and then goes on to briefly 
gauge the problems with the WTO system as a whole that may have impacted the 
development of ESMs under GATS.  The phenomenon of shift towards the regionalism or 
other forms of economic integration agreements are also looked at but solely in the context 
of development of ESMs under GATS.  Brief efforts have also been made to look at the 
evolution and importance of ‘collective preference’ concerns, lack of capacity and 
willingness in WTO system to address these concerns, which in turn have created the 
image and relevancy problems for the WTO.  The chapter concludes by analysing that 
whether the negotiations on development of standalone ESMs under GATS stalled for 
simple straight forward reasons of limitation of the model, or structural issues with the 
Services Agreement or simple preference for regionalism despite good faith efforts, or, 
were there external or unconnected considerations that led the negotiations to failure 
because of a deliberate policy choice by some important players. Any “solution to the 
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stalled negotiations on emergency safeguards under GATS will need to transcend the 
dichotomy created between the feasibility and the desirability
1”. One way to achieve this 
was to carefully examine – and ultimately rectify – those arguments that have been put 
forward by the members as part of their overall negotiating strategy and in some way 
detached from the good faith.   
 
6.1.1 GATT/WTO NEGOTIATIONS: DIFFERENT PROSPECTIVE 
 
There are, different theoretical lenses through which different negotiating processes can be 
viewed, and it is important to appreciate that “qualitatively different negotiations need to be 
analysed within different theoretical frameworks”2.  However, as a general principle, the 
participants to the  international negotiations need to have some common understandings of 
the issues involved and that the negotiations of most sorts are stringently demarcated and 
controlled by the agenda set for them; agenda setting process itself is, therefore, an 
important and integral component of any negotiations, be these bilateral, plurilateral or 
multilateral.  
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) held under the auspices of GATT/WTO, are 
no different in their dynamics including with respect to their agenda setting.  Agreements 
on the specific Agenda and structuring of the negotiations have traditionally been divisive
3
 
as “one of the most severe recurring problems facing the GATT/WTO throughout its 
history has been the manner in which decisions are made on the content and form of the 
negotiating agenda”4. The issues with agenda setting have been especially relevant in the 
last two rounds of MTNs held under the auspices of GATT where fairly deep Agreements 
were negotiated as compared to the earlier rounds of negotiations primarily had limited 
                                               
1
 Mario Marconini, Emergency Safeguard Measures in the GATS: Beyond Feasible and Desirable, UNCTAD. 
March 2005. p 20 
2
 Hopmann P Terrence Negotiating Data: Reflections on the Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of 
Negotiation Processes Watson Institute for International Studies, International Negotiation 7: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 67–85, 2002. 
3
 It took almost three years of intensive negotiations at Geneva to formally agree to the agenda for the UR of 
MTNs. 
4
 World Trade Organization Low Patrick, WTO Decision-Making for the Future Staff Working Paper, 
Geneva, May 2011 
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ambitions of only tariff reductions and market access at borders
5
.  In the initial years of 
GATT many of the differences over the reach and content of GATT rules were resolved not 
necessarily to the satisfaction of all parties involved or through simple negotiating process 
and articulation of arguments, but “in certain instances may have been disposed of with a 
certain degree of coercive persuasion
6” of major players in the world economy like the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US).  In the goods sector most of the ESMs 
related bilateral trade concerns between exporting and importing countries for the first 
quarter of the century of existence of the General Agreement were not settled through 
compensation under Article XIX but were dealt with in the context of six rounds
7
 of trade 
liberalization MTNs held from 1947 to 1967 within the context of on-going renegotiations 
of schedule of concessions under Article XXVIII of the GATT and gradual liberalization 
processes.  
 The global trade flows have dramatically changed in last couple of decades and new and 
important economic players have emerged on the international trade scene.  The new found 
importance of these major developing countries has now bestowed on them the right to be 
heard especially when it comes to rule making for conduct of international trade. The 
change in realities of the global trade flows has proportionately challenged the capacity of 
the major traditional developed economic powers (the US and the EU) to bilaterally 
determine the governing rules for international trade.  The GATT/WTO negotiating 
structures in last couple of decades has rapidly moved away from a hegemonic monopoly 
of the developed countries to more of multi-polarity. The market liberalization and rule 
making negotiations for the multilateral trading system, however, is still dominated
8
 by the 
                                               
5
 The seventh round of MTNs (Tokyo Round) held under the GATT has already been discussed earlier.  
6
 World Trade Organization Low Patrick, WTO Decision-Making for the Future Staff Working Paper, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD, Geneva, May 2011 
7
 The First six Rounds of MTNs were: First Round (1947), Annecy Round (1949), Torquay Round (1951), 
Geneva Round (1956), Dillon Round (1962) and Kennedy Round (1967) 
8
 Some of the other main multilateral treaty bodies: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO); Hague Conference on Private International Law; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); 
Intergovernmental Organisation for the International Carriage by Rail; International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT); International Maritime Organization (IMO); International Narcotic 
Control Board (INCB); International road transport Union; International Telecommunication Union (ITU); 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO); International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (UPOV); United Nations Secretariat; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL); United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); United Nations Office on drugs and 
Crime; United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); World Bank; World 
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GATT/WTO system which now has to accommodate multiple, diverse and at times 
contradictory interests.  These developments have not only affected the agenda of 
rulemaking for the GATT/WTO system but have also reduced the system’s ability to take 
decisions. The changing international trade equation has added further complications to the 
decision-making process which was already under pressure from the combination of 
rapidly increasing numbers of developing countries membership of the organisation most 
of which had recently attained independence and had very rudimentary management 
structures of different components of their economy.  
The dynamics of Uruguay Round of MTNs was influenced by a combination of different 
factors, like the negotiating experiences gained by the developing countries from previous 
round of MTNs, and more importantly in the context of this paper, the experiences gained 
in the past from the practical application of the provisions of Article XIX of the General 
Agreement relating to ESMs under the GATT System
9
.  The developing countries in their 
conduct of MTNs during the UR also had some external support that was created through 
parallel analytical and consultative processes that became available under the institutions 
like United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), South Secretariat 
and different Non-Governmental Organisations. The defining and creation of understanding 
about the issues that were subjected to multilateral trade negotiations, an activity which was 
previously solely a preserve and dependent on the technical support and other inputs to be 
provided by GATT Secretariat, changed radically. In the context of negotiations on for 
ESMs under the UR of the MTNs both in the goods and the services sector the support 
received from the outside sources essentially suggested non-discrimination. The possible 
benefits to small suppliers of source specific application of the ESMs for trade in goods, that 
were to restrain imports from major suppliers, was never discussed or even mentioned. This 
approach reflected the power or the influence that major exporting developing countries had 
attained. The practical realities had  further evolved by early 1990s and it was no more 
possible for the analysts of GATT to make any suggestions as were earlier made by the 
                                                                                                                                               
Customs Organization (WCO); World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Source http://www.intracen.org/policy/trade-treaties-map/ (.legacarta), 
9
 The exporting developing countries had been subjected to source specific export restraints through various 
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Executive Secretary of the GATT in one of his informal notes in mid-sixties recommending 
study on source specific application of the ESMs.10 
 The developing countries as a group not only showed successful coalition behaviour in the 
UR negotiations of MTNs but more advanced amongst them
11
 were also successful in 
bundling together the negotiating position of the developing countries across different set 
of issues. The negotiating positions created by the coalition of developing countries were 
generally of uneven interests to different developing member countries but these issues 
were of particular interest to the advanced developing countries
12
 that were leading the 
coalitions.   These advanced developing countries were not only able to forge but were also 
able to lead the coalitions that adhered better than ever before in the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations; despite the fact that the stance taken so successfully by these coalitions were 
in certain instances in essence against the immediate economic interests of some of the less 
knowledgeable and weaker coalition partners
13
.  The negotiating stances taken by 
developing county coalitions on the issues that had conflicting underlying interests 
included the negotiations on Emergency Safeguards provisions, Services, TRIMs and IPRs.  
The negotiating positions of developing country coalitions were in general wrapped in the 
rhetoric and terminology used by these very countries in the other UN forums like the 
Group of 77 or outside the UN on the non-aligned countries platform
14
.  A classic example 
of this split interest positions was the discussions surrounding the source specific and 
discriminatory application of ESMs in the cross border merchandise and services trade. The 
developed amongst the developing countries were the real beneficiaries of the stance taken 
by the developing countries collectively on the issue of non-discrimination and any 
                                               
10General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Informal note of the Executive Secretary of GATT “Rationale for 
Dealing with Market Disruption through the Application of Article XIX”, 26 May 1964.  
11
 The most vocal developing countries that lead the regional or issue related coalitions included; India; 
Brazil; ASEANs and Egypt. 
12
 The formations of coalitions lead by major developing countries prominently figure out in the negotiations 
on Agriculture, Textiles, Services, Investments and IPRs. These coalitions were led by Brazil and India 
followed by countries like Egypt and ASEANs.   
13
 Discriminatory or source specific application of an ESM was in a way helpful to the less efficient and/or 
small exporters as it reduced the competition for them in the economy applying the emergency safeguards 
measure. With fast growing suppliers restrained these small producers had more opportunities to increase 
their exports. Similarly the subsidized exports of the agricultural produce were in interest of some food 
importing countries.  
14
 UNCTAD and GATT are physically located at ten minutes’ walk from each other and in most cases the 
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proposal implying source specific application of ESMs was regarded as move to divide the 
developing countries.  The UR in the course of MTNs created a paradigm shift in the 
negotiating processes under the GATT/WTO system and institutionalized the participation 
of coalitions in the negotiating process
15
 a reality which became glaringly more evident in 
the post UR negotiations held in the context of built-in Agenda emerging out of the UR 
Agreements (including Article X of the GATS) or the new Doha Round of MTNs.   
 This movement in the approach, increased numbers of developing countries and the altered 
negotiating dynamics was probably the beginning of the UNisation or the 
‘UNCTADisation16’ of the GATT system and also probably the end of an era of all-
encompassing meaningful negotiations under the auspices of the WTO.  The GATT, had 
till mid 80s successfully avoided the pitfalls that had led to the failures of other 
international organisations, particularly of those that were within the UN system like the 
UNCTAD or ECOSOC
17
, because GATT had a reasonably clear purpose, a dynamic and 
contemporary negotiating agenda with a small number of key players.  The GATT/WTO 
system, as is reflected in the negotiations on question of Emergency Safeguards Measures 
(ESMs) under the GATS, instead of keeping itself relevant to the evolving interdependent 
economic relations amongst the countries, started to follow the UN-style rigid negotiating 
practices.  This trend was glaringly noticeably visible in the discussions and submissions in 
the Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR). The WTO’s capacity to function as an 
effective multilateral forum for result oriented conduct of international trade rule making 
negotiations started to decline. 
6.1.2 NEGOTIATIONS: ESMs 
 
The existence of escape clause provisions in an international trade agreement has always 
been criticised for the fact that its existence erodes the legal certainty and predictability of 
economic reform commitments undertaken by the Members in terms of the Agreement.    
                                               
15
 In early years of GATT and also the MTNs the negotiations were not held as a ‘North South’ dialogue but 
based on issues and even concessions were exchanged on ‘request’ ‘offer’ basis.  In the UR the coalition 
formations changed the dynamics in to more or less a north-south dialogue. 
16
 Sally Razeen, The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round, 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, March 2003 
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The political economy argument used in the WPGR was based on the view that the 
existence of ESMs help induce market liberalization in the services sector by providing 
insurance against situations of market disruption and thus reassurances to political decision 
makers that the government retains the freedom to respond to emergence of any unforeseen 
injurious situations. The value of political economy role for existence of ESMs, as already 
discussed is controversial and the experience shows that contrary to the claim of ESMs 
facilitating liberalization; the domestic protectionist or vested interests tend to pressurize 
the governments for application of the ESMs as a means of extending ‘temporary’ 
protection from competition
18
.  The space for domestic producers or supplier of product to 
pressurize the public officials and thus create a protection for the industry is already built 
into the mechanics of application of the ESMs under the GATT model.  The experience 
with model provided by GATT shows that even the initiation of investigations for 
application of any possible ESMs on trade in goods have been found to have a trade 
dampening effect.   
The value of the role the escape clause plays is controversial and is difficult to prove or 
disprove. However, based on the understandings gained by the international trading 
community under the framework of the GATT, it can comfortably be stated that the role of 
escape clause provisions in a trade Agreement is surely not guaranteed.   In the political 
context effectively selling of the benefits of the market liberalisation domestically requires 
much more than having access to ESMs, the entire trade policy regime essentially requires 
having domestic transparency with respect to the economic costs of different policy 
instruments that are employed to provide protection to domestic producers.  
6.1.3 ESMs: SERVICES and the WPGR 
 
 The Working Party on GATS Rules (WPGR) was established to address the rule making 
issues left unresolved under the GATS in the UR of MTNs. In the context of developing 
emergency safeguards under GATS the Working Group had before it the negotiating 
mandate provided in the built-in agenda under Article X:1 of GATS which provided that; 
“there shall be multilateral negotiations on the question of emergency safeguard measures 
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based on the principle of non-discrimination” (emphasis added).  This mandate for 
negotiations was narrowly interpreted to mean as obliging the conduct of multilateral 
negotiations with regards to evaluating the very feasibility of specific standalone 
mechanism for application of ESMs under the GATS.   If found to be feasible, then the 
agreement was required on the need or desirability of these provisions.  The second part of 
the sentence in Article X: 1 circumscribes the ‘command’ or ‘mandate’ given in the first 
part, to the effect that any possible answer that may be developed in response to the 
mandated question raised in the first part of the clause has necessarily to be based on the 
‘principle of non-discrimination’.   
 
 Some of the developed countries felt that it is not fair and equitable to restrain exports of 
the countries that are not contributing or have minimal contribution to the creation of 
adverse market circumstances, however, the concept of discrimination or source specific 
application of any ESM was vehemently resented by the major developing countries that 
were industrializing fast and their share in the world exports was growing
 
 rapidly
19
. These 
advanced developing countries, being the real beneficiaries of the notion of ‘non-
discriminatory’ application of ESMs, therefore, were always very apprehensive and on 
constant guard to ensure that no provisions that permit any form of source specific 
application or any discrimination amongst developing countries and that dilute the concept 
of non-discriminatory application of an ESM existing under the GATT paradigm should 
creep in to any Agreement.  It was in the interest of these countries to make the application 
of any possible ESM developed under the GATS exacting and also to ensure that these are 
so structured that an importing country is not in a position to specifically target the 
exporting country which is creating the unforeseen adverse market conditions that warrant 
application of an ESM.  
 
 The major developing countries successfully negotiated the text of the built-in agenda for 
the continued negotiations on development of ESMs under the GATS contained in its 
Article X.  Though the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization laying down the objectives of the Agreement provides 
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for“…substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations” yet the advanced developing 
countries ensured that the principle of non-discrimination stays integral  to the question of 
any possible emergency safeguards provisions under the GATS and that no answer that is 
developed should transcend that boundary of non-discrimination. These countries, in other 
words doubly safeguarded their interests that all negotiations that are held in terms of 
Article X are circumscribed by the concept of non-discrimination implying that irrespective 
of the process, whatever the answer, that is developed to the ‘question of the ESM’ in the 
negotiations; the answer nevertheless has to be based on the principle of non-discrimination 
 
 The discussions held in the WPGR were extremely restricted and merely revolved around 
the conceptual clarifications and primarily positioned around only an illustrative list of 
themes that were derived primarily from the model provided by the GATT.  The 
discussions were also an exercise in identifying any relevance of the existing concept or 
constituting elements of the GATT paradigm to the development of possible ESMs under 
the GATS and their possible application to cross border trade in services.  The quality of 
submissions made to the WPGR by the member countries reflects lack of commitment as 
these submissions were not even well thought out and deliberated upon before being 
presented to Working Party (WP) by the respective sponsoring Members.  The lack of 
commitment is well reflected in the fact that most discussions in the WPGR were, 
essentially, held without prejudice to the respective Member’s official position on the 
issues and also to that country’s position on the possible future emergence on any rights 
and obligations in any services sector under the WTO
20
.  The situation particularly places 
countries that were demanding standalone ESMs under GATS in wrong light because of 
their lack of political commitment and the intellectual application to a cause which they so 
vehemently pleaded.  The quality of discussions, submission of semi or unrefined proposals 
and even the level
21
 of participating countries representations in the meetings of the WPGR 
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suggest that vocal amongst the negotiating countries primarily not interested in answering 
the question raised in Article X of the GATS.  It appears that the Member countries simply 
wanted to keep the discussions on the subject as a work under progress and keep the 
mandate alive as “during the negotiating process in the WPGR many developing countries 
had argued that development of ESM must stay on the WTO agenda partly because this 
requirement was established by the GATS”22.  A non-substantial argument of low 
weightage used was that ‘as General Agreement on Trade in Services has been created in 
the shadow of GATT and that because the ESMs exist for trade in goods the same generic 
rules should, therefore, also apply to services’. The Punta Del Este ministerial declaration 
with respect to services also provides that the GATT procedures and practices shall apply 
to these (services) negotiations. 
 
The claim of equivalence by the proponents of the ESMs between the two Agreements, 
GATT and GATS, may appear to be attractive but in reality this assertion is fairly artificial. 
The two Agreements cover two fundamentally distinct areas of cross border trade and deal 
with products that are neither mutually substitutable nor comparable and also have their 
own strong specificities.  In the GATT framework, there is a long list of border measures 
that an importing country can adopt to provide protection to its manufacturers along with 
the provisions to take additional contingency protection measures like Antidumping, 
countervailing and emergency safeguards to provide protection to the domestic industry.  
While, on the other hand, the domestic services industries have their own specificities and 
four modes of delivery and, which cannot be protected simply through measures at the 
border.   The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), though created in the 
shadow of GATT, has a slightly dissimilar structure
23
 and there also exist differences in the 
substantive provisions of the two Agreements.  The GATS, unlike GATT, does not make 
National Treatment (NT) and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) as general commitments, and 
instead adopts a positive list whereby commitments to liberalize market access and national 
treatment apply only to scheduled services and modes of supply, and these too only to the 
extent that limitations are not listed in the schedule of concessions that preserve the right of 
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the country to apply measures that are inconsistent with the Agreement. While GATT 
primarily refers to the border measures whereas issues like National Treatment and MFN 
are dealt with and taken care of automatically.  
 
The differences apart there also are, no doubt, similarities in the two Agreements (already 
discussed in earlier chapters), including the fact that the GATS like GATT, allows member 
countries to take measures that may have the ultimate effect as similar to imposition of 
emergency safeguards measures under GATT, like possibility to permanently modify its 
schedule of market access commitments (Article XXI), and to take measures necessary to 
protect the balance of payments (Article XII).    
 
 The framework for the emergency safeguards provisions as enshrined in GATT paradigm 
and already discussed has many flaws, the concept has inbuilt inconsistencies and the 
passage of time has further eroded validity of this paradigm. These gaps in conceptual 
coherence includes factors like loss of anchor of time horizon for the ‘unforeseen 
developments’ which can enable these developments to be considered to be because “… 
the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party
24”. The framework provided by 
Article XIX of GATT had been a subject of almost continuous negotiations and has been 
part of the General Agreement’s work in progress since its early years.  The protracted 
negotiations did bring about an Agreement on Safeguards (AoS), which was an 
improvement and which elaborated and provided mechanics for the application of the 
provisions of Article XIX of the GATT (discussed in Chapter 2 and 3).     
 
It was important and meaningful that any independent mechanism for application ESM if it 
is developed under GATS does not further add to the complexity and vagueness of the 
provisions of Agreement, otherwise such a provision would simply compound the problem 
and not help to resolve these.  Any emergency safeguards instrument if developed will only 
be meaningful if it is administratively sound and also procedurally enforceable, creation of 
an ESM that does not simultaneously create right balance will be counterproductive and 
add further confusion to a complicated situation.  For any good faith MTNs to be 
meaningful members countries first individually need to comprehend the subject and 
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collectively also develop a shared understanding of the issues involved.  Where 
understandings are low, honest ‘knowledge intermediaries’ can help and ‘broker’ common 
understandings. The question raised in Article X and negotiations on the feasibility and 
desirability of the standalone ESMs under GATS  was a typical example of negotiations on 
norms without consensus on the issues contained in the agenda as Terrence  had rightly 
concluded that it is only “a reasoned consensus on the issues rather than a compromise on 
the agenda enhance the capacity of negotiators to reach an Agreement which contains 
agreement on the norms, rules, and procedures of the treaty under consideration, as well as 
the monitoring and enforcement procedures”25 . 
 
The discussions and submissions in the WPGR on the ESMs under the GATS also 
conspicuously bring out the fact that the negotiators ignored the necessary prerequisites of 
understanding of the issues and capacity of the negotiators, for meaningful conduct of any 
negotiations. The negotiators tried simply to “leap-frog” the negotiating process into 
developing rules and disciplines for application of emergency safeguards under the GATS. 
This was done without either taking the universe of cross border trade in services fully in to 
account or understanding the issues involved. This approach was not only simplistic but 
also reflective of the lack of seriousness on the part the negotiators. The negotiators by 
taking a leap in the dark in the WPGR added further confusion to the complications that 
already surrounded the concept of ESMs under GATT and their transposition to under 
GATS.  
 The WTO Members despite lack of progress on rulemaking under GATS and trying to 
leap frog the negotiations, simultaneously rushed into parallel negotiations under the frame 
work of Doha Round. The members tried to secure further market liberalizing 
commitments in the services sector without taking any significant step towards clarifying 
the scope and implications of existing GATS provisions. This approach was adopted 
despite the fact that, “unlike some of the other areas of trade regulation, GATS does not 
really fit into the Doha trade round. Instead, it is better to regard negotiations with respect 
to trade in services as a work-in progress because the GATS contains a built-in agenda that 
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addresses much unfinished business left over from the Uruguay Round. Moreover, the 
services programme was moving along a completely different track and time frame to some 
of the other WTO subject matter that formed part of the Doha Round”26.  The scenario 
driven by irrational exuberance and ambitions created complications and a danger of an 
inequitable outcome: the less experienced and informed being induced to offering some 
broad sectoral bindings while the more experienced countries holding back making any 
substantive commitments in the sectoral negotiations, for instance; “Gambia and Guyana 
were among those who committed to allow unrestricted cross-border trade in financial 
services and the required mobility of capital, but the United States and the European 
Union”27 along with most of other advanced developing countries did not. Similarly the 
major developing countries were not prepared to offer for binding their current market 
access practises in-force; even in the services sectors where they had already undertaken 
liberalization reforms and which had then also been time tested for more than two decades 
as to their possible or apprehended adverse implications.  
The negotiations held in the WPGR in terms of the mandate provided in Article X of the 
GATS were handicapped and suffered from all the conceivable and classical structural 
weaknesses which any MTNs theoretically can encounter or suffer from. The discussants in 
the Working Group tried only to conceptually clarify the issues involved without 
addressing the basic critical matter confronting the WTO with respect to the ‘question’ 
mentioned in Article X:1 of the GATS. The negotiators in the WPGR unfortunately tried to 
use a basically defective concept as a model to follow strictly that was itself marred by 
incoherence and to transpose it to create ESMs under the GATS. The negotiations on the 
development of emergency safeguards under GATS apart from the questionable political 
commitments and issues with underlying concept of mode 3 of delivery also brought the 
contradictions of the model under consideration. The discussions in the WPGR on question 
of ESMs were unfortunately held in total isolation of other topics
28
 under consideration of 
the Working Party (WP) and were dominated by dealing only with the question raised 
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regarding the Emergency Safeguards Measures for the services sector.  This detachment of 
discussions from other trade remedial concepts that were also being discussed parallel 
under the same WP is fairly surprising. The scope of any other parallel and relevant 
disciplines, like subsidies, if developed in the area of services, especially considering 
specificities of four modes of delivery, were also to influence Members’ need for, and the 
ability to apply, any emergency safeguard provisions.  
  Despite protracted discussions in the WTO since 1995 members were still unable to agree 
on the simple fact whether there was a need to extend generic ESMs to cross border trade 
in services under GATS
29
. Studies conducted by some institutions external to the WTO 
Secretariat suggested different possible approaches to developing of ESMs under GATS.  
An UNCTAD study on safeguards in services explored in some detail the option of mode 
specific ESMs and concluded that “safeguards mechanism in services may be quite 
unfeasible
30”. 
6.2 FINDING SOLUTIONS: COMPETITION POLICY or SUBSIDIES 
 
 Having failed to find a way forward strictly within the paradigm provided by the GATT 
model for the construct of ESMs under the GATS, it will be meaningful to try to find the 
answer to the question raised in in Article X: 1 in terms of some other domestic trade 
policy instruments that can possibly have nexus with the conduct of cross border services 
trade.    This identification of some alternate domestic economic policy option required 
analysing policies that in their practical application may provide the ultimate effect that can 
have the consequences of achieving the same results that are expected in case of imposition 
of an ESM as understood under the GATT paradigm.  This analytical exercise was 
expected to be of interest to explore and figure out whether an out of box solution can 
somehow be found to the question of the ESM under GATS from within the concepts for 
‘contingency protection’ that are already available under the GATT/WTO system.  
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 There are almost infinite concoctions of domestic policy instruments that are employed by 
the public officials of a country, for a variety of and at times strange reasons, but these 
instruments are primarily geared to provide protection to their domestic manufacturing and 
service industries. This ingenuity of public officials has a wide range; starting from the 
basics like fixed and variable border controls to domestic price triggers, seasonal 
adjustment, standards, labelling, language of inscriptions on the packaging  and the list 
goes on.  Remaining within the existing universe of available, commonly practiced and 
acceptable domestic economic and trade policy options, two instruments; namely ‘subsidy’ 
programmes and the ‘competition policy’, merit exploration in some detail especially 
because of their direct relationship with investments (mode 3 of service delivery; a 
contentious issue under GATS).  The competition policy has already been recognized in the 
UR Agreements to have some possible complementarity with the investment policy and 
trade related aspects of the investment measures
31
.  The model provided by the GATT has 
many parallel provisions in the three Agreements dealing with the three contingency 
protection mechanisms; anti-dumping, countervailing, and emergency safeguards. This 
investigation was expected to help determine whether anyone of these or some combination 
of both can possibly provide a substitute for standalone ESMs under the GATS. 
6.2.1 SUBSIDIES: ESMs 
 
There are ‘primarily two types of subsidy schemes, irrespective whether these are producer 
or consumer focused, these essentially serve the same purpose, that is, the schemes 
strengthen the position of a domestic industry vis-à-vis competitors that are established 
abroad
32’.  Subsidies are also fairly transparent and less trade distortive when compared 
with some other trade restrictive non-tariff barriers including quantitative restrictions. The 
compatibility of subsidies with MFN treatment can also be more easily ensured than the 
quantitative restrictions.
 
Recourse to subsidies in an emergency situation has always been 
regarded to be slightly advantages
 
over other possible alternatives for protection of the 
domestic industry.  The subsidies are costly from a government's and tax payer’s 
perspective, unlike tariff surcharges; therefore, it is comparatively easier for the public 
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 Adlung Rudolf, Negotiations on Safeguards and Subsidies in Services: a Never-ending Story? Journal of 
International Economic Law 2007 10(2):p 245 
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officials to dispense with them through the political process using transparency to 
propagate their costs.
 
 
 
The Services Agreement, currently, unlike Agreement governing trade in goods, does not 
establish any special disciplines with respect to subsidies.  The Services Agreement in its 
Article XV merely provides for a negotiating mandate to develop necessary disciplines to 
avoid ‘trade-distortive’ effects of subsidies. Article XV of GATS, like its Article X, is part 
of the unfinished agenda and provides for the development of countervailing mechanism 
under GATS. Though the Services Agreement does not define the term “subsidy”; 
however, GATS Article XV recognizes that “in certain circumstances, subsidies may have 
distorting effect on trade in services” and provides that: “Members shall enter into 
negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such 
trade-distortive effects”33. The Article XV does not condemn subsidies out rightly and 
guiding the negotiators provides that “…negotiations shall recognize the role of subsidies 
in relation to the development programmes of developing countries and take into account 
the needs of Members, particularly developing country Members, for flexibility in this 
area”.  The negotiations envisioned were also to ‘address’ the appropriateness of 
countervailing procedures (emphasis added). 
 
 The negotiations conducted on developing disciplines on subsidies in terms of the mandate 
provided by the Article XV of the GATS met the fate similar to that of its Article X 
mandated negotiations. The negotiations with respect to subsidies ignored the peculiarities 
and different modes of cross border supply of services, and the negotiators resorted to the 
GATT definition of subsidy
34
.  The proposals made on development of regime on subsidies 
                                               
33
 GATS Article XV: 1 reads as: “Members recognize that, in certain circumstances, subsidies may have 
distortive effects on trade in services.  Members shall enter into negotiations with a view to developing the 
necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive effects.  The negotiations shall also address 
the appropriateness of countervailing procedures.  Such negotiations shall recognize the role of subsidies in 
relation to the development programmes of developing countries and take into account the needs of Members, 
particularly developing country Members, for flexibility in this area.  For the purpose of such negotiations, 
Members shall exchange information concerning all subsidies related to trade in services that they provide to 
their domestic service suppliers”. 
34
 Korotana Shabir, International Financial Crises, Subsidies and GATS Article XV, Int. T.L.R. 2009, 15(6), 
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under Article XV of the GATS
35
, were structured around the paradigm provided by the 
GATT.  The negotiations in the WPGR under Article XV of the GATS also stalled and if had 
these been continued with some commitment, the outcome might have supported or , at least, 
clarified some of the subsidy-related questions that also affected and created problems for 
any possible movement in negotiations on question of ESMs in services
36
.  
 
 The provision of subsidies to domestic producers of goods and services, like application of 
ESMs, are trade distorting in their end effect as these provide protection and respite to the 
domestic industry from the injury caused by surge in imports, one through creation of 
engineered competitiveness and the other through border controls but in practical terms the 
ultimate effects are almost similar.  In absence of any disciplines in GATS on subsidies and 
countervailing measure some Members, who have the capacity to do so, can easily resort to 
subsidization to counter the loss of competitiveness of their industry, a practice which will 
almost amount to a safeguard measure.  The underlying rationale or factors leading to the 
provision of support through subsidies are, however, different from the reasons for the 
application of ESMs but the effect of the policy actions for the domestic market is 
practically the same.  This proposition, however, had a bias against cash strapped 
developing
 
countries who may find it difficult to mobilize enough fiscal surpluses and 
allocate the funds required to effectively protect
 
a domestic industry from foreign 
competition.   
To explore the possibility of using subsidies as a substitute for standalone ESMs under the 
Services Agreement; functions which a standalone emergency safeguards mechanism could 
perform in services trade need to be compared to possibilities available with the Members 
for using subsidies as a policy tool for achieving similar purposes. The role of subsidies in 
the goods trade, which has a simple single cross border dimension, is now fairly researched 
and well understood. However, in the context of trade in services which has its own 
specificities; it is the modal structure that appears to be an appropriate beginning point to 
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 World Trade Organization Proposal for a Provisional Definition of Subsidies in Services, Communication  
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assess whether subsidies can be used as substitute for the sought after standalone ESMs 
under GATS.   
 
In order to protect a domestic service industry from undue adjustment pressures created 
because of trade liberalization, governments may have few options in some specific sub-
sectors other than to grant some form of subsidy-type support. As under GATS there exist 
no disciplines with respect to subsidies Members countries are entitled within the
 
current 
legal framework to employ import-displacing (producer) subsidies
 
even in the service 
sectors that are subject to full market access commitments.  Under modes 1 and 2 of 
delivery the foreigners compete from an external or foreign jurisdiction therefore it is 
difficult
 
to see a role for subsidies as safeguards under modes 1 and 2 (cross-border
 
trade 
and consumption abroad
37
).  Considering the dynamics of trade under modes 1 and 2 of the 
service delivery, the services are under these two modes are supplied from and regulated in 
a foreign jurisdiction that is beyond the governing jurisdiction of public official of any 
country that is contemplating imposition of ESM. There is, therefore, no scope for 
subsidies to be used to provide reprieve to the domestic service industry under these two 
modes.  
 
Government subsidies, especially those subsidies that discriminate between the firms with 
respect to their country of origin, can be an important trade policy instrument that can 
possibly be used to make the domestic industry competitive and generate end results that 
may almost be similar to the imposition of the ESMs, especially considering the fact that 
the GATS in its present shape contains no substantial constraints on the use of subsidies 
other than in context of its MFN and national treatment obligations. In the absence of 
special rules, subsidies in services are subject to all obligations under the GATS—most 
importantly, national treatment. National treatment under mode 3 of supply implies that 
foreign established suppliers are entitled to the same benefits, including financial incentives 
(subsidies), as their domestically owned counterparts. In other words, in sectors where 
specific commitments are undertaken and unless national treatment limitations with respect 
to subsidies are inscribed, government aid offered to domestic service suppliers will 
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necessarily require to be extended on a non-discriminatory basis to the foreign service 
suppliers. If provision of subsidies to domestic service industry (a difficult definition on its 
own accord)  is inscribed in the schedule of commitments by a country than it becomes 
more a case of using scheduling flexibilities than subsidies.  
 In terms of the Services Agreement the national treatment must be granted only in the 
scheduled service sectors and that too only to the extent that no relevant limitations have 
been inscribed in the country’s schedule of commitments.  The discussions on the issue 
suggest that there can be an inverse relationship
 
between the (non-)existence of subsidy 
disciplines and the scope
 
for a GATT-type safeguard mechanism under the GATS. The 
more
 
leeway Members retain for trade-defensive subsidization in emergency
 
situations, 
whether apparent or real, the lesser the need for
 
a mechanism that would allow for the 
temporary suspension of
 
existing commitments.    In the WPGR many members expressed 
their intention to create a mechanism
 
that would allow them to protect nationally-owned 
incumbents
 
from injury that might be caused by foreign-owned competitors both with 
respect to application of an emergency safeguards measure or provision of subsidies
38
.  The 
schedules of commitments initially submitted by more than ten Member countries 
contained subsidy related limitations or complete
 
exemptions from national treatment under 
mode 3 which in practical terms provide scope and
 
cover for discriminatory support 
programmes that the member countries choose to maintain in favour of domestically
 
owned 
companies.  
 
 However, in the case of domestic producers under mode 3 (commercial presence) the 
situation is fairly
 
complex. Like the GATS, most Preferential or other Economic Integration 
Agreements (RTAs) covering trade in services have also not established any dedicated 
disciplines for subsidies. Submission from the European Communities to the Council for 
Trade in Services, in 2006, was clear and made no distinction, the EC considered that “[i]n 
accordance with Article XVII of the GATS, and with the scheduling guidelines, . . .  the 
fact that subsidies provided to services suppliers of a Member are not extended to services 
suppliers located outside the territory of that Member does not require to list a National 
Treatment limitation under Modes 1 and 2”. Consistent with this interpretation, the EC 
                                               
38
 Adlung Rudolf, Negotiations on Safeguards and Subsidies in Services: a Never-ending Story? Journal of 
International Economic Law 2007 10(2):p 264 
CHAPTER 6 
 217 
further noted that other national treatment limitations under mode 2, initially inscribed by 
some of its new Member States in their respective GATS schedules, served an ‘explanatory 
purpose’ only and, thus, could be omitted from the consolidated EC schedule. Cases in 
point were entries by Poland, Latvia and Slovenia that exempted hospital treatment abroad 
from cost coverage under public health insurance programmes”39.   
6.2.2 COMPETITION POLICY: ESMs 
 
 The basic goal of a competition policy
40
  of any country is to promote and maintain 
healthy inter-firm competition in the markets where ever it is viable.  This policy 
intervention is primarily required “in the face of increased competition and in the pursuit of 
larger profits, existing market players can be tempted to distort or eliminate competition in 
order to acquire and abuse market power. The competition policy provisions are also 
typically aimed at assuring companies that their market access and/or investments will not 
be threatened by anti-competitive practices of private or state-owned local firms in the host 
country. Consequently, policy interventions are necessary in order to maintain and 
encourage healthy competition. In recognition of this need, Governments in many countries 
implement a competition policy to maintain and encourage healthy competition, which 
includes laws and policies dealing with anticompetitive practices”41. 
 
Though normally the competition policy has a fairly overarching reach but this paper 
briefly looks only at the policy’s narrow implications with respect to GATS and there too 
only with respect to the possibilities of using the competition policy as a substitute for the 
ESM type temporary relief to domestic industry in case of surge of imports in cross border 
trade in the services sectors that have been included by the country in its schedule of 
market access commitments.  Prohibition of anti-competitive practices, prevention of abuse 
of dominant position and regulation of combinations (statutes governing mergers and 
acquisitions) are the tools normally available to the governments under the competition 
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policy to ensure that foreign service providers entering through any of the three modes of 
service delivery do not engage in unfair competition.   
 
It is of interest to examine that instead of creating specific and standalone emergency 
safeguards provision under the GATS on the paradigm provided by the GATT, some 
provisions that can substitute for standalone ESMs can be introduced by a Member country 
to provide temporary protection to its producers in the specific service sectors through the 
competition legislation.  The examination, in short, needs to determine that whether, for 
instance under Mode 3 of supply of service the competition policy can be used to achieve 
the same results as are expected, under the GATT paradigm, from the  inclusion of 
standalone emergency safeguards provisions. 
 
  However, the regulatory clauses, creating disciplines and controlling anti-competitive 
behaviour, in the competition legislations of countries are usually neutral to the nationality 
of the firm.  Under GATS the National Treatment with respect to mode 3 implies that 
foreign established suppliers are entitled to the same benefits, including financial 
incentives, as their domestically owned counterparts. The situation is somewhat different 
under modes 1 and 2, where the foreigners compete from a foreign jurisdiction. The 
competition policy of the countries do not differentiate on the basis of origin and these 
invariably subject the Foreign Service suppliers to the domestic jurisdiction of the 
competition office independent of the service sector or its mode of delivery, if the policy is 
made to differentiate then the complications of classifying the suppliers with respect to 
origin and also of the circumvention of the measure will arise. From an economic 
perspective, it would be unreasonable to expect the authorities of an importing country to 
assess the competitive conditions in committed sectors across all other Members that may 
have trade interests--and then try to create balance and level the ‘playing field’ vis-à-vis 
each of these Members.  
 
 Competition policy is difficult to be subjected to rules of origin. There are multiple 
problems in conceiving competition policy as a substitute to the ESMs because it is anyway 
difficult to establish the nationality of modern corporations, as already discussed in earlier 
Chapters; another problem originates from very essence of the character of regulations of 
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the competition policy. The competition policy specifically targets at forbidding certain 
specified market behaviours (e.g. price fixing) primarily originating in dominant position of 
the supplier in the market and this delimiting is without regard to the nationality of the 
defendant or the plaintiff
42
. The countries seeking independent ESMs under GATS can 
structure their competition policy in the manner desired and include their competition 
policies and other consumer protection policies as horizontal limitations in their market 
access schedule of commitments under GATS.    The safeguards type provisions have 
already been imported into some of the sectoral agreements in the form of provisions on 
anti-competitive practices or as so-called clauses on ‘competitive safeguards43’ that exist in 
different service sectors. These clauses will fall more under the context of scheduling 
flexibilities and not as ESMs in the context of GATT.     
6.3 SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS: LAMY 
  
The study on the political challenges of ‘collective preferences44’ presented in September 
2004; by Pascal Lamy has strong relevance to the subject of the thesis, contemporary socio-
economic world and also for the interstate commerce
45
. The study needs not only to be 
recognised but also merits consideration when contemplating development of any future 
regime for emergency safeguard measures under the GATT/WTO system. Lamy
46
 
explaining his proposal stated that; “traded goods and services are both an embodiment of 
and also a vehicle for the collective preferences of the countries producing them; these then 
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become an interface with the collective preferences of the consumer country
47”.   However, 
the concept of accommodating ‘collective preferences’ as safeguards under the 
GATT/WTO system has problems for the international economic relations and the WTO 
system especially if the resulting measure that may be required to be taken because of the 
‘collective preference’ violates the WTO rules and yet the measure is too popular in the 
regulating country for the government to withdraw it. Lamy, to address such circumstances, 
proposed the negotiations of a new WTO safeguard that would permit governments to 
retain strongly-supported measures provided that compensation is paid.  
 
The paradigmatic example is EC - Hormones in which the European Commission could not 
comply with the ruling of the Panel because of contrary popular opinion, The “EU-US beef 
hormone dispute “the ban  on US beef was considered an unnecessary policy to defend EU 
collective preferences according to the first ruling. Since the EU assessment of the policy 
rationale based on the sanitary risk was considered unconvincing, it means that the alleged 
EU preference for hormone-free beef was not considered a good reason for trade 
restriction. The trade retaliation imposed by the US can be interpreted as the ‘price to pay’ 
(for the loss of market share in the US) by the EU to maintain its policy for alleged 
European preferences. This indicates that countries can still defend their collective 
preferences in the absence of proven risk, but must suffer retaliation
48
. 
 
 The WTO disputes on hormones, shrimp, and asbestos were primarily also felt as disputes 
about ‘collective preferences’, and that there will be more of such disputes in future. The 
World Trade Organization and other global standard setting and governance institutions 
will have to create space for the accommodation of these concerns or else these institutions 
will be rejected by the public opinion that sees international trade and WTO rules as a 
threat to nationally-chosen collective preferences. The ‘sudden emergence’ of the reality of 
collective preferences demonstrates the need for governments to respond.  The Panel in the 
US-Gambling, transplanted the GATT balancing test into the rules on trade in services. In 
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the first ‘General Exceptions’ case adjudicated under GATS49, the panel held that for a 
measure to be ‘necessary’ under the moral exception in GATS Article XIV (a), the United 
States was required to negotiate with Antigua to see if a way could be found to avoid the 
harm associated with the remote gambling services that Antigua's private sector was 
offering to US residents. The fact that the United States had not entered into gambling 
negotiations was a decisive reason why it lost the case at the panel level. The panel went so 
far as to say that a US negotiation ‘with Antigua was required even if the United States 
considered the gambling ban indispensable’50 . 
 Pascal Lamy’s addition of ‘collective preference’ to the existing safeguards regime will 
broaden the concept of emergency safeguards through introduction as new qualifying factor 
that can trigger a special safeguards action.    Lamy was not the first one to have such a 
strand of thought, prior to him; “other analysts had also suggested the need to expand the 
availability of a safeguard for national policies. In 1996, Dani Rodrik had proposed a 
‘social safeguards’ clause for labour standards; a few years later in 2001, the team of 
Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr, and Jill E. Hobbs suggested the negotiation of a WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Consumer Concerns that would distinguish 
consumer-based trade restrictions from producer-based restrictions
51”. 
  Lamy expects WTO to show greater respect for broad or intense public opinion than for 
policies chosen through political representation, or technocratic expertise as in 
contemporary societies the biggest protectionist force is not so much the injury to 
producers, but more importantly injury or upsetting consumers or citizens primarily with 
respect to the values or collective preferences that they hold.  T existing contingency 
protection provisions under the GATT/WTO need to be changed or expanded, not with the 
objective to allow imposition of arbitrary restrictions to protect some subjective values, but 
rather to provide politicians with a window of specialized escape valve to accommodate 
‘collective preferences’ of the society imposing the restrictions, under clearly defined 
conditions.  
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The currencies of most countries now have free floating exchange rates, the import tariffs 
are at historically low levels in case of merchandize trade and simultaneously there exist 
very low entry barriers in case of services including under its mode 3 (investments) of 
delivery. The slicing or the unbundling of the production has added a new dimension to 
application of any traditional contingency protection instruments provided under WTO 
system. The change and shift in consumption patterns towards items that have a social 
preference have changed the dynamics of trade. The collective preference is now reflected 
in many diverse dimensions, like in social standards (like child labour, proper working 
conditions, safety, medical for workers, gender equality), social responsibility standards, 
ethical, governance and environmental standards and the list goes on and on. The service 
industry has also to ensure that they measure up to the collective preferences and observe 
standards or face rejection of collective or social preference.    The barriers to trade in the 
contemporary world have moved to inside the importing country and away from the 
traditional borders. The barriers, for reasons listed above, are created by collective of social 
preferences that are detached from the traditional trade remedy measures and so strong that 
it is not possible for the public officials to ignore them. It is difficult to follow the paradigm 
that was created seventy years back in the context of totally different realities both with 
respect to international economic relations and also the role of state, especially in the 
developed and democratic world. 
 
The phenomenon addressed by any name be it social preferences or public policy 
consideration or ‘collective preferences’ of the society, in the ultimate effect  of immense 
importance to the public officials especially in the democratic societies. It is presently the 
consumer and citizen concerns (values) that resist free trade. This changing behaviour calls 
for creation of treaty provisions for application of special safeguards to accommodate these 
preferences and the WTO’s contingency protection regime needs to be adjusted 
accordingly. The WTO system already recognizes and accommodates the concept of 
‘public policy’ or ‘collective preference’ concerns but in a very limited and restricted 
dimension under GATT Article XX and Article XIV of GATS but with regards to specified 
‘General Exceptions’ only.    Since its inception, the GATT/WTO’s contingency protection 
provisions focus on providing a safety valve and the possibility to re-introduce trade 
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restrictions in case domestic producers are hurt by imports. This  safety valve needs to be 
modified  and expanded to be able to take into account the concept of collective 
preferences and  policy space should be created for consumer triggered ESMs be it the 
supply of services or trade in goods. The WTO will have to change its way of doing things, 
create space for ‘collective preferences’ in its scheme of contingency protection 
instruments or risk and accept irrelevance. 
6.4 LIMITATIONS OF WTO: Added complications; BITs and RTAs 
 
When the GATT was created in late 1940s, the cold war was just beginning, Western 
Europe was struggling with ravages of war, Japan was essentially out of the international 
economy order; most of Africa and major parts of Asia and Oceania was part of colonial 
rule. The US was the unchallenged leader of the world economy with an apparently 
permanent trade surplus. The US dollar stood as firm anchor of international system, tied to 
gold and most other currencies were linked to the dollar, had strict capital controls in place 
and were pegged with fixed exchange rates.  
 
The world has moved away from that scenario which prevailed up to 1960s. The Bretton 
Woods has now ceased to exist and nothing has replaced it, the par value system is gone 
and so is the US dominance of the world economy.  The EU has grown to twenty seven 
member countries and Japan has become a major trading nation. China is now world’s 
“second largest trading nation and some developing countries have rapidly moved forward 
economically, however, the developing countries on the whole have not turned out all to 
belong to a single class, with some active participants in the global trading system, others 
are largely outside that system
52”.   
 
Today most important currencies are floating and capital crosses most borders freely, 
which has potentially a huge impact on the actual value of tariff concessions
53
.   Changes 
that have occurred in the international economic scenario include existing historically low 
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tariffs, increased financial integration amongst countries, more diversification in world 
trade shares and proliferation of Preferential Trading Agreements and deeper Regional 
Economic Integration Arrangements. Another important factor though often overlooked but 
of no less significance, is the unbundling or slicing of production and service supplies.  The 
fast evolving trading and manufacturing structures have induced a drastic change in the 
issues of concern to the contemporary interstate economic relations.  
 
The major economies like the United States, the EU and other industrialized countries now 
permit their currencies to float.  Simultaneously China and some other Asian governments, 
whose size of economy in certain cases exceeds the size of many developed countries 
economies, manage their exchange rates and try to maintain undervalued currencies. This 
phenomenon of undervalued currencies in practical terms has the effect that is similar to 
that of the border controls and provision of protection to domestic producers. The 
traditional concept that provided the rationale for application of ESMs does not hold same 
validity; raising barriers at borders is at times rendered ineffective by some other economic 
policy tool. Now currency manipulation, competition policy, IPRs and the regulation of 
foreign investment are the new areas of conflict in the trade policies but the GATT/WTO 
system is silent on these issues and does not have the agreed mandate even to address these 
concerns.  
6.4.1. PROBLEMS WITH WTO 
The ethos or the doctrine of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is derived from that of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This ethos had its roots in the world 
dominated by the US along with a few other developed countries, while most developing 
countries being marginal players in the system.  The traditional culture continued to 
prevail; which was fairly detached from the contemporary ground realities of interstate 
economic relationships among its members; it is this carryover culture of the WTO from 
past that primarily inhibits its progress. The possibilities of using the WTO as a platform 
for rulemaking for the world trading system do still remain but the Members to all intents 
and purposes appear not to be inclined to use this forum for doing so.   Most of the 
Members are captives of their familiarity bias and still think in terms of the old GATT 
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practices with which they are now familiar. The WTO system is captive of the successes of 
its predecessor organization GATT, which it achieved during the period when its agenda of 
work was relevant to the then prevailing needs of the world economy. The “problem is that 
the WTO is not the old GATT.  The GATT/WTO membership has increased over the 
years, from 23 in 1948 to 153 in 2009, so too did the diversity and complexity of issues that 
must be dealt with in trade relations. Greater variance among WTO members in terms of 
interests and priorities made negotiations harder to manage and slower to 
complete…provoking a search for new ways of doing business in relation both to 
procedures and the disposition of substantive rights and obligations among Members.  
Bilateral and plurilateral regional arrangements may also be seen in part as an attempt to 
address these difficulties54. 
The GATT’s ‘operating system’ since its inception has essentially been mercantilist55 and 
the soul of the system is still embedded in post war economic nationalism.  The  grant of 
market access has traditionally been considered as some sort of an altruistic generous 
gesture and continues to be called a ‘concession’ which can only be granted in return of 
‘concession’ received.   In the context of the WTO it is only appropriate for the public 
officials  to offer or withdraw concession if they get or give ‘something in exchange’, this 
approach not only hinders, but “it puts unilateral liberalization in a bad light, as if it is an 
act of weakness or self-surrender without getting anything in return
56”. This archaic 
negotiating process influenced the services sector liberalization negotiations more than 
those for the trade in goods where the negotiating processes have moved up from request-
offer approach to a formulae approach. This up-gradation to formulae approach primarily 
reflects of consensus on the feasibility of desirability of the tariff reduction exercise for 
trade in goods. However, “negotiating barrier to trade in services is difficult. These barriers 
are not simple and obvious like tariffs on goods; they are difficult to identify, to clarify, and 
to negotiate on the traditional basis of reciprocity. In many instances, the barriers to trade 
are domestic regulations, which may be designed to protect local monopolies, to protect 
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consumers, or to achieve some objective of monetary or fiscal policy, but will have the 
effect of excluding supply of services by outsiders
57”    
  
The entire GATT/WTO system is still grounded in a deep mistrust of domestic politics and 
transparency of the protection instruments. The assumptions being that if political officials 
are left alone to themselves, protectionism will be the order of the day and rampant and that 
the protectionism is at times camouflaged in layers of domestic trade policy instruments. It 
was this underlying mistrust of policy makers and need for transparency of trade policies 
that the  Trade Policy Review Mechanism was agreed primarily  “ to contribute to 
improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, 
and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving 
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of 
Members”58.  A new transparency clause, Article III, that is unique to services agreement 
from amongst the WTO Agreements, was provided in the GATS. This Article III obliges 
that each Member shall publish all relevant measures of general application pertaining to 
Trade in Services, and shall give notice of proposed changes to the Council on Trade in 
Services.      
 
Another important change that has occurred in the international trade since the inception of 
GATT system is the content and mechanics used for conduct of international trade or 
simply put, with what is being traded and how. The bulk of trade flows presently are not 
between industries with one country specializing in some sectors and the other country 
focusing on others.  Instead, most of today’s trade is intra-industry and intra-firm 
(components between subsidiaries), and most importantly, “rather than trade in raw 
materials or finished products, what we have witnessed in recent years is an unbundling or 
slicing up of the production chain”59. A recent OECD study in this regards “emphasises 
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that tradability is not only determined by the technical feasibility of unbundling and 
digitisation, but also of transaction costs and the economies of scope of keeping tasks 
together”60.  The slicing up of the production chain has immense impact on structuring of 
domestic economic policy regulations of the countries as it happens in consort with the 
increased flows of foreign direct investment (mode 3 of supply of service). The ensuing 
enhanced trade flows that have followed the unbundling of productions have created the 
new pressures to liberalize trade and to attract investments. In other words, unbundling in 
itself, and quite separate from the WTO process, has led to enhanced levels of trade 
liberalization and also induced countries to create disciplines relating to competition. This 
unbundling of supplies and slicing of the production chains have created enormous issues 
with almost all the constituting elements which provide the basis for the application of 
Emergency Safeguards Measures in the area of goods under the GATT paradigm. The The 
slicing of production has made the origination or manufacture of the product really blurry, 
and thus rendered the increased trade flows as not actionable under any ESMs that are 
modeled on the GATT.  The phenomenon is more pronounced in the supply of services 
making application ESMs under GATS, which are developed on the GATT model, 
impossibility.   
 
 The WTO over the last two decades, this period in certain ways overlaps with the closing 
years of the UR of MTNs. During the period the institution was mostly occupied in 
discussing agenda that was in process of becoming irrelevant to emerging structures for the 
conduct of international economic relations and its governing structures. This 
preoccupation of the WTO in the non-productive and irrelevant  activities created a gap in 
the governance that is fast being filled by the uncoordinated developments elsewhere – 
primarily in deeper than ever before Regional Trade and Economic Integration Agreements 
and Bilateral Investment Treaties along with autonomous structural reforms in some 
emerging economies.  The resulting package of deeper disciplines can also be called the 
“21st century regionalism61”.  
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 The lack of progress in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the stalling of the decision- 
making and global trade rule-making machinery at the WTO are attributed to different 
reasons by different researchers.  There is a thought that is also subscribed by some 
scholars that probably “the proliferation of regional trade agreements, partly in response to 
the impasse in the multilateral negotiations, is also diverting precious government resources 
and attention from the WTO toward regional negotiations”62.  The exercise of choice by the 
individual countries to subscribe to some specific market liberalization rule making process 
from amongst the different available parallel ongoing negotiating processes suggests of a 
shifting of preference of the individual countries towards the Regionalism and/or 
Bilateralism.  This phenomenon takes a practical manifestation in the exponential 
development of RTAs, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and recently towards more 
comprehensive economic co-operation and integration Agreements covering almost all 
aspects of interstate economic relationships. These include not only trade in goods and 
services but also agreed disciplines for investment flows and protection to IPRs.   
6.5 PTAS/BITS: IMPACT THEREOF 
 
There were different models or the options that were analysed in the WPGR for drawing 
some possible inferences for dealing with the question of the ESMs under the GATS. These 
models were primarily drawn from within the existing framework or paradigms provided 
by the GATT and some different WTO Agreements.  None of the models that were 
discussed provided any coherent answers to the question raised in the negotiating mandate 
provided in Article X of the GATS.  The cursory look at the negotiating stance in the 
WPGR taken by some important player and also in some of the parallel negotiations in that 
were being simultaneously in different forums outside the WTO framework
63
 suggests of 
linkages of mode 3 of delivery of services with the negotiations on the development of 
multilateral disciplines for international investments.  The shifting focus of major economic 
players away from the WTO and towards deep commitments under the evolving deeper 
Economic Integration Regional Agreements and rapid emergence of BITs are some of the 
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flanking factors that necessarily need to be explored in some detail to understand the 
behaviour of the negotiators in the WPGR and evaluate the conduct of negotiations in the 
WPGR on ESMs under the GATS. 
 
 The experience generated over the last decade shows that the multilateral trade 
negotiations conducted under the auspices of the WTO in this day and age  of rapidly 
evolving economic relations amongst the countries have only a very limited scope. This 
reduction of the role of the WTO/GATT system has led to emergence of new structures that 
have provided alternate mechanisms to the countries and enabled them to circumvent the 
unpredictable, tedious and stretched negotiating processes under the WTO system.  The 
development of alternate or parallel forums was the logical consequence of the role that 
WTO chose by restricting itself to under the GATT paradigm and suffocating its relevance 
to the emerging needs of economic relations. Gradually over time these regional and 
similar other arrangements have established their supremacy and relegated to secondary 
levels the traditional multilateralism as defined and embodied in the GATT/WTO system.   
 
The efficacy of these extra-WTO or new economic integration Arrangement can easily be 
gauged from the fact that the issues like those that were being negotiated in the WPGR 
under the WTO/GATS, including the question of ESMs and where no solutions were in 
sight under the multilateral process have now been managed to the satisfaction of the 
concerned parties under these regional arrangements.  These difficult to manage issues 
have not only been coped through simple and voluntary instruments but the outcomes have 
now almost been standardized under these to new limited partnership
64
 frameworks  like 
deeper economic integration agreements or even simple BITs. This re-orientation of the 
market liberalization processes and opportunities to deal with the trading partners of choice 
has also eliminated the necessity to tolerate the menace associated with the concept of ‘free 
riders’ that was so common under the multilateral framework. The countries can now 
choose their preferred and major trading partners and also free themselves from the 
‘unwanted’ economic partners by employing selective policy instruments, unlike under the 
WTO, where all their policies had to be on a MFN basis.  
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President Vladimir Putin of Russia had recently made a very true to life statement about 
evolving pattern of interstate economic relations when he said that; “the new architecture of 
economic relations implies a principally new approach to the work of international 
organisations. It has become increasingly apparent of late that the existing organisations are 
not always up to the measure in regulating global international relations and the global 
market. Organisations originally designed with only a small number of active players in 
mind sometimes look archaic, undemocratic and unwieldy in today’s conditions. They are 
far from taking into consideration the balance of force that has emerged in the world 
today”. He also highlighted that the “rapid growth in regionalism has emerged for a reason: 
It is not coincidence that a parallel system of regional alliances and agreements is taking 
shape, essentially giving the global market a new structure. And the trade liberalisation 
process is now taking place more and more through these new agreements
65”.  
 
This phenomenon has produced an anomalous situation and created many complications 
with respect to the application of an ESM under the GATT paradigm by a country in a 
specific service sector or on its some particular mode of delivery where same market access 
commitments have been made by a country under the GATS and also under a PTA or a 
BIT.  In such circumstances the PTA or the BIT may confer benefits to certain countries 
that are party to the regional arrangement, which will, however, be at the cost of other 
member countries of the WTO.  This situation will always arise in cases where an 
importing country imposes an ESM that is modelled on GATT within the framework of 
GATS and not in the context of some other bilateral or broad regional economic integration 
or investment agreements to which it is a party.  
This divided application of the safeguards measure  will create treaty complications 
because of the simple fact that the “legal effect of an RTA is only to create new rights and 
obligations for the Members under the RTA regime, rather than changing the rights and 
obligations under the ‘covered agreements’ of the WTO because the WTO Agreement 
provides exclusive procedures to be followed in amending the obligations under the 
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‘covered agreements’, any amendment must follow such prescribed procedures before it 
could change the content of the ‘covered agreements’ under the WTO66”.  Even though the 
Panel and the Appellate Body have no power to change the rights and obligations of the 
Members, the Members themselves can always conclude other treaties (such as RTAs) to 
change their rights and obligations under the WTO. To give effect to these treaties, the 
panel and the Appellate Body shall have the power to apply them in WTO disputes as well. 
Otherwise, the power of Members to conclude other treaties would be diminished.  The 
decisions reached, if any, on the question of standalone ESMs under GATS will have 
influence on trade in services between the countries that are party to an RTA. The impact 
of the RTAs will apparently be felt in the Agreements in fairly diverse areas particularly 
those that relate to Investments,
67
 and also even in cases of other binding bilateral and 
multilateral agreements or contracts like those on Transfer of Technology.  
 
If the liberalization and binding market access commitments that have been made by the 
developing countries with respect to cross border trade in the services collectively at the 
Multilateral, Bilateral and Regional level are evaluated in an all-encompassing manner, 
then the assertions made by some analysts about the lack of progress in the overall 
liberalization in the services sector because of lack of presence of independent Emergency 
Safeguards provisions under the covering Agreement becomes seriously questionable.  The 
overall, market access commitments offered and made under different PTAs by the WTO 
Members tend to go significantly beyond offers that have been tabled in terms of improved 
and new bindings in context of trade liberalization under the GATS. “The proportion of 
new/improved commitments is also generally much greater in PTAs (compared to GATS 
offers) than in GATS offers (when compared to existing GATS commitments). There is, 
however, a great diversity in the offers made by the countries.  The countries that have 
signed a PTA with the United States, like, Bahrain, Central American countries, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Morocco, Oman, Peru, and Singapore had generally made 
mode 1/mode 3 bindings in their GATS market access schedules or had made offers in less 
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than half of all services sub-sectors, however, these countries have taken  giant leaps in the 
commitments made under the PTA in terms of sector coverage: on average, they have for 
both modes of supply in more than 80% of all services sub-sectors
68”. 
 
Those countries that have a comparatively higher number of service sectors already bound 
under their GATS schedules of market access commitments, have all offered much 
improved level of binding under the PTAs. For example: “Singapore, under mode 3, has 
gone much beyond its GATS offer by improving the level of commitment in 45 sub-sectors 
(30%) and making new commitments in 63 sub-sectors (41%). Similarly the Dominican 
Republic, which had mode 1 commitments in its GATS schedule/offer in 26% of sub-
sectors has increased this proportion to 89% in its PTA. Overall, while much diversity was 
found, the overview suggests that many PTAs go well beyond GATS offers in terms of 
sector coverage (i.e., commitments in new sub-sectors), but also levels of commitments, as 
suggested by the proportion of sub-sectors where commitments in GATS schedules/offers 
were improved.  Many PTAs have gone a long way to correct the generally low level of 
sector coverage in Members' existing GATS commitments and the modest quality of offers 
in the Doha Round. PTAs generally have provided for significant improvements over 
GATS commitments, sometimes even leading to real liberalization of the market. The 
advances in PTAs have in general well exceeded the offers made in the context of the Doha 
Round
69”. 
 
The member developing countries, in most cases, have already experimented with 
autonomous liberalization, as was done in the goods sector, prior to scheduling of the 
commitments; the autonomous liberalization has provided these countries with the 
experience of the possible impact of opening up of the service sector and may have helped 
them identify the limitations which may be incorporated in their respective schedules.    
This prior experience and assessment of liberalization theoretically should have eliminated 
the apprehensions with respect to making liberalizing commitments and need of ESMs 
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under the covering WTO Agreement.. The reluctance of the Members to offer bindings 
under the WTO suggests of profound and structural problems with the System, it is the 
frustrations or concerns with the WTO system and efforts to channel away from it is a fact 
that is reflected in the rapid growth of Bilateral, Plurilateral and Regional Free Trade and 
also much broader and deeper Economic Integration Agreements 
However, undertaking of binding commitments by individual countries on an MFN basis 
under the GATS is another issue; there is not only a definite lack of interest but also some 
pull back.   The liberalization and development of new regime governing trade in services   
are amply reflected in the fact that quite a number of Members have undertaken fairly 
sweeping market liberalization commitments even with respect to Mode 3 of delivery of 
services (investments) either under Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or strictly within 
the context of BITs. The same countries, however, appear not to be inclined to undertake 
any commitments or make any offers for binding in the MTNs that are under way in 
Geneva under the auspices of the WTO.  The commitments in WTO were even denied in 
the context of even those service sectors where these countries have already yielded their 
sovereignty to legislate under a BIT or the PTA.   
 
The expansive liberalization and in most cases legally enforceable commitments have 
voluntarily been undertaken by the developing countries in the context of the PTAs despite 
the fact that very few Regional Economic/Preferential Trade Agreements actually do not 
contain any provisions allowing for taking some sort of Emergency Safeguards Measures 
and, where these provisions do exist, their scope has been made time bound and confined 
mostly to an initial implementation or transition period. In a nutshell, “21st century 
regionalism is not primarily about preferential market access as was the case for 20th 
century regionalism; it is about disciplines that underpin the trade-investment-service 
nexus. This in practical terms means that 21st century regionalism is driven by a different 
set of political economy forces; the basic bargain is “foreign factories for domestic 
reforms” and not simply traditional “exchange of market access”70”.   
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A WTO Panel is subject to a fundamental limitation: “it may only examine a claim arising 
from an agreement covered by the “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU)
71” agreed in UR of MTNs and annexed to WTO, and not 
some other source such as a PTA. The DSU explicitly states that a dispute must be brought 
under (‘pursuant to’) the relevant provisions of a covered agreement. This requirement 
would clearly exclude any attempt by a PTA party to launch a WTO dispute based solely 
on a trade-in-services commitment in a PTA. In addition, however, a WTO Panel might be 
subject to other jurisdictional limitations relating to a PTA
72
.  These could include a 
provision in a PTA establishing precedence for its own dispute settlement rules, or an 
existing decision by a PTA tribunal that had already made a ruling on the matter, through a 
resjudicata effect. Similarly, a WTO Panel might decline jurisdiction where the two parties 
had made a bilateral agreement neither to appeal a PTA ruling nor invoke WTO dispute 
proceedings. Importantly, though, there would appear to be no other overall jurisdictional 
bar preventing a WTO Panel from hearing a defence, based on a provision in a PTA, to a 
claim arising under a WTO-covered agreement”73 as has been the practice under the GATT 
in cases of application of a measure involving the issue of PTA under the interpretation of 
Article XXIV of GATT. 
 
6.5 GATS: CONTEXT & STRUCTURAL ISSUES. 
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing World Trade Organisation created an organization 
possessing its own international legal personality’. In order to avoid any ambiguity about it, 
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the Agreement Establishing the WTO in its Article VIII
74
 specifies that the Organization 
“shall have legal personality”. The system is no longer based solely on the principles of a 
certain diplomacy which often led, under the GATT, to the adoption of negotiated solutions 
that reflected the relative power of the states involved in the negotiating process.  
 All of the WTO Agreements are adjoined under a ‘single undertaking’, and legal 
provisions emerging out of different WTO Agreements form constituting elements of a 
single system that is an integrated whole. A number of provisions recall this fact, in 
particular Article II: 2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO states that the multilateral 
trade agreements ‘are integral parts’ of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and are 
‘binding on all Members’. In the Indonesia – Autos dispute, the Panel which ruled in the 
first instance recalled that there was a presumption against conflict between the different 
provisions of the WTO treaty since they formed part of Agreements having different scopes 
of application or whose application took place in different circumstances. The Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), however, reaffirmed the Panel’s findings that Members must 
comply with all of the WTO provisions, which must be interpreted harmoniously and 
applied cumulatively and simultaneously. The ‘WTO treaty is thus a ‘single agreement’, 
which has established an ‘organized legal order75’. 
 More importantly, since both the GATT and the GATS are formally annexed to the same 
Treaty instrument, the ‘Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization
76’, pursuant to Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)
77, a GATT provision may, therefore, be considered as ‘context’ in interpreting a 
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GATS provision; as the context for the purpose of the treaty interpretation comprises any 
annex to the treaty’78.   
 
Structuring of GATS on the GATT model, making it part of the ‘single undertaking’ and 
both the Agreements being annexed to the same treaty has linked the two Agreements in 
more than one way. Any standalone ESMs that are developed under GATS, on the model 
or paradigm provide by the GATT will also be burdened with the history of the emergency 
safeguards provisions under GATT including different rulings of the Panels and AB 
decisions that have already been taken under the GATT in the area of emergency 
safeguards. It will be interesting to recall here that in case of trade in goods “every 
emergency safeguards measure that has been taken by any member country and that has 
been challenged under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO has been 
ruled either by the Panel or by the AB to be in violation of the WTO law”79 implying that 
any application of the safeguards measure scrutinized by the Dispute Settlement System 
has been found to have problems associated with basis of the application of the measure. 
Invariably the Panels in their rulings have not upheld the Emergency Safeguards action 
taken by the importing country. Therefore, even in an unlikely situation where emergency 
safeguard measures are developed under GATS that are modelled on the GATT there will 
always, in ultimate analysis, be issues associated with their imposition and it will be 
difficult for the country applying the measure to withstand any challenge under the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system. 
 
The GATS is a framework Agreement that also provides an umbrella for conduct of 
negotiations on sectoral, market liberalization Agreements
80
.  However, the Agreement 
does not provide adequate disciplines on most indirect forms of protectionist measures that 
are normally concealed in domestic regulations. The dynamics of the international 
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merchandise trade are totally different from those of cross border trade in services, 
especially considering the latter’s four modes of delivery.  Despite basic differences in the 
coverage and of the products, efforts were made to develop GATS in the shadow of the 
GATT and there were more than one reason for doing so.  
 
 For reasons of specificities of underlying trade in services GATS could not purely imitate 
GATT and the efforts to replicate were extremely ambitious and almost a misadventure. 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as it emerged out of UR of MTNs is, 
therefore, fairly “complicated and suffers from basic inherent incomprehensibilities81”. The 
complexities of the provisions have made the Agreement fairly ambiguous with uncertain 
implications particularly with respect to the practical application of different permitted 
measures under its existing provisions. There exist fair amount of unpredictability’s in the 
Agreement even including with respect to its scope and also in some important areas of the 
Agreement’s practical application.  
 
The Agreement is still fairly new and substantive jurisprudence has yet to develop on it. 
Despite its limited life, the agreement, however, has now been unfolding itself now for over 
a decade; through the continued negotiations on the built-in Agenda that emerged out of the 
UR left overs; in the context of new Round of the MTNs and; also through the dispute 
settlement process. These unfolding processes of the Agreement, instead of clarifying the 
issues, have added to the complexities and created real apprehensions amongst the 
domestic service sector regulators in the Member countries with respect to the reach and 
scope of practical implications of the Agreement.  In short in its ultimate effect the 
Agreement’s “reach (far) exceeds its grasp82”, as we have already seen this in the context of 
aspects of unpredictability attached to it.  
 
 The different rulings and decisions emerging out of the WTO’s dispute settlement system 
have underlined the fact that in the undertaking of the new market access commitments 
under the GATS there were always some risks that were associated with ultimate 
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unpredictably of these commitments. This unpredictability was particularly more 
pronounced with respect to the scope and coverage of the commitments which even at their 
best were mostly incomprehensible for the regulators to their definitive impact.   The 
Agreement contains provisions that are surrounded by the ambiguities; these ambiguous 
provisions are not merely with respect to peripheral requirements under the Agreement but 
also with respect to some central and critical constituting elements for any Agreement 
conceived under the GATT paradigm. These ambiguous provisions include like those 
relating to market access (Article XVI), national treatment (Article XVII) and even 
domestic regulations (Article VI).  There may be a number of other provisions in GATS 
that may eventually turn out to be similar and be also classified as ambiguous. However, 
most of the apprehensions about these other provisions, as yet, still remain to be tested and 
clarified to their ultimate effect or with respect to their final practical implications by 
passing through the scrutiny of the dispute settlement process.    
 In areas where the constraints imposed by the GATS on policy-makers and regulators are 
predictable; then it is the desirability of these constraints that has raised concerns with the 
domestic regulators, because the structure of the Agreement is already fairly intrusive in 
many aspects in to the trade policy areas that were previously considered exclusively 
within the purview of the domestic policy concerns.  The ambiguity of the provisions 
combined with lack of understanding and the ownership of the treaty provisions by the 
concerned political official’s has resulted in concerns being raised about the desirability 
and acceptability of these constraints.  
 
 Though efforts were made by the drafters of the Agreement to delineate the scope of the 
domestic regulatory provisions with respect to the market access and national treatment 
provisions, but the dividing line is not clear and the scope of applicable provisions of the 
Agreement remain misty and uncertain. The existing GATS rules and commitments create 
two distinct types of concerns and problems for the regulators that are domestically 
managing the compliance requirements with the obligations undertaken by a country in 
terms of the Agreement.   The market access and national treatment provisions overlap if 
these are analysed on a conceptual level, any discriminatory quotas, if levied by a Member 
country, will practically fall within the scope of each. Similarly in situations where 
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commitments made under the two provisions differ, it is almost impossible to identify the 
measures that can be precluded.  In short, the Agreement in its current structure raises two 
types of serious and at times unnerving concerns for regulators: intrusiveness and inherent 
incomprehensibility.  
 
The unpredictability of the market access commitments made by individual countries under 
the  GATS have glaringly been brought out by the dispute settlement process and are 
reflected in the simple fact that the three WTO Members that possessed the strongest 
capabilities in the form of institutional resources with respect to the research capacities, a 
large, experienced and knowledgeable pool of legal expertise along with a well-trained 
force of professional, well exposed and resourceful negotiators have each been a defendant 
in the three different services related cases that have been brought before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System. Each of these resourceful Members; the EU (in the bananas dispute), 
Canada (in the automotive parts dispute), the US (in the gambling dispute) was found to 
have misunderstood their own schedule of market access commitments that were drafted 
and agreed by them.  All the three individual Members were also not able to comprehend or 
predict properly the full scope and practical implications of the provisions contained in the 
services Agreement as these were subsequently defined and interpreted by the dispute 
settlement processes.   
 
 The  experiences that developed with respect to the Agreement in the context of the three 
cases involving the three major economies, that were also the primary movers and drafters 
of the  GATS,  interestingly suggests that the Agreement contains  uncertainities of which 
its primary promoters and architects were even unaware of, or could not comprehend at the 
time of drafting it.  In the US-Gambling case the core issue was considered to be that of 
applicable law and it was felt that the decision required was with respect to whether the US 
regulation of internet gambling or Antiguan regulation of internet gambling would prevail, 
in connection with cross-border internet-based provision of services from Antigua to the 
United States.   However,  the US- Gambling
83
 eventually through dispute settlement 
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process emerged to be a case regarding market access and the United States was found to 
have violated Article XVI of GATS, which was read to impose restrictions in this case that 
are similar to those under Article XI of GATT. The general exception provisions under 
Article XIV of GATS, which are very similar to Article XX of GATT, also came into play, 
creating uncertainty as to the scope of regulatory authority
84
.   
 
The issue relating to the co-application of the GATS and GATT arose for the first time in 
the context of the Canada—Periodicals85 case, both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
rejected the Canadian argument and determined that the obligations of both the Agreements 
(GATT and GATS) are cumulative and co-exist, rather than the obligations of one 
agreement (GATS) overriding those of the other (GATT).  This ruling had very important 
and far reaching implications. The ruling put in place the seeds for later determination that 
the GATT and the GATS are not mutually exclusive Agreements and that these may 
overlap. It was also ruled that “a measure primarily relating to trade in goods can be 
reviewed under, and found to be inconsistent with, the GATS”. Competition-type 
disciplines that related to the behaviour of a private actor contributed to forcing a Member 
to open up its market on telecommunications services Mexico – Telecoms.  Similarly a 
measure to prohibit (US- Gambling) the remote supply of gambling services was 
scrutinized and found to be inconsistent with that Member’s market access commitments. 
The US-Gambling has, in particular, contributed to bringing the GATS to the forefront and 
it sparked a “debate as to what should be the right balance between trade constraints, on 
one hand, and the autonomy of Members’ service regulators, on the other86”.   The 
Appellate Body has on occasions drawn on the provisions available under the GATT in 
order to interpret GATS requirements that have a similar wording and intended functions.  
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The Appellate Body has used the extensive jurisprudence on general exceptions under 
Article XX of GATT in order to shed light on the analogous provisions in Article XIV of 
the GATS. In US — Gambling, the Appellate Body applied interpretations developed under 
Article XX of GATT to GATS Article XIV on the basis that both provisions have the same 
objective and that each uses ‘similar language’87.   
 
 If domestic regulators are to support the political officials for making binding market 
access commitments, they need to be reassured that these commitments have predictable 
implications and strike the appropriate balance between market access and regulatory 
autonomy
88
 something with which the regulators are not confident at present. The focus on 
obtaining market-opening commitments in the post UR negotiations in the services sector 
has led to a relative neglect of the wider regulatory context. This avoidance of regulatory 
context has made the market opening goal even more difficult to attain within the 
GATS/WTO system.  Members instead of focussing on market liberalization needed to 
respond to ‘three substantive concerns that were holding the market liberalization, these 
concerns, as we have discussed, were; i) that GATS commitments deprive regulators of the 
freedom to regulate and the full implications of the commitments are very difficult to 
predict; ii) that the service sector regulatory institutions in a many countries are too weak to 
cope with liberalized markets; and iii) There is no provision for the regulatory cooperation 
that is necessary for successful liberalization
89’. 
 
In a fast globalizing and interdependent world the solution to issues being faced in the 
negotiations like those under the GATS also require harmonisation of domestic legislations 
and regulation.  However, the GATS did not sufficiently consider the issue of international 
cooperation and possible harmonization of international supervisory standards. The 
dynamics of global trade are changing fast and the boundaries between different areas of 
economic activities and international interactions are rapidly getting blurred. The different 
fields of interstate economic relations that were customarily considered as mutually 
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detached now interact at different places and also at times overlap. The traditional modes of 
classifying different areas into different fields of economic relationship are becoming 
difficult to segregate
90
.  Problems with conduct of smooth international economic relations 
are also highly interdependent in reality and cannot easily or neatly be allocated to one or 
the other institutional framework.  For “example, the depletion of oceans cannot be 
effectively addressed in the framework of FAO and the Law of the Sea Convention without 
addressing WTO related subsidies to the fishing industry. Health issues dealt with by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) cannot be dealt with without taking into account WTO 
law, in particular intellectual property rights
91”. Another example can be drawn from the 
concept of ‘collective preferences’ that if Emergency Safeguards having an undertone of 
collective preference or some other shade of social safeguards if agreed to be 
accommodated as additional safeguards under WTO system will cut across currently 
segregated institutions. 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The GATS as an international treaty is still fairly young and also in its early stages of 
development. Broad based Multilateral Framework Agreements like GATS can anyway not 
be concluded and finalized in a single push; such Agreements normally evolve gradually by 
moving one step at a time. The parties involved also appreciate and understand these facts 
and that  each step taken by them during the evolution of the Agreement may be incomplete 
but this incomplete step is very important in itself as this creates a requirement for further 
steps to be taken in proper course of things so as to make the Agreement complete and also 
keep it relevant.  That is exactly how the post-war simple Coal and Steel Community 
gradually, taking one incomplete step at a time, transformed itself into the EU as we see it 
today that is still in the evolution process. Similarly there was nothing extraordinary in the 
GATS becoming an agreed treaty while simultaneously still being a work in progress.   
Though there is tremendous strength in the argument to move forward and not only 
complete but also to expand the Agreement through successive rounds of MTNs. However, 
for the Agreement to remain relevant the pace of movement forward and its agenda of work 
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also have necessarily to match the evolving requirements of the participants and also the 
changes occurring in the international trading system.  
 
 All international Agreements between sovereign states involve some sort of a trade-off 
between flexibility, security and predictability.  Provisions for possible application of 
ESMs in the international trade agreements in practical terms are also simply a mechanism 
to provide an accepted instrument for creating flexibilities in the Agreement by providing a 
conditional escape clause.  In the specific context of developing ESMs under GATS, the 
challenge was to strike a balance between the cost of giving up some predictability by the 
members and the benefit of securing market access. The negotiating process in WPGR on 
the question of ESMs under GATS, which was a carryover and unfinished work from the 
UR of MTNs, was irrationally difficult as the Working Party was expected to deal with 
issues that were not only new but also little understood. The difficulties for the Members 
were compounded by the fact that there were no conventions or history of past practices of 
rulemaking in the areas under negotiations in the WPGR and also on the issues involved 
which the Working Party was trying to capture.   
 
 The negotiations on the question posed in Article X of GATS suffered from a combination 
of factors that included excessively limited scope of the model the negotiators chose to 
follow strictly.  The negotiators, particularly the demandeurs of the standalone ESMs under 
GATS, tried to draw too many inspirations from the existing incoherent and not so 
efficacious mechanism of the ESMs that was already available for merchandise trade under 
the GATT. The negotiating mandate that read as; “multilateral negotiations on the question 
of emergency safeguard measures based on the principle of non-discrimination
92”, 
therefore, after almost a decade of intensive negotiations still remains as an open issue, 
with little common understanding amongst the negotiators about the issues involved and 
even the future course of work to be adopted.   
 
However, the analyses undertaken earlier in the course of the thesis suggests that even if an 
agreement is reached, amongst the participants, on the feasibility of the ESMs and these are 
also found to be desirable under the GATS, the eventual shape that these ESMs may take, 
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following the incoherent model provided by the GATT will have some real associated 
concerns, and the mechanism developed will also have fairly broad implications attached to 
it.   The implications of such a major outcome in the interstate economic relations will be 
fairly far reaching to extant that these will be not easy to grasp. The ESMs, if agreed and 
developed under GATS that also have a ‘context’ with GATT and in the contemporary 
scenario of interstate economic relations that are dominated by BITs and other deeper and 
broader economic integration agreements, will not simply and solely fall under the domain 
of GATS or even the WTO, at times. The application of ESMs will in all probability also 
simultaneously fall under the domain of either some other source of international law or 
under the purview of some other Regional or Bilateral trade or broader economic treaty. 
This overlap will not only create further complications but also contradictions.  
 The argument asserting that the incorporation of specific emergency safeguards provisions 
under GATS that will make the liberalization in the service sector possible does not appear 
to be irrefutably convincing. The development of independent ESMs under GATS, 
modelled on GATT, as a precondition for liberalization, considering the weakness of the 
model and dynamics of the services sector also appear to be irrelevant. Meaningful 
liberalization of markets is only possible through a concerted policy approach. The 
availability of ESMs in the regime governing trade in services is unlikely to contribute 
much to liberalisation and even if these are introduced as independent provisions under 
GATS. As ESM provisions without ownership of and commitment to the liberalization 
process may well become captive of protectionist interests, both within the industry and 
politically and the provision may be used even to simply bypass the natural structural 
adjustment needs associated with any market opening process.  To be really meaningful the 
policy regime in individual Member countries governing international trade in the services 
requires political and intellectual ownership and policy needs to be subjected to public 
scrutiny with public officials enthusiastically trying to create understanding and 
appreciation of the merits of services liberalisation in the domestic market. This awareness 
has to be supported by independent public research and other reliable policy inputs on the 
costs and even benefits of protection.  
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In terms of the mandate given in GATS for the negotiations on ESM in the WPGR it was 
not necessarily required to follow the paradigm provided by the GATT. The direct and 
unqualified association of the mandate to the objectives and the paradigm provided by the 
Article XIX of the GATT and also the AoS was an unnecessarily narrow and rigid 
interpretation. This reading combined with the interpretation of the question raised in 
Article X of the GATS was confusing when this interpretation was strictly observed to 
mean not only an affirmative
 
answer to the question raised but also a positive tangible 
outcome that was tried to be created to the exclusion of discussions on other parallel issues 
within the WPGR. This was especially so when the negotiations also ignored the specifics 
of the cross border trade in services and its coverage under the GATS as differentiated from 
the regime provided for the trade in goods under GATT. The unreserved embedding of the 
negotiations in the WPGR in to the GATT paradigm limited the possible policy choices 
that could become available to the negotiators. If the Working Party had adopted an open 
approach to the negotiations the chances of creating innovative policy choices would have 
been comparatively much greater.  This narrow and restricted approach to devising of 
ESMs under GATS on a flawed model was destined to suffocate, mislead and eventually 
derail the discussions.  
Despite developing a strong linkage between the development of ESMs and market access, 
Members in accordance with Article XIX of GATS have also entered into consultations for 
progressive liberalization of the markets. They have formally adopted the 'Guidelines and 
Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services', and also held a Services Signalling 
Conference in July, 2008 that was followed by the Services Cluster meetings in 
March/April, 2009.  These concurrent activities of the members suggest that the Members 
have practically reconciled to the prevailing situation and decided to terminate or suspend 
or simply abandon the multilateral negotiations that were underway in the WPGR on the 
question of ESMs under GATS. However, this state of affairs still provides the room for 
use of scheduling flexibilities by the countries, and it appears that for all practical purposes 
they for present will have to be contented with sector specific solutions to the question of 
standalone or specific ESMs in the Services Agreement.  
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6.9 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Negotiations by definition are a dynamic process in which negotiating stances 
taken by the participants normally shift over time and are modified within the 
course of negotiations, especially by the principal parties, so as to enable the 
development of an agreement
93
. The irrational rigidities in the negotiating positions of a 
group of countries in any one area of negotiations are normally interpreted either as a 
tactical negotiating stance for extraction of some concessions in a remotely linked area or 
even in a totally detached subject but usually being negotiated under a common umbrella. 
This irrationality can, at times, also be interpreted to be a part of a larger grand design of 
some major parties to stall the negotiating process altogether by leading the process in to a 
blind alley with nowhere to go and even more difficult to come out of.  
 The approach adopted in the negotiations on ESMs under GATS by strictly restricting 
these solely to the GATT model by some major developing countries essentially reflected 
of multiple possible reasons or factors and from which different and interesting inferences 
can possibly be drawn.  This singular focus suggests of an unchecked and irrational 
familiarity bias towards GATT.  In addition, this conduct of discussions or negotiations in 
the WPGR in the area of Emergency Safeguards Measures, totally within the confines of 
the incoherent model provided by the GATT, despite the enormous differences in the 
dynamics of underlying sectors of trade in goods and services, may not simply be an 
innocent lack of understanding of issues involved. This rigid approach may very well have 
been a component of an overall premeditated strategic design; a deliberate policy choice 
and; a conscious decision to simply keep the negotiators entangled in a non-productive and 
impossible pursuit while simultaneously, for tactical reasons keep the activity of 
negotiations alive and an on-going process while patiently waiting for triggers when this 
process can eventually be led to derail itself.  
 
The negotiations on the question of ESMs in the WPGR if analysed in the context also 
appear to have been guided into getting stalled.  Though the ‘Members had to all extent 
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acknowledged the impossibility of conceiving GATS equivalent to relevant trade remedy 
GATT provisions
94’ but despite this acknowledgment restricting discussions for possible 
development of ESMs under the GATS solely to the GATT model led to the stalling of the 
negotiations. If seen from a different perspective this exercise can be attributed to the 
overall negotiating design of some member countries or coalitions to relegate the rule 
making issues carried forward from the Uruguay Round, ensure that these issues remain 
unresolved and also preserve them in the process so that these outstanding issues linger as a 
work in progress. Through these tactical endeavours and in a narrow perspective these 
countries desired, probably successfully, to eliminate any pressures on them with regards to 
undertaking of any new substantive market access liberalization obligations in the services 
sector under GATS on a multilateral basis. These countries were, particularly apprehensive 
and concerned with creating multilaterally agreed disciplines on and allowing investments 
on an MFN basis under mode 3 of the service delivery. 
 
 The advanced developing countries denied undertaking of market access commitments 
under the WTO without the development and incorporation of standalone ESMs under 
GATS and this concern stalled the negotiating process on the ESMs in the WPGR. 
Interestingly all this occurred concurrently and in parallel with undertaking of substantive 
liberalization of their services sector markets under other Arrangements by the same 
countries that had refused to make market access commitments without the ESM under 
GATS on the multilateral basis.  These countries unconditionally liberalized their service 
sectors in the context of other Regional Trade Agreements or more comprehensive and 
deeper Economic Integration Arrangements that had no specific provisions for application 
of the ESMs and in most cases these Regional Agreements also had no other provisions 
that could possibly substitute for ESMs as have been identified under GATS in Chapter 5 
of the thesis.  
 
 The proclaimed need of some Members of existence of ESMs in the services Agreement 
for undertaking market liberalization commitments appears purely to be a tactical 
negotiating stance. This fact is all the more clearly brought out when the market 
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liberalization by the ESM demanding individual countries undertaken in context of PTAs 
with countries of their choice is evaluated against their market access commitments under 
the GATS where any extended commitments will be on an MFN basis and infected with 
‘free riders’. Given Members’ scheduling flexibilities, leeway in granting trade-defensive 
subsidies, plus possible constraints under Preferential Trade Arrangement and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), it is difficult to imagine if there is “any role left for safeguards 
modelled on Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
95”.   
 
When the GATS was agreed in 1994, there was little understanding that the internet would 
provide such a wide avenue for the cross-border provision of services. The phenomenal 
development of the internet has redrawn the traditional concepts about the cross border 
trade in services and also of the regulatory jurisdictions.   The transformation brought about 
by the internet has also created related issues with respect to the extent to which the MFN 
and national treatment obligations apply across various modes of supply of services.  
Contemporary trade is radically more complex than it was in 1940s, the internet revolution 
has led to an internationalisation of supply chains, and that has now evolved to create a 
fairly strong ‘trade-investment-service nexus’.  This nexus is now at the heart much of 
present day international trade both in goods and also in services.  The countries that were 
demanding the standalone ESMs under the GATS with the declared intention to provide 
them with the comfort level to offer market access commitments under the GATS were 
strangely also the same advanced developing countries that were opposed to the conduct of 
negotiations to set up working groups on ‘investments’ and ‘competition’ in terms of 
Singapore Ministerial Meeting decision
96
 in 1996.   
 
In the broader sense these advanced developing countries were, through their efforts to stall 
the negotiations in the WPGR, trying to avoid undertaking of new binding market access 
commitments under the WTO’s Services Agreement. They linking of the liberalization in 
the context of the WTO to formulation of the ESMs under GATS deflected any pressures to 
do take market access commitments especially under mode 3, primarily because of nexus 
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of mode 3 of supply of services (commercial presence) and investments.  These countries 
by stalling the progress on GATS and thus mode 3 of supply of services (commercial 
presence) were simultaneously also avoiding any movement forward or conduct of 
negotiations in terms of the decision contained in Article 9 of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Trade Related Investment Measure (TRIMs). The TRIMs provides for consideration, at a 
later date, of whether the Agreement should be “complemented with provisions on 
investment and competition policy more broadly
97”.   
 
 It is worth noting here that the countries that were seeking ESMs as a prerequisite to 
making of market access commitments under GATS were also opposed to development of 
Multilateral Agreement on Investments
98
.  There are currently no all-encompassing 
multilaterally agreed treaty disciplines or universally accepted rules concerning foreign 
direct investments. All efforts made in the past to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment especially between 1995 and 1998 under the auspices of the OECD failed 
because of opposition of almost the same group of advanced developing countries. Most of 
the major developing countries are not interested, and averse, to development of any 
multilaterally binding disciplines on cross border Investments, especially under a unified 
framework that has a robust Dispute Settlement System and compensation mechanism. 
 
 These advanced developing countries
99
 as a group were also strongly opposed to the 
inclusion of services in the agenda for UR of MTNs for negotiating a multilateral 
agreement on cross border trade in services.   Any comprehensive Services Agreement, in 
the perception of these countries, anyway was not in their interest. These countries wanted 
to retain the total sovereignty over their investment policies and to be in a position to 
provide protection to their service industries and create the opportunity to grow and 
eventually become competitive.  Stalling of negotiations on the ESMs under GATS in the 
WPGR, virtually stifled the GATS, these countries in practical terms achieved in the 
WPGR what they could not stop at Punta Del Este.  
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 The WTO system, is anyway victim of a general paralysis primarily because of the 
cumbersome institutional machinery, refusal of the Institution to expand its existing limited 
agenda. In recent years, technology has transformed global markets. Investments, IPRs, 
environment, competition policy and Regional Economic Integration Agreements have 
become critical levers of economic statecraft. For any system to remain relevant, including 
WTO system, it is necessary that it should have the capacity to accommodate these diverse 
interests, be flexible and continuously adjust and extends its agenda to the needs of its 
membership in a dynamic and rapidly changing world economic order. The WTO is not 
geared to address any of these contemporary issues of interstate economic relations, the 
issues have to be addressed, the institutional rule making and governance vacuum cannot 
exist. The WTO needs major surgery in order to respond effectively to the new political 
realities in the international economic system.  
The WTO cannot be the old GATT and survive; members need to abandon the agenda and 
practices that are no longer relevant. “A ‘time out’ can be put to good use if it is used to 
seize the opportunity to search for a new culture and mandate for the WTO – a culture and 
a mandate that meets the needs of all the global players in this multi-polar and 
interdependent world. New models for global economic governance need to be forged
100”.   
Slowly over the last decade the romance for WTO as a platform for rulemaking for conduct  
of interstate trading and an instrument or one of the principal sites of global governance has 
fading fairly rapidly.  The world economic relationships and trading system has moved a 
long way away from where it was in late 1980s or mid-1990s. The WTO, despite attached 
issues and the stalling and failure of the negotiations, has not lost its relevance as given the 
transforming state of affairs and emergence of multi-polarity in the international economic 
relations. It will be really difficult, if not impossible, to forge a multilaterally agreed 
binding international treaty with such a broad coverage and a strong Dispute Settlement 
System. The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO is not only robust but is also 
functioning. The consumers in  major countries have serious concerns with lack of grasp of 
the system for ‘collective preference’, the WTO system has no option but to create some 
space to accommodate these ‘preferences’ or else we may see re-emergence of some form 
                                               
100
 Steger Debra P. The Culture of the WTO: Why it Needs to Change  Journal of International Economic Law 
10(3), 483–495 
CHAPTER 6 
 251 
of ‘grey area’ measures creeping in. Though the discussions “on the value of collective 
preferences in trade negotiations is still at an early stage, nevertheless, the questions raised 
by Pascal Lamy do relate to the existing debate on the role of the WTO in global 
governance … and the challenge, in his view, was to design an open trading system that 
everyone accepts and that safeguards legitimate social choices
101”. 
 The WTO is a strong and an effective organization that provides a fairly comprehensive 
foundation for conduct of basic rules-based trading system to the world, the rest is mostly 
incremental to it. If the negotiations under the aegis of WTO fail, “it will not be the end of 
the WTO. On the contrary, it might provide a useful ‘time out’ for the multilateral system 
to find its new stride. A related problem is that the mandate of the WTO is no longer 
clear
102” and in most aspects not relevant to the contemporary interstate trading relations. 
Negotiations may be dead but dispute settlement under WTO is very much alive and 
empowered. However, the trading nations of world becoming disenchanted by the WTO’s 
new rule making and trade liberalizing negotiating processes primarily because of the slow 
pace and rigid agenda. All this does not make the WTO irrelevant. 
  The Daniel Altman in his article that was carried by the Newsweek Magazine in its 
February 2010 edition had very appropriately brought out the contemporary realities of 
evolving interstate economic relations. He rightly acknowledged the fad towards formation 
of Trading Blocks, and also that eventually these blocks will have to look outside to enlarge 
their reach not only with respect to the raw materials but also with respect to the consumers 
and knowledge.  Though Altman has not said it, but his vision is reflected in the approach 
adopted by the current day two economic giants, namely the European Union and the 
NAFTA. Their evolutions in thought of the great economic powers and approach to issues 
are the practical or the real world manifestation of the path the countries will be adopting 
for their future. The two economies are now also linking up with other trading blocks and 
provide the role model for development for other countries. Daniel Altman’s article reads 
as “…the World Trade Organization has been trying to lower trade barriers  …  whether the 
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WTO succeeds or not will make little difference to most people; indeed, trade negotiations 
would actually go much further if the WTO simply closed down its talk’s altogether.     The 
majority of nations can simply leave the obstructionists behind and move forward with 
regional trading partners. Eventually, most of the world’s trading nations will arrange 
themselves into just a few big blocs… the blocs will focus on lowering trade barriers 
among their own members. Those that lower barriers faster will create more gains from 
trade, and their incomes will rise more quickly. … As a result, blocs that lower trade 
barriers will see incomes converge; their members will start to look more and more like 
each other. When that happens, the blocs will have to look outside their borders to other 
countries for cheap materials and labor. They’ll find those countries in the blocs where 
incomes didn’t rise as much. All of a sudden, the big blocs will have a very strong 
economic motive to start talking to each other. … This is how global trade talks will work 
in the future
103”.  
In the fast changing patterns of economic relationships amongst the countries, the 
traditional concept of application of Emergency Safeguards Measures that strictly follows 
the paradigm that is provided in the GATT now has minimal utility.  This lack of relevance 
of the concept is particular applicable to the cross border trade in services. The present-day 
economic and trade relations amongst countries do not work by the paradigms that were 
developed around early to mid of last century. The different factors including unbundling 
or slicing of productions, currency movements, social preferences, standards, low tariffs 
have all now dramatically shifted the working paradigms.  The traditional contingency 
protection instruments will continue to be used but with a declining utility. This is more 
relevant for ESMs as the WTO has a predictable Dispute Settlement System and 
conventionally an application of the measure has not been able to withstand legal scrutiny. 
These protection instruments, including the GATT concept of emergency safeguards has 
served its purposes well when it was relevant.  It is not to pronounce that they will be no 
application of emergency safeguards but these may have any reasons including prevalence 
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of some lobby
104
 on the public officials but most probably not for the valid reasons of 
temporary reprieve in the circumstance specified.   
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